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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR -DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiffs allege: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is and at all times herein mentioned a resident of Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
I '-• 
COMPLAINT 
Case No. 
Judge 
OtO^OlOV4* I'D 
2. Defendant RANDY HAUGEN, is and at all times herein mentioned was, a 
resident of Weber County, Utah. 
3. Defendant KIP CASHMORE, is and at all times herein mentioned was, a resident 
of Weber County, Utah. 
4. Defendant, QUICK CASH, LLC (hereinafter "QUICK CASH") is a limited 
liability company and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was doing business in the State of 
Utah, County of Weber. 
5. Defendant, USA CASH STORES (hereinafter "USA CASH") is a 
business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein 
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber. 
6. Defendant, USA CASH SERVICES (hereinafter "CASH SERVICES") is a 
business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein 
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber. 
7. Defendant, QC INSTANT CASH (hereinafter "QC") is a business organization 
whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was 
doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber. 
8. Defendant, RKT HOLDING (hereinafter "RKT") is a business organization 
whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was 
doing business in the State of Utah, County of Weber. 
9. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as 
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Does 1 through 50, Inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. 
Plaintiff will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. 
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each of the fictitiously named 
defendants is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and plaintiffs 
injuries. 
10. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein 
mentioned each of the defendants was the agent and the employee of their co-defendants, and in 
doing the things hereinafter alleged were acting within the course and scope of their authority as 
such agents, servants and employees, and with the permission and consent of their co-defendants. 
11. The unlawful conduct complained of herein occurred in Weber County, Utah as 
did the other acts complained herein. 
12. On or about January 1985, plaintiff and defendant Haugen began a business 
relationship involving an Amway distributorship which has since become very successful. 
Defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore were also involved with Amway as well as various 
other business partnerships and ventures. 
13. On or about the fall of 1994, Mark Archer, an individual in plaintiffs Amway 
organization, approached plaintiff with a business idea, which was to form a credit service 
company utilizing post dated checks. At the time it was a relatively new concept and Mr. Archer 
did not have the capital to fund its development. Plaintiff told Mr. Archer it was a great idea and 
proposed entering an equal three way partnership with plaintiff and defendant Haugen providing 
the funds and Mr. Archer as the manager. Defendant Haugen agreed to plaintiffs proposal and 
3 
the three way partnership entitled Quick Cash was formed. Additionally, plaintiff and Haugen 
decided to keep their involvement in Quick Cash private so that it would not be detrimental to 
their Amway business which they both agreed was their first priority. 
14. The next few years proved to be very successful for Quick Cash as it expanded to 
eight (8) stores in Utah, California and Nevada. However, in the fall of 1996, plaintiff and 
defendant Haugen suspected the third partner of embezzling. When confronted by them he left 
the partnership leaving plaintiff and Haugen to be equal partners. 
15. On or about July of 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant 
Cashmore knew a company that was interested in purchasing the Quick Cash stores. Plaintiff 
had no active interest at the time of selling his interest in the stores. Defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore met with plaintiff to discuss what the value of the stores. Defendant Cashmore 
received information from another cash store chain that the Quick Cash stores were valued at 
approximately 1.2 million dollars. Plaintiff informed defendant Haugen that he would not sell 
the stores for 1.2 million or even 1.5 million and defendant Haugen agreed. 
16. On or about September 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant 
Cashmore had an idea regarding the business and that plaintiff should hear defendant Cashmore 
out. The three men met wherein defendant Cashmore revealed his plan to develop the business 
to be large enough to take public with defendants Haugen, Cashmore and plaintiff as partners. 
Plaintiff and defendant Haugen agreed to keep the existing stores as a separate entity between 
them and start a new partnership with defendant Cashmore. Defendant Cashmore proposed a 
figure that would be needed to start up the new stores which plaintiff and Haugen agreed to. 
4 
Defendant Cashmore then approached them a second time and a third time, each time raising the 
amount of the capital needed from $100,000.00 to close to a half a million dollars. Plaintiff did 
not want to borrow close to a half a million dollars and suggested that he and Haugen put up their 
stores as their share of the venture and have defendant Cashmore put up the balance needed. 
Defendant Cashmore informed plaintiff he was against this suggestion and that he did not want 
the existing stores. Plaintiff believes and based on this belief alleges that it was at this time that 
defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore became at odds with plaintiff because plaintiff would 
not agree with them on a satisfactory purchase price. 
17. On or about October 1997, defendant Haugen gave defendant Cashmore full 
access to the stores so defendant Cashmore could obtain any information he needed to assist 
defendant Cashmore in expanding and taking public his own stores. Defendant Haugen never 
consulted plaintiff regarding allowing defendant Cashmore full access to the stores. 
Additionally, it was at this time that defendant Haugen began to pressure plaintiff into selling 
their stores. Defendant Haugen told plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores as it was 
detrimental to his Amway business. Additionally, defendant Haugen also told plaintiff that 
defendant Cashmore had made an offer of $250,000.00 on their Sacramento store. A week later, 
Haugen told plaintiff that Cashmore had offered $750,000.00 on all the stores including the 
Sacramento store and that plaintiff had to sell and so that defendant Haugen could get out of the 
check cashing business . Plaintiff believes and based on his belief alleges that he accepted the 
offer of $750,000.00 because had he not defendant Cashmore would have opened additional 
stores on his own without justly compensating plaintiff. Defendant Haugen specifically told 
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plaintiff that he wanted out of the business so that he could concentrate on Amway. Plaintiff and 
Haugen agreed to sell and end their partnership after pressure from defendant Haugen because 
defendant Haugen wanted out of the check cashing business. 
18. At different times throughout 1998, plaintiff asked defendant Haugen if he was in 
partnership with defendant Cashmore in the business plaintiff and Haugen owned. Each time 
defendant Haugen denied that he was still a partner in the business and told plaintiff that it was 
not good for their Amway business to let anyone know about plaintiffs or Cashmore's check 
cashing business. 
19. On or about May 1998, plaintiff, through the discovery of various documents, 
discovered that defendant Haugen never sold his part of the partnership to defendant Cashmore 
but instead continued the partnership with Cashmore instead of plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed 
and believes and based on this belief alleges that if not for the representations of defendants 
Haugen and Cashmore made to him he would not have sold his share of the partnership. 
Additionally, because of the representations of defendants and each of them, plaintiff was forced 
to sell at a price lower than the true value of the business and was forced to expend additional 
capital to restart his own business. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Misrepresentation of Fact) 
(Against All Defendants) 
20. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 19 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
21. The above-stated representations were made to plaintiff to induce him to sell his 
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share of his partnership so that defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore could be partners in 
the same business. 
22. Defendant Haugen represented to plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores'as it 
was detrimental to his Amway business and that defendant Cashmore offered $750,000.00 to 
purchase the business. This fact was a primary inducement in plaintiffs decision to sell his share 
of the partnership and venture out on his own. 
23. The representations made by representatives of defendants were in fact false. The 
true facts were that because of the existing business relationship between defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore, Haugen wanted Cashmore to replace plaintiff as his partner. This was never revealed 
to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff was never informed of the fact that defendant Haugen never 
intended to receive any monies from the sale but rather intended to keep the money in the 
business. In addition to QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company, defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore branched out from Quick Cash, LLC and formed USA Cash Stores and USA Cash 
Services. Had plaintiff been aware of the true facts, plaintiff would not have agreed to sell his 
portion of the partnership. 
24. When defendants made these representations, they knew them to be false and 
made these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud plaintiff and to induce 
plaintiff to act in reliance on these representation in the manner hereafter alleged, or the with 
expectation that plaintiff would so act. 
25. Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by defendants and at the 
time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants' 
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representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was 
induced to and did sell his portion of the partnership. Had plaintiff known the actual facts, he 
would not have taken such action. Plaintiffs reliance on defendant's representations was 
justified because plaintiff had no reason to believe defendants did not represent the truth of 
various facts relating to plaintiffs sale of his portion of the partnership. 
26. As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged, 
plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and has been damaged in an amount 
according to proof at time of trial. 
27. The aforementioned conduct of defendants was an intentional misrepresentation, 
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of 
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing 
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in 
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Misrepresentation of Fact) 
(Against All Defendants) 
28. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 27 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
29. When defendants made these representations, they had no reasonable ground for 
believing them to be true. 
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30. Defendants made these representations with the intention of inducing plaintiff to 
act in reliance on these representations in the manner herein alleged, or with the expectation that 
plaintiff would so act. 
31. As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged, 
plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and by reason of which plaintiff has 
been damaged in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 
32. The aforementioned conduct of defendants was a negligent misrepresentation, 
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of 
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing 
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in 
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Relief Based on Rescission) 
(Against All Defendants) 
33. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 32 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
34. Plaintiff, at the time the aforementioned representations were made by defendants 
and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants' 
representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was 
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induced to and did enter into the contract with defendant Cashmore to sell his share of the 
business. 
35. Plaintiff has and will suffer substantial harm and injury under the contract if it is 
not rescinded in that as a result of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has and will be deprived of his 
share and income derived from the aforementioned partnership. 
36. Plaintiff intends service of the summons and complaint in this action to serve as 
notice of rescission of the contract, and hereby offers to restore all consideration furnished by 
defendant Cashmore under the contract, on condition that defendants restore to him the 
consideration furnished by plaintiff in an amount to be proven at time of trial. 
37. As a result of entering into the contract with defendant, plaintiff has incurred 
expenses in addition to those alleged above (and will continue to incur them in an amount 
unknown to him at this time) in an amount to be proven at time of trial. Plaintiff prays leave of 
this court to amend this complaint to insert the true amount of those expenses when they are 
ascertained. 
38. In performing the acts herein alleged, defendants intentionally misrepresented to 
plaintiff material facts known to defendants, as stated above with the intention on the part of 
defendants of depriving plaintiff of his money and property, thereby justifying an award of 
punitive damages against the defendants. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Interference With Business Relations) 
(Against All Defendants) 
39. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 38 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
40. On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written 
partnership agreement at Ogden, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check 
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash, LLC, with its principal place of business at 
Ogden, Utah. 
41. Defendant Cashmore knew of the above described relationship existing plaintiff 
and defendant Haugen. As stated above, defendants and plaintiff all have a business relationship 
involving Amway. Defendant Haugen falsely represented to plaintiff that it was in the best 
interests of their Amway relationship for them to sell their Quick Cash business to defendant 
Cashmore, all with the intent to harm plaintiff financially and to induce plaintiff to sell his share 
of the Quick Cash business. 
42. The aforementioned acts of defendants, and each of them, were willful and 
fraudulent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages., 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Accounting) 
(Against All Defendants) 
43. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 42 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
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44. On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written 
partnership agreement at Odgen, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check 
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash, LLC, with its principal place of business at -
Ogden, Utah. 
45. Thereafter and until about December, 1997, the partnership conducted the 
aforementioned business, acquired assets, and incurred liabilities resulting in an overall profit. 
As stated above, plaintiff was fraudulently induced into entering a purchase/sale agreement with 
the defendants thereby losing his share of the partnership. The amount of assets and liabilities is 
unknown to plaintiff and cannot be ascertained without an accounting of the profits and losses 
that occurred during the period of time defendants Haugen and Cashmore were in possession of 
Quick Cash. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For general and special damages according to proof at time of trial; 
2. For incidental and consequential damages according to proof at time of trial; 
3. For punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants; 
4. For prejudgment interest at the highest possible rate from the earliest possible 
date; 
5. For an accounting of the profits and losses; 
6. For a rescission of the contract; 
7. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees herein incurred; and 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
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DATED this " ^ > day of January, 2000. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN 
By. 
-Den^r'tTSnuffer, Jr. 
Attorney fWlPWintiff 
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Sch 
$120 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
$120 
Sch 
$120 
$120 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
Sch 
$0 
$120 
$120 
$80 
$120 
$80 
$120 
Q 
Q 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Q 
Q 
• 
• X 
'• 
• Q 
• 
• 
• . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Q 
• 
• 
Case Type 
APPEALS 
Administrative Agency Review 
Small Claims Trial de Novo 
- f l F N F R A r rTVTT 
Attorney Discipline 
Civil Rights 
Condemnation 
Contract 
Debt Collection 
Expungement (Fee is $0 under 
circumstances of §77-18-10(2)) 
Forcible Entry and Detainer 
Forfeiture of Property 
Interpleader 
Lien/Mortgage Foreclosure 
Malpractice 
Miscellaneous Civil 
Extraordinary Relief 
Personal Injury 
Post Conviction Relief: Capital 
Post Conviction Relief: Non-
capital 
Property Damage 
Property/Quiet Title 
Sexual Harassment 
Small Claims 
Tax 
Water Rights 
Wrongful Death 
Wrongful Termination 
- DOMESTIC 
Cohabitant Abuse 
Common Law Marriage 
Custody/Visitation/Support 
Divorce/Annulment 
Check if child support, custody or 
visitation will be part of decree 
Paternity 
Separate Maintenance 
Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) 
Fee 
$120 
$25 
$40 
$30 
$25 
$0 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$120 
$0 
$25 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$0 
$25 
$0 
$25 
$25 
Q 
• 
Q 
• 
Q 
Q 
• 
• 
• Q 
• 
Q 
Q 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Q 
• 
• 
Q 
• 
Q 
• 
• 
• 
Case Type 
Uniform Interstate Family 
Support Act (UIFSA) 
— JUDGMENTS 
Abstract of Foreign Judgment or 
Decree 
Abstract of Judgment or Order of 
Utah Court or Agency 
Abstract of Judgment or Order of 
Utah State Tax Commission 
Judgment by Confession 
Renew Judgment 
PROBATE 
Adoption 
Conservatorship 
Estate Personal Rep - Formal 
Estate Personal Rep - Informal 
Guardianship 
Involuntary Commitment 
Minor's Settlement 
Name Change 
Supervised Administration 
Trusts 
Unspecified Probaate 
<sPFrTAT MATTFR<\ O r E U l r t L . IVlrY JL 1 J3JtvO 
Administrative Search Warrant 
Arbitration Award 
Criminal Investigation Search 
Warrant 
Deposit of Will 
Determination of Competency in 
Criminal Case 
Extradition 
Foreign Probate or Child 
Custody Document 
Hospital Lien 
Judicial Approval of Document 
not part of a Pending Case 
Notice of deposition in out-of-
state case 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ; 
INCLUSIVE, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) MOTION FOR ADMISSION OF ETAN 
) EMANUEL ROSEN PRO HAC VICE 
) Case No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr., a resident attorney, moves this court to admit Etan Emanuel Rosen 
pro hac vice for the limited purpose of this case. 
This motion is made for the reasons that: 
1. I am a resident practicing attorney in the State of Utah, and an active member of 
the Utah State Bar Association in good standing. 
2. I have examined the Affidavit of Etan Emanuel Rosen filed with this motion. I 
find Mr. Rosen to be a reputable attorney and recommend his admission to practice before this 
court during pendency of this matter. 
3. I hereby agree to do the following: 
A. Serve as local counsel for this case; 
B. Readily communicate with opposing counsel and the court regarding the 
conduct of this case; 
C. Accept papers when served; and 
D. Recognize my responsibility and full authority to act for and on behalf of 
the client in all case-related proceedings, including hearings, pretrial conferences, and trials, 
should Mr. Rosen fail to respond to any order of this court. 
DATED this2( day of February, 2001. 
NELSpN), SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
DenverC^Smjffer, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
S \Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Motion 
? 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916)369-9750 
t Served ?y<-f C^^Ju I^AJL _ 
] Date/Time •. 3 -S~-0 I 
.am, pm 
Server. 
I W IUJ Tit's . Process Server 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: USA Cash Services 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this?_ day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
DenVgfC. Snuffett Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
USA Cash Services 
c/o Kip Cashmore 
Registered Agent 
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
S:\Pipkin\Summons-USAServices 
1 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS 
Countv of Salt Lake j 
RETURN 
1, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
say : 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed Summons and Comp1 ai nt, on 
the 23rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon USA Cash 
Services the said defendant on the 3_t_h day of March, 2001, by then 
and there delivering and leaving with Kip Cashmore the Registered 
Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age and 
discretion there residing and served at the place of abode of said 
defendant at 2522 Bonnev i 1 1 e Terr. Dr.. Qgden, in the countv of 
Weber, State of Utah, a 
Comp1 a int. 
true copy of the attached Summons and 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official title. 
Dated at Midvaie, County of Salt L/arFT^ , State of Utah, the 5th day 
of March, 2001. 
<iUJ_ A- (MuJ^ 
Process Server 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5 ~~ day of * 1 ( V I M L J 
2001 . 
* ,«<*?^;>v Notary Public"*" " 1 
j ffi^£§\ LAUREL D. ALLIED , 
74? 7 Sou*;:-.) Ens' 
« w ,,-,---,» -y kUy <>, 2001 
3 ^ ; ^ " state of Utah 
^ ' l B_ Wu^L 
N o t a r y P u b 1 i c 
^_JL0JL 
Case it: 01090107^ 
Matter#: 
I r i p s @ M i i e s 
_J>. 
iervic e 
Mi i eage 
Other 
$ 6.00 
TOTAL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
*•<& 
I J * * 
r> 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ETAN 
EMANUEL ROSEN 
Case No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
COUNTY OF ^StUttMth 
ss. 
) 
ETAN EMANUEL ROSEN, having been first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am a member of the firm BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, 3230 Ramos Circle, 
Sacramento, CA 95827 (Telephone: 916-369-9750). 
2. I received a J.D. from 
3. I am an active member in good standing of the State Bar Associations of 
California. 
4. I have not been denied admission in the courts of any state or to any federal court. 
5. I am familiar with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct and will abide by and 
comply with them. 
6. The resident attorney with whom I am associated for the purposes of this case is 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. of the law firm of Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C., 10885 South 
State Street, Sandy, Utah. 84070.84111. 
DATED this f ± _ day of February, 2001. \ 
Etan Emanuel Rosen 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ZZjday of February, 2001. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
lA_J 
My Commission Expires: 
S:\Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Affidavit 
NOT
Residing at: .:i33&^^>c-^u> £<u_<rJ<~ 
i , , , . . . . ,
 | % 
^ S S S ^ K DONNA JEAN BROWN j> 
Comm. # 1 2 7 4 1 2 8 .2 
NOTARY PUBLIC-CAUF0BN1A (/J (0 
rt vSaSSSrv Sacramento County *" 
T ^ ^ S a p E ^ My Comrrj. Expires Aug. 17,2004 7* 
' • r . , . , . , I 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ] 
INCLUSIVE, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) SUMMONS 
) Case No. 010901074 
I Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: USA Cash Stores 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiff's attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this ^ i day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
DenvepC: S nuf fer J Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
USA Cash Stores 
c/o Kip Cashmore 
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
S:\Pipkin\Summons-USACash 
2 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS 
County of Sait Lake } 
RETURN 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
say : 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
i received the within and hereto annexed S ummon s and C omp1 a int, on 
the 23rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon USA Cash 
Stores the said defendant on the 5th day of March, 2001. by then 
Kip Cashmore the REgi stereo 
and 
id 
and there delivering and leaving with 
Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age 
tion there residing and served at the place of abode of s 
" " "'" " Dr., ORden, in the county of 
discrete ~. ~ .
 0 ._ 
defendant at 2522 Bonneville Terr. 
Weber , State of Utah, a true copy of 
Complaint. 
the attached Summons and 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official titie. 
Dated at Midvale, County of Sait La^re ,JState of Utah, the 51 h day 
of March, 2001. 
•l^j_Aaskju 
P r o c e s s S e r v e r 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s 5" day of 
2001 . 
i /tfZ^h LAUREL CAUSED
 s 
! Mcrar/ Public i 
--:.\.'« w \ , ^ Wv Ccr.rn.ss.on E>p,M't, jj 
, v ^ - r ^ ' ' May o. 2001 
S - - ^ " ^ state of Utah } 
" * * MM u n aaera c a rjir.-ji «••* wcwm -~nm -„.,
 MmlMm. 
Case \i: 01 090!07^ 
Matter^: 
Notarv Pubi ic 
Trips (3 Mi I es 
._£ 6_..,0_0 S e r v i c e 
_£ M i i e a g e 
Other 
6.00 
TOTAi 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
i Served _ j i ^? ^ . , i k . , 
j Date/Time « 4 ^ ^ . a m , p n i 
Server^  J ^ 4 
™ 3 - Process Server 
N THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: RKT Holding Company 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED th is lL day of February, 2001. 
NELSON; SNfUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Deaver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorneys foiiPlaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
RKT Holding Company 
c/o Kip Cashmore 
Registered Agent 
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr. 
Ogden, UT 84403 
S:\Pipkin\Summons-RKT 
2 
STAVE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
RETURN 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
s a y : 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 2! years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed Summons and Complaint, on 
the 2 3rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon R_K_7 
Ho 1ding Company the said defendant on the 5t h day of March, 200 1. 
by then and there delivering and leaving with Kip Cashmere the 
REgistered Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing and served at the place of abode ox 
said d e f e ndant at 2522 Bonnev ij_l e Terr. Dr. , O g d e n , in th e count y 
of Weber , State of Utah, a true copy of the attached Summons and. 
Complain t. 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
add i ng t h e r et o my name and official title. 
Dated at M i d v a l e , County of Salt Lake,] State of Utah, the 5th day 
of March, 2001. / J 
) Process Server 
me this K ^ day of M ^i-L.> , 
N o t a r y P u b 1 i c 
$ 6.00 Servi c e 
Wiles $ Mi i eage 
Other 
Subscribed and sworn to before 
2001 . 
Case it: 0 10901074 
Mat teril: 
Trips ($ 
$ 6.00 
= = = = --- = - = — TOTAL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, \ 
9 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KJP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ; 
INCLUSIVE, ; 
Defendants. ) 
) SUMMONS 
) Case No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Quick Cash, LLC 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
\ Served 
1 Date/Time 3- 2 o I 
| Server.^ M^ sni, pm 
T m
 Process Ssn/ar 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this lk_ day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
©enVeTc.s|ilffe^Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
Quick Cash LLC 
c/o Travis L. Bowen, P.C. 
Registered Agent 
175 South West Temple, Suite 710 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637 
S.\Pipkin\Summons-QuickCash 
2 
STATE OF I TAH 
:SS 
Count) ol Salt Lake ) 
RETLR.N 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first dul> sworn upon oath, depose and 
say : 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at tht 
time of service herein, and not part) to or interested in the 
within titied action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed Summons and complaint, on 
the 2 3rd day ot February, 2001, ana served the same upon Qui CK 
Cash. LLC the said defendant on the 2_n_d da> of Mareh. 2001, by then 
and there delivering and leaving with Travis L. Bowen the 
Registered Agent of said defendant, being a person of suitable age 
and discretion there residing and served at the place of business 
of said defendant at 173 So. West TtrinpU, #7 10, Salt Lakt City, i n 
the county of Salt Lake, State of Utah, a true copy of the attached 
Summons and Complaint. 
1 do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official title. 
Dated at Midvale, Count) of Salt La^t, jstate of Utah, the k th day 
of March, 2001. 
'KX*cX__ 
Process Server 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this H ~- dav of ' ' Uv^ v^ tvJ 
2001 . 
s'ZF' 
-'iX hj'ary Public LAURtLD.ALL.1E J 
J \ A *Df *f^ ' '.* / f 'v C O P ; : . . , ^ i r vo ^ 
W~ ^7/ KU) C 20'J1 
5 " - — ; > ' S ta te of U»-V. 
N c t a r > P u b l i c 
I 
ease it: 010^01070 
Mattertt: 
.1 b^JX; Service 
_ Trips (3 Miles Mil *--dge 
Other 
$ 6.00 
- = :=-- = = -- = - TOTAL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) -jf* 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916)369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiffs, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ) 
INCLUSIVE, ) 
Defendants. ) 
) SUMMONS 
1 Case No. 010901074 
1 Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Randy Haugen 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
\ Date/Time A^ d-'^l—am, pm 
I Server-, trv^-c-^v-
5 Title . Process Sen/er 
1IWUWWIM 'I. I I'M 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this J^l day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
JDenver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Attorneys Ur Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
Randy Haugen 
S.\Pipkin\Summons-Haugen 
2 
STATE OF UTAH 
:SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
RETURN 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
say: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed S ummons and Comp1 a i n t, on 
fhe 2 3rd day of February, 2001. and served the same upon Randy 
Haugen the said defendant on the 2jid day of March, 2001. by then 
and there delivering and leaving with ValovIe Haugen the spouse of 
said defendant, being a person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing and served at the place of abode of said defendant at 2kSS 
Bonneville Terrace Dr., Ogden. in the county of Weber, State of 
Utah, a true copy of the attached S ummons a nd Comp1 a int. 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official title. 
Dated at Midvale, County of Salt Lj&e) State of Utah, the 4th day 
of March, 200 1. 
Jl fl (at-
Process Server 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this *\ day of PA l**w\J 
200
 L — _ 
* ^'"^-^ Notary Public 
j /tf£*£i?\ LAURELD.ALL3E0
 t 
fv!v Cop'.miiiv.or. E x o : ' ^ 
May 6 H'OOl 
State of u»..-nh 
Notary Public 
S 6.00 
Case #: 01090 1 074 
Matter*: 
i Trips @ .40 Miles $ 40.00 
S e r vice 
Mi 1eage 
Other 
$ 46.00 
====zr=_=== TOTAL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
i Served 
Date/Time 
_ ILL 
\'L^ ?on» 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
p - 5~ -O I gm, pm 
Server. 
Title Process Server 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
Case No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: Kip Cashmore 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this ^ _ day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Denver G. Snuffer, Jr. 
U ^ j 
Attorneys-'for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
Kip Cashmore 
2522 Bonneville Terr. Dr. 
Osden, UT 84403 
S \Pipkin\Summons-Kip 
1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:SS 
Countv of Salt Lake ) 
RETURN 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
say: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
1 received the within and hereto annexed S urnmo n s and C onip 1 a i n t , on 
the 23rd day of February , 2001, and served the same upon Kip 
Cashmor e the said defendant on the 31. h (Jay of March, 2001, by then 
and there delivering and leaving with Kip Cashmore the person of 
said defendant, being a person of suitable age and discretion there 
residing and served at the place of abode of said defendant at 2322 
Bonneville Terr. Dr., O^den , in t h e c o u n t y of Weber., State of Ufa h . 
a true copy of the attached Summons and Cornp la i n t . 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official title. 
Dafed at Midvaie, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, the 3th day 
of March, 2001. / 
) Process Server 
tuL 
Subscribed and sworn to before nit- this -5 — ' day of 1*1 vs^\X\^J 
2001 . 
~S*Z?zZ " t o ^ Public*"" ~] >4 . { f\ /Uii_t_.l 
i / ^ £ 3 § \ LAUREL D.ALLflED , J ^ g ^ L J L Ht<>^\ 
1
 iii 'irt:£ Q :4'7 s ° l - r - • ° ^ - * N o t a r y P u b l i c 
\ V * V ^ 4 - | ^ V ^ / MvComin;ss.on6xp:«?s 
. ^Tr^-V May 6. 2001 J^ 2^~* State o\ Utah i 
— ^.mmmmmam « _ .^ ^ 6 . 00 Se r v i c e 
C a s e # : 0 1 090 1 07M. 
M a t t e r * : 
2 Trips @ kQ Miles $120.00 Mileage 
Other 
$126.00 
= = = = = = = — = = TOTAL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN
 t ^ ^
 r0 
A Professional Law Corporation $n" 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916)369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ; 
INCLUSIVE, ] 
Defendants. ) 
) SUMMONS 
1 Case No. 010901074 
1 Judge Roger S. Dutson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT: QC Instant Cash 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in writing to the attached 
Complaint with the Clerk of the above-entitled Court at Second District Court, Weber County, 
2525 Grant Avenue, Ogden, UT 84401, and to serve upon or mail to Plaintiffs attorney, Denver 
C. Snuffer, Jr., Nelson, Snuffer & Dahle, 10885 South State Street, Sandy, UT 84070 a copy of 
said Answer within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you. 
If you fail so to do, judgment by default will be taken against you for the relief demanded 
in said Complaint, which has been filed with the Clerk of said Court, a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this^L day of February, 2001. 
NELSON, SUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
Denver C. f njiiffer, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant at: 
QC Instant Cash, LLC 
c/o Travis L. Bowen, P.C. 
Registered Agent 
175 South West Temple, Suite 710 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0637 
S:\Pipkin\Summons-QC 
2 
STATE OF UTAH 
SS 
County of Salt Lake ) 
RETURN 
I, RICHARD B. ALLRED, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and 
say: 
I am a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
time of service herein, and not party to or interested in the 
within titled action. 
t received the within and hereto annexed Summons and Complaint, on 
the 23rd day of February, 2001, and served the same upon QC Instant 
Ca,sji the said defendant on the 2nd day of March, 2001, by then and 
there delivering and leaving with Travis L. Bower, the Res i s ter ed 
Agent of said defendant. being a person of suitable age: and 
discretion there residing and served at the place of b u s i n es s of 
said defendant at 175 So, West Temple, #710, Salt lake City , i n t h e 
county of Salt Lake, State of Utah, a true copy of the attached 
Summons and Complaint. 
I do further certify and return that at the time of said service 
upon said person, I endorsed upon said copy so served, the date, 
adding thereto my name and official title. 
Dated at Midvale, County of Salt L 
of Majrch., 2001 . 
State of Utah, the ^th day 
Process S e rv e r 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this M - Jday of pi *SA.\-4>~> 
2001 . 
Notary Pubiic 
LAURtLD.ALinEL 
May 6. 2001 
State of Utah 
Notary Public 
Case #: 0 1090107^ 
Matters: 
2 T r i p s @ ._2 M l i e s 
6.00 
6.00 
5er v ice 
Mi ieage 
$ 12.00 
TOTAL 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANTS' ANSWER 
1 (Jury Demand) 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Defendants Randy.JHaugen, Kip_Cashmoxe, Quick Cash, LLC, USA^ Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby answer 
Plaintiffs complaint and demand trial by jury. 
»em'eo'u'i&' 
30 2 56 PH '01 
1. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 
the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint and, 
therefore, deny paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
2. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
3. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
4. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
5. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
6. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
7. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
8. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
9. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
10. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
11. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
12. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
13. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 
the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint and, 
therefore, deny each and every averment contained therein, except Defendants admit that Mr. 
Haugen was involved in the establishment of Quick Cash. 
14. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
15. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, but admit that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore met with Plaintiff to discuss the stores 
in 1997. 
16. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
17. Defendants deny in part the averments contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, but admit that when Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase seven of the stores, 
Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen agreed to sell their interests in their partnership. 
18. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, except admit that Mr. Haugen did tell the Plaintiff truthfully that he was not a partner 
with Mr. Cashmore in the check cashing business. 
19. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
20. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above. 
21. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
22. Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase the business 
and that Mr. Haugen told Plaintiff he wanted to sell the business. Defendants deny each and 
every other averment contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
23. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
24. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
25. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
26. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
27. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
28. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
30. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
31. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
32. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
33. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
34. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
35. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
36. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
37. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
38. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
39. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 above. 
40. Defendants admit that Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen entered into a business 
arrangement in 1994 concerning check cashing services, but deny each and every other averment 
contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
41. Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore knew that there was an existing business 
relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen and that Mr. Cashmore, Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff 
did have a business relationship involving Amway, but deny each and every other averment 
contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
42. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
M. Defendants itptat and incotpoiate htitin by ttfeitnct each and tvtr/ avtra\tnt, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 above. 
44. Defendants admit that Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff entered into a business 
relationship in 1994 for the purpose of carrying on a check cashing business, but deny each and 
every other averment contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
45. Defendants admit that the check cashing business was carried on until about 
December 1997, but deny each and every other averment contained in paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
46. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
47. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
48. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the 
doctrine of waiver. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
49. Plaintiff is estopped by reasons of his own actions in selling the business with the 
advice and assistance of counsel and Plaintiff, therefore, is barred from pursuing the claims 
contained in the Complaint. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
50. Any damages caused to Plaintiff as a result of any of the claims contained in 
Plaintiffs Complaint, which damages Defendants specifically deny occurred, were incurred as a 
result of Plaintiffs own fault which is greater than or equal to the fault of the Defendants, which 
fault these Defendants specifically deny exists, and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering 
any damages from the Defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
51. Plaintiffs Complaint and each and every claim from relief contained therein is 
barred by the doctrine of laches. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for relief as follows: 
.1 . That Plaintiff take nothing by his action; 
2. That Defendants be awarded all costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable 
attorneys fees; 
3. For such further and other relief as the Court deems proper. 
DATED: March 29, 2001. 
ANDERSON A KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karfenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 29th 
day of March, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Answer to be served, via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
"TM/'aAW/ts&S ffrvie^^^ 
LAW OFFICES 
;uRl 
A N D E R S O N &Fl^$k]NBERG 
A PHOFESsJWt CO&ORAnON 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOn A. CALL 
JOHN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. TILY 
MM 30 2*ffl'W 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
March 29, 2001 
Via U.S. Mail 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al. 
Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of Defendants' Answer (Jury 
Demand), along with a check in the amount of $50 to cover the fee for filing a jury 
demand. Please file the original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and 
return the copy to the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Thank you for your help in this matter. 
Very truly yours, 
Michelle R. Somers 
Secretary 
Enclosure 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801) 576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. , 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, \ QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ] 
INCLUSIVE, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) ORDER ADMITTING ETAN 
) EMANUEL ROSEN PRO HAC VICE 
) Case No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
The Court having reviewed the Affidavit of Etan Emanuel Rosen Pro Hac Vice and the 
Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice of Etan Emanual Rosen, and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
2001 MAY 23 P lc 25 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Etan Emanual Rosen is admitted to practice before this 
Court in this matter during the pendency of this matter. 
n A T C n f . . , , MAY 2 3 2001 DATED this day of , 2001. 
BYTHFCQURT 
Hefterjrole William-A. Thornc— >^  
District Court Judge 
S:\Pipkin\Pro-Hac-Order 
2 
/•'^, 
* 0 • * # 
in C Baldwin 
cutive Director 
)ard of Commissioners 
*vid O Nuffer 
ssident 
-ott Daniels 
ssident Elect 
hn A Adams 
inci Snow Bockelie 
leresa M Cook 
George Dames 
laronA Donovan 
sniseA Dragoo 
alvin Gould 
andy S Kester 
Dbert K Merrell, CPA 
?bra J Moore 
Dane Nolan 
Utah §tatc Bar 
645 South 200 East • Suite 310 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111-3834 
Telephone 801-531-9077- 1-800-698-9077 
FAX 801-531-0660 
www utahbarorg 
fl;p,rP »0ONT* 
ftps 30 12 5u W "01 
April 25, 2001 
RECEIPT OF PRO HAC VICE FILING FEE 
Re: Pro Hac Vice Filing Fee Receipt 
Case No.: 010901074 
Case Name: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, 
Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA Cash 
Services, QC Instant Cash, RKT Holding Company 
And Does 1 through 50 inclusive 
Clerk of the Court: 
This letter serves as receipt that the $75.00 pro hac vice filing fee for 
Etan Emanuel Rosen, in the above referenced case, has been paid to the Utah 
State Bar. If you have any questions, please call the Bar at (801) 531-9077. 
Very truly yours, 
Phylli^ A. Yardley (j (J 
Assistant to General Counsel 
Fox/prohac/recpt 110 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ] 
Defendants. ] 
\ ~~.il M "* 
w w
 w ~ 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
) Civil No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
>~ 7 (^P') 
I hereby certify that on the day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of 
Defendants' Rule 26(a) Disclosures to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
DATED: July j Z ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Mrrenberg 
Jathes H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 1^ 
day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Certificate of Service was 
served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
^i/v^JSj/^ 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOTT A. CAU 
JOHN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. T1LY 
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
July 12, 2001 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al. 
Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Certificate of Service in the 
above-referenced action. Please file the original and date-stamp and return the copy to 
the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
' Suzanne H. Hurst 
Secretary to James H. Tily 
Ol 
Enclosures 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
V S . ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
1 JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby move the 
court for an order of summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
The grounds for Defendants' motion are set forth in the accompanying memorandum of points 
and authorities. 
J VA 
DATED: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Lrl/Lv 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tilj 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or c-h.,.i..vo . v ,-.- \ nrrn ~f 'Vnderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake Citv *» I.? day 
of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
i iMlJgi1 fl iquid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffei, -.. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 9582 7 
C;R^6U^-. ^Jd.U-j-
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOn A. CALL 
JOHN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. TILY 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
-n 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et al. 
Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clei k: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of the following papers to be filed in the 
above-referenced action: 
9 
1 Motion for Summary Judgment; 
2. Memorandi im in Support of Motion for Sum mar j Ji ldgment; 
\ffidavit of Kip Cashmore; and 
4 \ffidavit of Randy Haugen. 
Please file the originals and date-stamp and return the copies to the undersigned in the 
enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
^ 
t ' 
Sincerely, 
Suzann^H. Hursi 
Secretary to Tame 
Enclosures 
20GI .:\. \': ."=> 2-25 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841ui 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ) 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
December 1997, Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") operated seven check-cashing 
stores. Defendant Randy Haugen ("Haugen") and Plaintill Ken\ Pipkin I'Tipkm i VK \\ M\\ uril 
a one-half, 50% membership interest in Quick Cash. Defendant Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore") 
pin chased Quit k ( ;isli Irmu einki I1'*)/ hpkin now claims he was 
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ddiutidtxi (M in.!1! lili'M'iiill', m l n t n n l 'villi I1, I'lpkin ui.l iislunun mlr selling lui; mlu "il in 
Quick Cash and should somehow still be entitled to profits from oi included in the continuing 
businesses of Cashmore. 
Pipkin alleges fraud and negligent misrepresentation against the Defendants but cannot 
identity a single untrue or negligent statement or omission made by any of the Defendants. 
Pipkm alleges iiiluilioiul mlrifrrrnn1 i1 illli irnimmn ICLIIIUILS jjvtiiis! Drlcndanls 1: it it 
is predicated on the failed fraud claims and Pipkin cannot identify a single other wrongful act by 
Defendants to support such a claim. Pipkin claims the equitable remedies of accounting and 
rescission but lacks any basis for equitable relief. Pipkin assert h> • i u Pendants 
besides Cashmore and Haugen yet fails to identity a single act committed ! . :- -se Defendants or 
i vh;! these Defenda nts shoi ild be liable fc i ai i) • 3f Plaintif f s cla • * ..; * !.- "s 
remorse for which there is no legal remed) For the reasons outlined l~u,^ fJ^kii s 'amis 
against all Defendants fail as a matter of law and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah K J 
56. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. " i« I.JIIM IUU1 in.iiMi.ii.ii null Pipkiii iMI:IIi I'AiinJI ;i SlH iiienihei >lii|i mien, si in 
Quick Cash * v . Complaint :• * - attached hereto as Exhibit A; Affidavit of Randy Haugen 
("Haugen . attached hereto as Exhibit B.) 
2 . In or around October 1997, Haugen told Pipki: 
membership interest in Quick Cash, because he wanted longer wanted to be iiivoh ed in owning 
Quick Cash or any other check-cashing businesses. (See Exhibit A, Complaint at H 22; See 
Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 1 5.) 
3. 
Exhibit A, Complaint at f 1 7; Exhibit B, I laugen Aff. at "f 6; Affidavit of Kip Cashmore 
("Cashmore Aff.'' ) at "f 2, attached hereto as Exhibit C.) 
4. Cashmore paid $750,000 for Quick Cash. Cashmore paid $375, 000 t< > PIpl; i n f< n 
Pipkin's 50% ownership interest in Quick Cash Cashmore paid $375,000 • !!.*•:,• 
between Pipkin and Cashmore ("Pipkin Agreement') at f 2(a), attached hereto as Exhibit D; 
Membership Purchase Agreement between Haugen and Cashmore ("Haugen Agreement") at f 
i. attached hereto as Exhibit E; Cashmore ** ff at ff 2 !•; I lai lgen \ ff at f ' 7 ) 
I >ipkin, Haugen and Cashmore were represented by the North Carolina law firm 
o! iJlliull n ul|i mil I u | M i il i in in diiiliiii)" 11 it ripkm .null ll.iiiLjeii Ayimnenh (See I'xlliihil ( , 
Cashmore Aff. at 1 5; Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 1 7.) 
6 Cashmore paid Pipkiii > 5?000 pursuant to the Pipkin Agreement (See Exhibit 
C, Cashmore Aff. at 13 . ) 
7 Pipkin, Haugen and Cashmore have each fully performed under the Pipkin and 
Haugen Ayjcniinils I Src I'Wululll Ihuuni Ml .i l l ' I  \luhl (' l 'asluiiDic A11 Jill I I l 
8, received and has retained $375,000 in consideration for the Pipkin 
Agreement in 1997. Pipkin has not tendered any payments back to Cashmore nor has he ever 
offered to tender back the consideration he received under the Pipkin Agreement. (See Exhibit 
ashmore 
9. Haugen and Cashmore have fully performed the Haugen Agreement. (See Exhibit 
B, Haugen Aff. at 1 7 ; Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at 14 . ) 
'I "jsiiniore nc v\ promised HI .IIJL'HTHJ 1 i include Pipkin in any nl his hiluiv business. 
ventures as a condition of his agreement with Pipkin to purchase Pipkin's interest in Quick Cash. 
^
 E x h i b i t ^ C a s h m o r e A j | |1( i | u | 
i i . The Pipkin Agreement provides for the sak ^* :i\ - •• 
Quick Cash. There is no provision that entitles Pipkin to future royalties o:r future profits from 
Qi lick Cash < lei: Ibi isiness \ entures of Cashmnie I Sre E: > Pipkin Igreeiiie lit at 
f 11(d)'("... Agreement contains the sole and entire agreement between the parties ....").) 
1 laugen did not sell his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore in order to replace 
Pipkin as his partner in Quick Cash. (See Exhibit B * I ) 
\fter Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore, Haugen has had no 
illfftTMII III <,hlli I' I .1 Jl HI a i d Ul l l i ' l I !l"*1 l « MOIITIO lii i '-Ult'SM * HJllll | Js l i l iHiH1 \\u I \\ |||| i|| jR, 
Haugen Aff. at if 8; Exhibit C, Cashmore \t'\ at « > 
1 dendant liKT Holding company is . , an company that holds real property to 
sell later for development. Cashmore and Haugen are eu owners nl M r lloldnif ('ninpanv. 
RKT Holding Company does not operate any check-cashing or similar businesses and is entirely 
sqwrale fmm .in nl ('.isliinim i link osliiiijj busincssi . (, See Exh ibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f 
8; Exhibit B, Haugen Aff. at 110.) 
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1S Defendant USA Cash Stores was a DBA for Quick Cash but that name is no 
longei used li ' I'ashnioie nil .in, ' ol lus check-cashing businesses or any other entity i n 'which 
Cashmore has an interest. (See Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f 9.) 
1
 * Defendant QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a 
check-cashinp 
was sold to Cashmore Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. (See Exhibit C, 
Cashmore ^ ) 
i / . Defendant USA Cash Services is a unr * 
Cashmore Aff. at 11.) 
ill ill I ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD BE AWARDED SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL OF 
PIPKIN'S CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANTS. BECAUSE HE CANNOT 
PRESENT ANY SET OF FACTS TO HIS SUPPORT CLAIMS AGAINST ANY OF THE 
DEFENDANTS. 
STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Under well-settled principles o( lliuli law, ill IN Court may properly grant Defendants' 
summary judgment, dismissing Pipkin's claims if "there i^  IK -
fact and the [Defendant] is entitled to judgment as a mat* r KJ I* i ^6(c). See 
also Malonc v 1 aiku 8Jfi !' Ml I I U (I lull |«w,'i Waneii v. Frovu City Coip * 
1125, 1127 (Utah 1992); Hill v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank. 827 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1992). 
Under the undisputed material facts of this ease, Pipkin cannot provide any set of facts 
that would support his Causes of Action I'm Vt\\\w\ fNruit^ nK Miisirpresentalinii liiinilmnal 
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Interference with Economic Relations, Rescission or Accounting agai nst any of the Defendants. 
Pipkin's claims therefore fail as a matter of law, and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah R. 
I "mi • P 56 
1
 Pipkin's Claims for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Fail as a Matter 
of Law Because Pipkin's Alleged Misrepresentations Are All True. 
Tn iiiruiiiiliiiiii i\ trj'iiii i il.'iiiii a plamlill in in ".I1 h" .ill IV" ih p i r sen l fat1 io ".Jtislh ' .ill lllllii" 
essent ia l e l emen t s r\ «s :r4n. ii-:\. i ncsL* include . representa t ion; (2) conce rn ing a 
p r e s e n ••-••. ..:.-. »e r ep re sen to r e i ther knew tube 
false or made recklessly knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which the base of such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) that the other 
thereby induced to act; (8) to the plaintiff's injury and damage. See Dugan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 
L! Wllllah icAH0i 
Pipkin cannot identify a single untrue or negligent representation made by Hauuen " 
Cashmore, a fundamental prerequisite for maintaining his fraud or negligent misrepresentation 
claims See Duuan v. Jones f ih P M I M'MHiah I'M)! lajdme v^  LijjJJis^ikLt.Vip , 4/1 P M 
659 (Utah 1967) (false statement is an essential element of a negligent nils representation claim). 
Pipkin luiiiiiiioi i1 i" jiil IdiriK 1 ,i i| i[ IN, HI i Hi!', III jinn I mi negligent misrepresentation claims foi the 
simple reason that he fails to identify a single untrue statement or negligent misrepresentation 
made by Haugen or Cashmore, Pipkin's alleged misrepresentations are nothing more than true 
statemi 
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affidavits. The alleged misrepresentations or material omissions upon which Pipkin bases his 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims are identified below and the insufficiency of each 
allegation as a basis for a misrepresentation claim is discussed. 
Pipkin's Alleged Misstatements and Omissions: 
hphn rlwiih flkil lliiu i in 11>liI I'lpkin llul ('ii hninit n fined $7Sf),IHHI in puidiasi1 IJuitl 
Cash. See Exhibit A, Complaint at \ ,.,. This would have been a ti ue statement and could not 
give rise to a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim. Cashmore offered and paid $750,000 
for Quick Cash. See Exhibit D, Pipkin Agreement; Exhibit E, 1 lai igeri Agreement 
Pipkin asserts that Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen no longer wanted to own Haugen's 
interest in Qi lick Cash See Ex 1 libit "I| C iigen readilj admits he told pipkin 
that he no longer wanted to own his interest in Quick Cash and no longer wanted to be involved 
in any check-cashing businesses. See Exhibit B, Haugen Aff, at f c Parkin cannot support, his 
fraud claim with true statements made bj \,\wv\\ inn IIHIIIHT wmtvd in In nil business 
with Pipkin or that Haugen wanted to sell his interest to concentrate on his other businesses 
Pipkin i Linn1, il "vvii". .1 It.Hiilttlni'i iimisMim 111„11 ILniiicii si/urll) wanted Cashmore to be 
his partner in Quick Cash instead of Pipkin. See Exhibit A, Complaint at if 23. This claim is 
absurd on its face. Haugen sold his interest to Cashmore in 1997 and has had no involvement in 
any check-cashing businesses with Cashmore since that tin1-; Viv Fxhibit I! Ihupni AJI „il ]\ S 
Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff, at: f 7 Pipkin claims that Cashmore and Haugen have continued to be 
ill " ol\ ed In check ca shing businesses to^dlta lull Pipkin .in mi in I ulaiuly a single I.nl to support 
this conclusory claim. See Exhibit A, Complaint at t1 19, 21, 23. In fact, the allegation is 
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completely false. Sec l-'xhihil II, ILmi'ni All «it 1 K, Cishmmc <iA II .nil "I Ill ' .iftidjrvil11 ill 
Haugen and Cashmore establish that Haugen has had absolutely no involvement or interest in 
Cashn . , < )ecember 
1997. k l 
Pipkin further makes the irrelevant allegation that he only agreed to sell his interest in 
Quick f\ish hiTiiusr" hi bdicvni 111,il  ill In iliull mil fiishinnir \\nu\t\ npcn hi1* mui 4\W\,K IMIIHHII 
"justly compensating" Pipkin. See Exhibit A, Complaint at f .1 7 I his fact, even if true, would 
nevertheless be insufficient to suppoi t a ft and claim Pipkin fails to identify a single statement 
made by Haugen or Cashmore that would lead Pipkin to believe Cashmore was goiiig to open his 
own stores without "justly compensating" Pipkin or why Pipkin would be entitled In 
< - - * ' "I "astininit1 Ofinied t-vithoiii Pipkin 
Becauv , i.!: JIIL-Z.- • ; usrepresentation is true and there were no material omissions, 
Pipkin cannot support a tram, ,; i..,.. misrepresentation claim against Pipkin ur 1 laugen as a 
matter of law and these claims fail as a matter of law. 
0
 Pipkin's Third Cause of Action for Intentional Interference with Economic 
Relations Against the Defendants Fail as a Matter of Law Because Pipkin Has 
Not and Cannot Present Facts to Satisfy the Elements of That Claim. 
Pipkin cannot support his claim for interference with economic relations against any of 
llit DHunLiiil i I in •tii ill Iin11in IUMUI! iill iniiileiiliuii.il mierference with economic relations. a 
plaintiff must prove: (1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff's existing or 
potential economic relations (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3) causing 
injury to the plaintiff. See Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom. 657 P.2d 293, 304 (Utah 
1982). Pipkin cannot meet these elements. 
Indeed, Pipkin's claim for intentional interference against Haugen, his former partner, is 
nonsensical. Pipkin asserts that Haugen interfered with his economic relations with Pipkin by 
expressing to Pipkin that he thought it was in their best business interests to sell Quick Cash to 
Cashmore. See Exhibit A, Complaint at 1 41. Haugen could not have interfered with his own 
economic relations with Pipkin and there were no future economic relations with which Haugen 
could have interfered. 
Furthermore, courts have uniformly recognized that a claim for intentional interference is 
predicated an improper motive or improper means used by the defendant. See Leigh Furniture. 
657 P.2d at 304. Pipkin cannot present any facts to show that Cashmore or Haugen acted for an 
improper purpose or used improper means in any way. Pipkin alleges only that "Cashmore knew 
of the ... relationship existing between plaintiff [Pipkin] and defendant Haugen." See Exhibit A, 
Complaint at % 41. The fact of whether Cashmore knew about Haugen and Pipkin's business 
relationship when he purchased Quick Cash is entirely insufficient to support a claim for 
intentional interference with economic relations. 
Equally fatal to Pipkin's claim, Pipkin cannot show any injury as a result of the alleged 
interference. Pipkin alleges that Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen wanted to sell his interest with 
"the intent to harm plaintiff financially...." See Exhibit A, Complaint at f 41. Yet Pipkin does 
not identify how he was injured, because he cannot. He executed and arms length agreement 
with Cashmore to sell his interest in Quick Cash in 1997 and has retained the $375,000 
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consideration he received under the Pipkin Agreement. Because Pipkin has not and cannot 
present facts to satisfy the requisite elements of his claim for intentional interference with 
economic relations against Pipkin and Cashmore, this claim fails as a matter of law. 
C. Pipkin's Fourth and Fifth Causes Of Action For Accounting and Rescission 
Fail As A Matter Of Law. 
As outlined above, Pipkin has no claims of relief against Cashmore or Haugen. 
Presumably, Pipkin's equitable claims are predicated on his legal claims that fail as a matter of 
law as demonstrated above. Thus, Pipkin cannot support his equitable claims for accounting and 
rescission, because equitable remedies will grant relief only legal remedies are insufficient and 
"when fairness and good conscience so demand." Jacobson v. Jacobson. 557 P.2d 156, 158 
(Utah 1977). Pipkin cannot show that legal remedies would be insufficient. Furthermore, 
equitable remedies are an extraordinary relief and are not available to parties who slumber on 
their rights. Jacobson, 557 P.2d at 158-59. Pipkin alleges he became aware of the actions that 
gave rise to this complaint in May 1998. Yet despite Pipkin's allegation of discovering his injury 
in May 1998, Pipkin chose to retain the $375,000 he received under the Pipkin Agreement and 
did not assert any claims until January 31, 2001. Pipkin was not vigilant in pursuing his rights 
and he is therefore not entitled to any equitable remedies. IcL Pipkin's equitable claims for 
accounting and rescission therefore fail as a matter of law. 
D. Pipkin's Claims Against the Other Named Defendants Fail as a Matter of 
Law, 
Pipkin named RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, and John Does 1 through 10 in 
the Complaint. Pipkin does not and cannot identify any actions by these other defendants that 
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would give rise to any causes of action against them. RKT Holding Company is and has always 
been an entirely separate business entity from the matters in this Complaint and separate from 
Quick Cash; RKT Holding Company is a company that holds real property to sell later for 
development. See Exhibit C, Cashmore Aff. at f 8; Exhibit b, Haugen Aff. at f 10. QC Instant 
Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing business in California 
and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to Cashmore. See Exhibit C, 
Cashmore Aff. at K 10. Thus, Pipkin has not and cannot present any facts to show that the 
entities of RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, or any other entity are in any way liable to 
Pipkin for anything. Accordingly, summary judgment is warranted on Pipkin's claims against 
RKT Holding Company, QC Instant Cash, and any other unrelated defendants. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Defendants should be awarded summary judgment on all 
of Pipkin's Causes of Action against the Defendants pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
DATED: July / 3 ,2001. 
ANDERSON & kARRENBERG 
JM'f// 
lipomas R. &arrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 1 ^ 
day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Memorandum in Support of Defendants1 
Motion for Summary Judgment to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
I i / 
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Etan E. Rosen (SBN 17372S) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)576-1400 
Attorney for Plaintiffs, 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, j 
Plaintiffs, ] 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN. KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH. LLC. USA CASH ; 
STORES. USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH. RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY AND DOES 1 THROUGH 50 ] 
INCLUSIVE. 
Defendants. 
) COMPLAINT 
) Case No. 010901074 
t 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Plaintiffs allege: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Plaintiff is and at all times herein mentioned a resident of Weber County, State 
of Utah. 
2. Defendant RANDY HAUGEN. is and at all times herein mentioned was. a 
resident of Weber County. Utah. 
3. Defendant KIP CASHMORE. is and at all times herein mentioned was. a resident 
of Weber County, Utah. 
4. Defendant, QUICK CASH. LLC (hereinafter "QUICK CASH") is a limited 
liability company and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was doing business in the State of 
Utah. County of Weber. 
5. Defendant. USA CASH STORES (hereinafter "USA CASH") is a 
business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who. at all times herein 
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber. 
6. Defendant. USA CASH SERVICES (hereinafter "CASH SERVICES") is a 
business organization whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein 
mentioned, and was doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber. 
7. Defendant. QC INSTANT CASH (hereinafter "QC") is a business organization 
whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who, at all times herein mentioned, and was 
doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber. 
S. Defendant, RKT HOLDING (hereinafter "RKT') is a business organization 
whose form is currently unknown to plaintiff and who. at all times herein mentioned, and was 
doing business in the State of Utah. County of Weber. 
9. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as 
o 
the three way partnership entitled Quick Cash was formed. Additionally, plaintiff and Haugen 
decided to keep their involvement in Quick Cash private so that it would not be detrimental to 
their Am way business which they both agreed was their first priority. 
14. The next few years proved to be very successful for Quick Cash as it expanded to 
eight (8) stores in Utah, California and Nevada. However, in the fall of 1996. plaintiff and 
defendant Haugen suspected the third partner of embezzling. When confronted by them he left 
the partnership leaving plaintiff and Haugen to be equal partners. 
15. On or about July of 1997, defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant 
Cashmore knew a company that was interested in purchasing the Quick Cash stores. Plaintiff 
had no active interest at the time of selling his interest in the stores. Defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore met with plaintiff to discuss what the value of the stores. Defendant Cashmore 
received information from another cash store chain that the Quick Cash stores were valued at 
approximately 1.2 million dollars. Plaintiff informed defendant Haugen that he would not sell 
the stores for 1.2 million or even 1.5 million and defendant Haugen agreed. 
16. On or about September 1997. defendant Haugen told plaintiff that defendant 
Cashmore had an idea regarding the business and that plaintiff should hear defendant Cashmore 
out. The three men met wherein defendant Cashmore revealed his plan to develop the business 
to be large enough to take public with defendants Haugen, Cashmore and plaintiff as partners. 
Plaintiff and defendant Haugen agreed to keep the existing stores as a separate entity between 
them and start a new partnership with defendant Cashmore. Defendant Cashmore proposed a 
figure that would be needed to start up the new stores which plaintiff and Haugen agreed to. 
4 
plaintiff that he wanted out of the business so that he could concentrate on Amway. Plaintiff and 
Haugen agreed to sell and end their partnership after pressure from defendant Haugen because 
defendant Haugen wanted out of the check cashing business. 
18. At different times throughout 1998, plaintiff asked defendant Haugen if he was in 
partnership with defendant Cashmore in the business plaintiff and Haugen owned. Each time 
defendant Haugen denied that he was still a partner in the business and told plaintiff that it was 
not good for their Amway business to let anyone know about plaintiffs or Cashmore's check 
cashing business. 
19. On or about May 1998, plaintiff, through the discovery of various documents, 
discovered that defendant Haugen never sold his part of the partnership to defendant Cashmore 
but instead continued the partnership with Cashmore instead of plaintiff. Plaintiff is informed 
and beiieves and based on this belief alleges that if not for the representations of defendants 
Haugen and Cashmore made to him he would not have sold his share of the partnership. 
Additionally, because of the representations of defendants and each of them, plaintiff was forced 
to sell at a price lower than the true value of the business and was forced to expend additional 
capital to restart his own business. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Misrepresentation of Fact) 
(Against All Defendants) 
20. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 19 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
21. The above-stated representations were made to plaintiff to induce him to sell his 
6 
share of his partnership so that defendant Haugen and defendant Cashmore could be partners in 
the same business. 
22. Defendant Haugen represented to plaintiff that he no longer wanted the stores as it 
was detrimental to his Amway business and that defendant Cashmore offered S750.000.00 to 
purchase the business. This fact was a primary inducement in plaintiffs decision to sell his share 
of the partnership and venture out on his own. 
23. The representations made by representatives of defendants were in fact false. The 
true facts were that because of the existing business relationsliip between defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore. Haugen wanted Cashmore to replace plaintiff as his panner. This was never revealed 
to plaintiff. Additionally, plaintiff was never informed of the fact that defendant Haugen never 
intended to receive any monies from the sale but rather intended to keep the money in the 
business. In addition to QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company, defendants Haugen and 
Cashmore branched out from Quick Cash. LLC and formed USA Cash Stores and USA Cash 
Services. Had plaintiff been aware of the true facts, plaintiff would not have agreed to sell his 
portion of the partnership. 
24. When defendants made these representations': they knew them to be false and 
madr these representations with the intention to deceive and defraud plaintiff and to induce 
plaintiff to act in reliance on these representation in the manner hereafter alleged, or the with 
expectation that plaintiff would so act. 
25. Plaintiff, at the time these representations were made by defendants and at the 
time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants' 
i 
representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was 
induced to and did sell his portion of the partnership. Had plaintiff known the actual facts, he 
would not have taken such action. Plaintiffs reliance on defendant's representations was 
justified because plaintiff had no reason to believe defendants did not represent the truth of 
various facts relating to plaintiffs sale of his portion of the partnership. 
26. As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged, 
plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and has been damaged in an amount 
according to proof at time of trial. 
27. The aforementioned conduct of defendants was an intentional misrepresentation, 
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of 
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing 
injury* and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in 
conscious disregard of plaintiff s rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Negligent Misrepresentation of Fact) 
(Against All Defendants) 
28. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 27 of his 
complaint as though full}' set forth herein. 
29. When defendants made these representations, they had no reasonable ground for 
believing them to be true. 
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30. Defendants made these representations with the intention of inducing plaintiff to 
act in reliance on these representations in the manner herein alleged, or with the expectation that 
plaintiff would so act. 
31. As a proximate result of the fraudulent conduct of defendants as herein alleged, 
plaintiff was induced to sell his portion of the partnership and by reason of which plaintiff has 
been damaged in an amount according to proof at time of trial. 
32. The aforementioned conduct of defendants was a negligent misrepresentation, 
deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendants with the intention on the part of 
the defendants of thereby depriving plaintiff of property or legal rights or otherwise causing 
injury, and was despicable conduct that subjected plaintiff to a cruel and unjust hardship in 
conscious disregard of plaintiffs rights, so as to justify an award of exemplary and punitive 
damages. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Relief Based on Rescission) 
(Against All Defendants) 
33. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 32 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
34. Plaintiff, at the time the aforementioned representations were made by defendants 
and at the time plaintiff took the actions herein alleged, was ignorant of the falsity of defendants' 
representations and believed them to be true. In reliance on these representations, plaintiff was 
9 
induced to and did enter into the contract with defendant Cashmore to sell his share of the 
business. 
35. Plaintiff has and will suffer substantial harm and injury under the contract if ius 
not rescinded in that as a result of defendants' conduct, plaintiff has and will be deprived of his 
share and income derived from the aforementioned partnership. 
36. Plaintiff intends service of the summons and complaint in this action to serve as 
notice of rescission of the contract, and hereby offers to restore all consideration furnished by 
defendant Cashmore under the contract, on condition that defendants restore to him the 
consideration furnished by plaintiff in an amount to be proven at time of trial. 
37. As a result of entering into the contract with defendant, plaintiff has incurred 
expenses in addition to those alleged above (and will continue to incur them in an amount 
unknown to him at this time) in an amount to be proven at time of trial. Plaintiff prays leave of 
this court to amend this complaint to insert the true amount of those expenses when the\ are 
ascertained. 
38. In performing the acts herein alleged, defendants intentionally misrepresented to 
plaintiff material facts known to defendants, as stated above With the intention on the part of 
defendants of depriving plaintiff of his money and property, thereby justifying an award of 
punitive damages against the defendants. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment as hereinafter set forth. 
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FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Intentional Interference With Business Relations) 
(Against All Defendants) 
39. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 38 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
40. On or about the fall of 1994, plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written 
partnership agreement at Ogden, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check 
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash. LLC. with its principal place of business at 
Ogden, Utah. 
41. Defendant Cashmore knew of the above described relationship existing plaintiff 
and defendant Haugen. As stated above, defendants and plaintiff all have a business relationship 
involving Amway. Defendant Haugen falsely represented to plaintiff that it was in the best 
interests of their Amway relationship for them to sell their Quick Cash business to defendant 
Cashmore. all with the intent to harm plaintiff financially and to induce plaintiff to sell his share 
of the Quick Cash business. 
42. The aforementioned acts of defendants, and each of them, were willful and 
fraudulent. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to punitive damages^ 
FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Accounting^ 
(Against All Defendants) 
43. Plaintiff incorporates herein by reference Paragraphs 1 through 42 of his 
complaint as though fully set forth herein. 
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44. On or about the fall of 1994. plaintiff and defendant Haugen entered into a written 
partnership agreement at Odgen, Utah for the purpose of carrying on the business of check 
cashing service, under the name of Quick Cash. LLC. with its principal place of business aT 
Ogden. Utah. 
45. Thereafter and until about December. 1997. the partnership conducted the 
aforementioned business, acquired assets, and incurred liabilities resulting in an overall profit. 
As stated above, plaintiff was fraudulently induced into entering a purchase/sale agreement with 
the defendants thereby losing his share of the partnership. The amount of assets and liabilities is 
unknown to plaintiff and cannot be ascertained without an accounting of the profits and losses 
that occurred during the period of time defendants Haugen and Cashmore were in possession of 
Quick Cash. 
• WHEREFORE. Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows: 
1. For general and special damages according to proof at time of trial: 
2. For incidental and consequential damages according to proof at time of trial; 
3. For punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish and deter Defendants; 
4. For prejudgment interest at the highest possible rate from the earliest possible 
date: 
5. For an accounting of the profits and losses: 
6. For a rescission of the contract: 
7. For costs of suit and reasonable attorney's fees herein incurred: and 
8. For such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper. 
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DATED this ~x^ da\ of Januan. 2000 
NELSON. SNUFFER. DAHLE & POULSEN 
BY 
-"-Den v efT!?$ nuffer. Jr. 
Attorney forPlaintiff 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ; 
) AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN 
1 Civil No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Randy Haugen, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I owned a 50% membership interest in Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in 
October 1997. Kerry Pipkin "Pipkin" owned the other 50 % membership interest in Quick Cash in 
October 1997. 
2. Quick Cash operated check-cashing stores in October 1997. 
3. Around October 1997,1 decided that I no longer wanted to be in the check- cashing 
business and no longer wanted to own my membership interest in Quick Cash. 
4. I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished to be 
involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses. 
5. I told Pipken I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished 
to be involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses. 
6. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase Quick Cash. 
7. I sold my membership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore for $375,000 by 
individual agreement and that agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore and myself. 
Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore by a separate individual agreement. Pipkin, 
Cashmore and myself were represented by the North Carolina law firm of Elliott, Culp and 
Carpenter in drafting the individual agreements to sell our interests in Quick Cash to Cashmore. 
8. Apart from the payment I received from Cashmore for the sale of my interest in 
Quick Cash, I received no other compensation from Cashmore for the sale of my interest nor have I 
afterwards had any interest at all in Quick Cash or in any check-cashing business with Cashmore. 
9. I did not sell my interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin with Cashmore as 
my partner in Quick Cash. 
RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell later for 
development. RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and unrelated to Cashmore's 
check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Cashmore. 
QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing 
business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to 
Cashmore. 
DA ITil > Juner '2- ,2001. / 
RANDY', H A U G ^ 
Jul/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /X_ day of April-, 2001. 
•SCA/v 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
-T-.FJ» . • • . . •»«*—^ t . 
J03VK.TAVlOa 
612 North 3000 West 
WestFotnt,UT84015 
Mjf Cocmrtsston Expires 
Noveater£4ft,20Oi 
-J 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake O h , Huh, K4NH , ;HKI th.n <TI ihe[J?T 
day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN to 
••» :••• > itage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN ANI) !•( )K WFBFR COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, j 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES. USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1 -50, inclusive, ] 
Defendants. ] 
I \ 1 1 i l ) > v i 1 . p i K - i < 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
\SHMORE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SAL! I AKE ) 
Kip Cashmore, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. "USA Cash Services" is a DBA for Quick Cash, LLC. ("Quick Cash"). 
2. I offered to purchase and subsequently purchased Randy Ilaugen's ("Haugen") and 
Kerry Pipkin's ("Pipkin") membership interests in Quick Cash in December 1997 for a total of 
$750,000. 
3. I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Pipk ii i providing for 
Pipkin to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Both parties 
have fully performed under that agreement. Pipkin has been fully paid under that agreement and 
has never tendered back nor offered to tender back any part of the consideration he received for his 
interest in Quick Cash. 
4. I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Haugen providing for 
Haugen to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Haugen and 
I have fully performed under that agreement. 
5. In drafting the Pipkin and Haugen agreements, Pipkin, .-ij. • vself were 
each represented by the North Carolina law firm of Culp, Elliott and Carpenter. 
6. I never stated or in any way implied oi prvitihet) ihat Pipkin would continue to be 
involved in any of my check-cashing or other businesses after Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash 
to me in December 1997. 
7. Haugen has no interest in any of my check-cashing businesses nor has he been 
involved in any of my check-cashing businesses after the sale of his Quick Cash membership 
interest to me in December 1997. 
8 RK. 1 Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real propem \u *dl for 
development. RKT Holding C'ornpanv is entirely separate from and has nothing to do with any of 
my check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Randy Haugen. 
9. "USA Cash Stores," an entity named in the Complaint, was a DBA for Quick Cash 
but no longer exists as an entity in which I have any interest. 
10. QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing 
business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to me. 
JylvJ 
DATED: Jurir f'SL , 2001. 
C\ t. • » -
ce 
KIPjCASFMORE 
vjjiy 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/£_ day o f W , 2001. 
NOT. 
^MA%y>u&\ ; /! 
LIC T 
woDtforroaiic 
612 North SQOOVfest 
Wast Point UT 84016 
My GomratssJon Expfces 
l**wnber2«hf2O01 
SBHE8G7U1AH 
STATE OF UTAH ) MEMBL^HIP TNTEREST 
) PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
C"01! NTT OF DAVIS ) 
THIS AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY MEMBERSHIP INTEREST (the "Agreement") is made and entered 
into and effective as of the 1st day of December, 1997, by and among KERRY PIPKIN 
("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC, a Utah limited liability company (the "Company") and KIP D. 
CASHMORE ("Purchaser"). 
m i E f c S S E . ' l i l : 
WHEREAS, Seller owns a Membership Interest in the Company, which operates 
i.i short-term financing business (the "Business"); and 
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and Purchaser desires to acquire, all of Seller's 
Membership Interest in the Company representing 50% of the total Membership Interest in the 
Company, and all rights thereunto appertaining (collectively, the "Membership Interest"); 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants, 
conditions, promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties do 
hereby agree as follows: 
1. PURCHASE OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST. Seller, in consideration of 
Purchaser's payment of the Purchase Price as set forth in Section 2 below, hereby agrees to sell, 
transfer and assign to Purchaser, and Purchaser, in consideration of such sale, transfer and 
assignment by Seller, agrees to purchase and acquire from Seller, on the Closing Date (as defined 
in Section 4(a) below), all of Seller's Membership Interest in the Company. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. 
(a) The aggregate consideration (the "Purchase Price") for the Membership 
Interest set forth in Section 1 shall be Three Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Sixty 
Five and 10/100's Dollars ($368,465.10). Including interest on the deferred payment of the 
Purchase Price as calculated in Exhibit "B." the total payments by Purchaser shall total Three 
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and No/100's Dollars ($375,000.00), The parties agree that the 
Purchase Price shall be paid as follows: 
(i) One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($ 175,000) paid on . 
oi before the 1 losing Date. 
(ii) The remaining portion of the purchase price, including interest, 
paid in Twelve (12) monthly installments of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) per month for 
twelve months, beginning on the Closing Date, due on or before the last day of each month. The 
balance of the Purchase Price shall be due on January 2, 1999. 
(b) Purchaser will also pay an additional amount equal to one-half of the 
amount of cash held in the accounts of the Company on the Closing Date, to be determined from 
applicable bank records. Provided, however, in no event shall the Purchaser's payment 
obligation under this Section 2(b) exceed Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00). 
3. NO OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY PURCHASER. Purchaser shall 
not assume or become liable for any obligation, liabilities or indebtedness of any nature 
whatsoever of or related to Seller, the Company, the Membership Interest or the Business arising 
or related to the period prior to the Closing Date, whether due or to become due, asserted or 
unasserted, and Sellfer shall be and remain liable therefor. Seller represents and warrants that as 
of the Closing Date, all obligations, liabilities and indebtedness of the Company or otherwise 
related to the Business shall have been paid, and does hereby agree to indemnify Purchaser and 
hold Purchaser harmless from any and all such obligations, liabilities and indebtedness. 
Except for the liabilities Purchaser expressly assumes herein, Purchaser hereby assumes 
no liabilities of Seller or the Company, including, without limitation, liabilities, claims or actions 
alleging or relating to any tort, product liability, environmental liability, taxes on Seller or the 
Business, or breach of contract or otherwise seeking damages and relating to the operation of the 
Business prior to the Closing Date. 
4. CLOSING: PAYMENT: DOCUMENTS. 
(a) The consummation of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement 
(the "Closing") shall be held and effective as of December 1, 1997 (the "Closing Date"). 
(b) Seller will deliver to Purchaser on the Closing Date a Bill of Sale in the 
form attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
(c) \ Seller will deliver possession of and title to the Membership Interest to 
Purchaser at Closing by a valid and duly executed document of assignment of Membership 
Interest in the Company. 
(d) All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this 
Agreement, or in any document delivered pursuant to this Agreement, shall survive the Closing. 
5. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. Seller represents and 
warrants as follows: 
(a) The Company is a limited liability company validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Company has all necessary power and 
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authority to carry on its Business as and where now conducted. All of the Membership Interest 
in the Company has been duly and validly issued, is fully paid and nonassessable, and has been 
offered and sold in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws. 
(b)\ Seller and the Company have full power and authority to execute and 
perform this Agreement. This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized and approved 
by all necessary formal action on the part of Seller and the Company. This Agreement 
constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Seller and the Company enforceable in 
accordance with its terms. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the consum-
mation of the transactions hereby contemplated result in, or will result in, a violation or breach 
of any provision of any other instrument to which Seller or the Company is a party or by which 
the Membership Interest may be affected. 
(c) Seller has, and at all times up through and including the Closing Date will 
have, good and marketable title to the Membership Interest, free and clear of all mortgages, 
pledges, liens, security interests, conditional sale agreements, charges, encumbrances and restric-
tions of every kind and nature. 
(d) No representation or warranty of Seller or the Company in this Agreement, 
nor any document furnished or to be furnished to Purchaser pursuant hereto or in connection with 
the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a material 
fact nor do such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any statement necessary 
in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not misleading. 
(e) With regard to any purchase orders or other contracts issued or received 
in the ordinary course of the Business by the Company and expressly agreed in writing to be 
assumed by Buyer (the "Assumed Contracts'7), Seller warrants and represents that: 
(i) Each Assumed Contract is in full force and effect and is valid and 
enforceable in accordance with its terms. 
(ii) The Company is in compliance in all material respects with all 
applicable terms and requirements of each of the Assumed Contracts; 
(iii) To the best of Seller's knowledge, each other person or entity that 
has or had any obligation or liability under any of the Assumed Contracts is in 
compliance in all material respects with all applicable terms and requirements of such 
Assumed Contract; 
(iv) No event has occurred or circumstance exists that (with or without 
notice or lapse of time) may contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation or breach 
of, or give Seller or other person or entity the right to declare a default or exercise any 
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remedy under, or to accelerate the maturity or performance of, or to cancel, terminate, 
or modify, any Assumed Contract; 
(v) Neither Seller nor the Company has given to or received from any 
other person or entity, at any time since January 1, 1997: any notice or other 
communication (whether oral or written) regarding any actual, alleged, possible, or 
potential violation or breach of, or default under, any Assumed Contract; and 
(vi) Other than in the ordinary course of the Business, there are no 
renegotiations of, attempts to renegotiate, or outstanding rights to renegotiate any 
material amounts paid or payable to the Company under current or completed contracts 
with any person or entity included in the Assumed Contracts and no such person or entity 
has made written demand for such renegotiation. 
(f) There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations 
pending or, to the knowledge of Seller or the Company, threatened against or affecting Seller or 
the Company, nor is either Seller or the Company subject to any order, judgment, decree, 
stipulation or consent of or with any court, governmental body or agency that would impair the 
ability of Seller and the Company to consummate the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
(g) Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the 
consummation or performance of any of the transactions contemplated hereby will give any 
person or entity the right to prevent, delay or otherwise interfere with the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement pursuant to any legal requirement or Order to which Seller or 
the Company may be subject, or any material contract to which Seller or the Company is a party 
or by which either may be bound, nor will violate any law, order, judgment, decree, rule or 
regulation of any court or governmental agency or body having jurisdiction over Seller or the 
Company. 
6. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF PURCHASER. Purchaser 
represents and warrants to Seller as follows: 
(a) This Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by 
Purchaser, and constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Purchaser enforceable in 
accordance with its terms. Purchaser has the absolute and unrestricted right, power and authority 
to execute and deliver this Agreement and the other documents contemplated to be executed and 
delivered at the Closing by Purchaser and to perform its obligations under this Agreement and 
such other documents. 
(b) No representation or warranty of Purchaser in this Agreement, nor any 
certificate furnished or to be furnished to Seller or the Company pursuant hereto or in connection 
with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a 
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material fact nor shall such representations and wananties taken as a whole omit any statement 
necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or dierein not misleading. 
(c) There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations 
pending or, to the knowledge of Purchaser, threatened against or affecting Purchaser, nor is 
Purchaser subject to any order, judgment, decree, stipulation or consent of or with any court, 
governmental bodj or agency that would impair the ability of Purchaser to consummate the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
Purchaser makes no representation or warranty to Seller or the Company regarding the purchase 
or sale of any limited liability company Membership Interest other than that which is the subject 
of this Agreement 
7. COVENANTS. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Seller will, 
at its own expense, execute and deliver, or cause to be executed and delivered, such documents 
to Purchaser as Purchaser may reasonably request in order to consummate the purchase of the 
Membership Interest and to vest, confirm or evidence in Purchaser good title to the Membership 
Interest. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Purchaser will, at its own expense, 
execute and deliver or cause to be executed and delivered such documents to Seller as Seller may 
reasonably request in order to consummate the sale of the Membership Interest pursuant to this 
Agreement. 
8. CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PURCHASER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE. 
Purchaser's obligation to purchase the Membership Interest and to take the other actions required 
to Be taken by Purchaser at the Closing is subject to the satisfaction of Purchaser, at or prior to 
the Closing, that tttere have not been made or threatened by any person or entity any claim 
asserting that such person or entity (a) is the holder or beneficial owner of, or has the right to 
acquire or to obtain beneficial ownership of, the Membership Interest, or (b) is entitled to all or 
any portion of the Purchase Price payable for the Membership Interest. 
9. INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS. 
(a) Seller will indemnify and save Purchaser harmless from and against any 
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and 
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other 
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done, 
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Seller or the Company on or before the Closing 
Date specifically including (whether or not Seller has notice or knowledge on the Closing Date 
of such matters), but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Seller, the Company or the Business, 
accruing, arising or relating to an event occurring or existing prior to the Closing Date; (iii) any 
breach of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Seller contained in this Agreement, by or on 
behalf of Seller; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document or 
other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Seller pursuant to the terms of 
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this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations of Seller 
or the Company in respect of the Membership Interest, the Business of the transaction 
contemplated by this Agreement; (vi) any breach by Seller or the Company on or before the date 
of closing of any contract; or (vii) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by 
Seller, or the Company before the Closing Date. 
(b) Purchaser shall indemnify and save Seller harmless from and against any 
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and 
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other 
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done, 
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Purchaser in relation to the Business on or after the 
Closing Date, specifically including, but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Purchaser or the 
Company, relating to an event occurring or existing only after the Closing Date; (iii) any breach 
of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Purchaser contained in this Agreement, by or on 
behalf of Purchaser; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document 
or other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Purchaser pursuant to the 
terms of this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations 
of Purchaser in rrispect of the Membership Interest ox the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement; or (vi) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by Purchaser, or 
the Company after the Closing Date. 
(c) Purchaser and Seller agree to give one another prompt written notice of 
any claim of one ('Indemnitee'*) against the other ("Indemnitor'") under this Agreement arising 
from threatened or pending third party claims, specifically including, but not limited to, any 
claim, demand, action, controversy, or suit which may give rise to a claim for indemnification 
of Indemnitee by Indemnitor under this Agreement. Indemnitor shall undertake the defense of 
any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit by representatives of its own choosing, at 
its own cost and expense, provided, however, that in the event Indemnitor, within a reasonable 
time after notice of any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit, shall fail to undertake 
the defense thereof, then Indemnitee shall have the right to undertake the defense, compromise 
or settlement thereof at the risk of Indemnitor, subject to the right of Indemnitor to assume such 
defense at any time prior to compromise or final determination thereof. The Indemnitor may 
settle any such claim with the consent of Indemnitee which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, provided that adequate financial security for the fulfillment of the Indemnitor's 
indemnity obligations under this Section in cash lump sum is provided by Indemnitor to 
Indemnitee. 
10. ASSIGNMENT RIGHTS. Purchaser may assign this Agreement to any other 
person or entity without the consent of Seller. Seller may not assign its rights or delegate its * 
duties under this Agreement. 
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11. MISCELLANEOUS. 
(a) The parties shall cooperate fully with each other in connection with any 
steps required to be taken as part of their respective obligations under this Agreement, and all 
parlies will use their best efforts to consummate the transactions contemplated in this Agreement. 
(b) All transfer taxes, including sales or use taxes, if any, payable by reason 
of the sale, transfer or delivery of any of the Membership Interest shall be paid by Seller. 
Purchaser hereby Waives compliance with any applicable bulk sale laws. 
(c) All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed given when delivered 
by hand or by facsimile transmission, telexed or mailed by reputable courier service or registered 
or certified mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, to the parties at the addresses set 
forth on the records of the Company (or at such other address for a party as shall be specified 
by like notice; provided that notices of a change of address shall be effective only upon receipt 
thereof). The parties may change the address for any such notice, request, demand, tender or 
other communication by delivery of such notice of change of address in accordance with the 
terms of this Section. 
(d) This Agreement supersedes all prior discussions and agreements between 
the parties with respect to the matters contained herein, and this Agreement contains the sole and 
entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated herein. 
This Agreement may be amended or modified only in a writing signed by all of the parties 
hereto. 
(e) This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the 
parties hereto and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns. 
(f) This Agreement shall be construed and governed by the substantive laws 
of the State of Utah. 
(g) The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this 
Agreement shall not affect the other provisions, and this Agreement shall be construed in all 
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision had not been contained herein. 
(h) Whenever in this Agreement a singular word is used, it shall also include 
the plural wherever required by the context, and vice versa. Whenever in this Agreement a word 
of one gender is used, it shall also include the other gender and the neuter. 
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(i)« The captions in this Agreement are for convenience and identification 
purposes only, are*not an integral part of this Agreement, and are not to be considered in the 
interpretation of any part hereof. 
(j) All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this 
Agreement and any certificate or document delivered pursuant to this Agreement will survive 
the Closing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement under seal effective 
on the date first above written. 
SELLER: 
(SEAL). 
COMPANY: 
QUICK CASH, LLC 
£—(SEAL) 
ember and Manager 
PURCHASER: 
^s-SSP^CTCASHMORE 
.(SEAL) 
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EXHIBIT A 
BILL OF SALE 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in accordance with that certain Agreement (the 
"Purchase Agreement") for Sale and Purchase of Certain Membership Interest of a Jimited 
liability company Membership Interest, dated as of December 1,1997, by and between KERRY 
PIPKIN ("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC (the "Company") and KIP D. CASHMORE 
("Purchaser"), Seller does hereby sell, assign, transfer, deliver, and convey to Purchaser all right, 
title and interest in and to the Membership Interest identified in the Purchase Agreement 
(collectively, the Membership Interest"). 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its 
successors and assigns, and Seller does hereby represent and warrant that such Membership 
Interest is transferred to Purchaser free and clear of any security interests, liens, adverse claims, 
encumbrances or other restrictions whatsoever, and Seller agrees to forever defend the title of 
such Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its successors and assigns against all persons 
whomsoever. 
THIS BILL OF SALE is given pursuant and subject to the Purchase Agreement, 
and in the event of any conflict between the terms hereof and those of the Purchase Agreement, 
the Purchase Agreement shall be deemed controlling. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller has executed this Bill of Sale effective as of 
the date first written above. 
SELLER: 
(SEAL) 
: :0DMA\S0FTS0L\311 \CECVW89\0 
Quick Cash Sale 
Compound Period : Monthly 
EXHIBIT "B" 12/16/1997 Pagel 
Nominal Annual Rate... 
Effective Annual Rate .. 
Periodic Rate 
Daily Rate 
• 5.610 
5757 
0.4675 
% 
% 
% 
0.01537 % 
CASH FLOW DATA 
Event Start Date Amount Number Period End Date 
1 Loan 
2 Payment 
3 Payment 
11/30/1997 
12/30/1997 
01/02/1999 
193,465.10 
15,000.00 
20.000.00 
1 
12 Monthly 
1 
11/30/1998 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization 
Date Payment Interest Principal Balance 
Loan 11/30/1997 
1 12/30/1997 
1997 Totals 
2 01/30/1998 
3 02/28/1998 
4 03/30/1998 
5 04/30/1998 
6 05/30/1998 
7 06/30/1998 
8 07/30/1998 
9 08/30/1998 
10 09/30/1998 
11 10/30/1998 
12 11/30/1998 
1998 Totals 
13 01/02/1999 
1999 Totals 
Grand Totals 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15.000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
165,000.00 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
200,000.00 
904.45 
904.45 
838.55 
772.35 
705.83 
639.01 
571.87 
504.42 
436.65 
368.57 
300.17 
231.45 
162.40 
5,531.27 
99.18 
99.18 
6,534.90 
14,095.55 
14,095.55 
14.161.45 
14,227.65 
14,294.17 
14,360.99 
14,428.13 
14,495.58 
14,563.35 
14,631.43 
14,699.83 
14,768.55 
14,837.60 
159,468.73 
19,900.82 
19,900.82 
193,465.10 
193.465.10 
179,369.55 
165,208.10 
150,980.45 
136,686.28 
122,325.29 
107,897.16 
93,401.58 
78,838.23 
64,206.80 
49,506.97 
34,738.42 
19,900.82 
0.00 
STATE OF UTAH ) MEMBERSHIP INTEREST 
) PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
COUNTY OF DAVIS ) 
THIS AGREEMENT FOR PURCHASE AND SALE OF A LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANY MEMBERSHIP INTEREST (the "Agreement") is made and entered 
into and effective as of the 1st day of December, 1997, by and among RANDY L. HAUGEN 
("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC, a Utah limited liability company (the "Company") and KIP D. 
CASHMORE ("Purchaser"). 
WITNESSETH: 
WHEREAS, Seller owns a Membership Interest in the Company, which operates 
a short-term financing business (the "Business"); and 
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell, and Purchaser desires to acquire, all of Seller's 
Membership Interest in the Company representing 50% of the total Membership Interest in the 
Company, and all rights thereunto appertaining (collectively, the "Membership Interest"); 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants, 
conditions, promises and agreements hereinafter set forth, and other good and valuable 
consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties do 
hereby agree as follows: 
1. PURCHASE OF MEMBERSHIP INTEREST. Seller, in consideration of 
Purchaser's payment of the Purchase Price as set forth in Section 2 below, hereby agrees to sell, 
transfer and assign to Purchaser, and Purchaser, in consideration of such sale, transfer and 
assignment by Seller, agrees to purchase and acquire from Seller, on the Closing Date (as defined 
in Section 4(a) below), ail of Seller's Membership Interest in the Company. 
2. PURCHASE PRICE. 
(a) The aggregate consideration (the "Purchase Price") for the Membership 
Interest set forth in Section 1 shall be Three Hundred Sixty Eight Thousand Four Hundred Sixty 
Five and 10/100's Dollars ($368,465.10). Including interest on the deferred payment of the 
Purchase Price as calculated in Exhibit "B," the total payments by Purchaser shall total Three 
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand and No/100's Dollars ($375,000.00). The parties agree that the 
Purchase Price shall be paid as follows: 
(i) One Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($ 175,000) paid on 
or before the Closing Date. 
(ii) The remaining portion of the purchase price, including interest, 
paid in Twelve (12) monthly installments of Fifteen Thousand Dollars ($15,000) per month for 
twelve months, beginning on the Closing Date, due on or before the last day of each month. The 
balance of the Purchase Price shall be due on January 2, 1999. 
(b) Purchaser will also pay an additional amount, equal to one-half of the 
amount of cash held in the accounts of the Company on the Closing Date, to be determined from 
applicable bank records. Provided, however, in no event shall the Purchaser's payment 
obligation under this Section 2(b) exceed Seventy Thousand Dollars ($70,000.00). 
3. NO OBLIGATIONS TO BE ASSUMED BY PURCHASER. Purchaser shall 
not assume or become liable for any obligation, liabilities or indebtedness of any nature 
whatsoever of or related to Seller, the Company, the Membership Interest or the Business arising 
or related to the period prior to the Closing Date, whether due or to become due, asserted or 
unasserted, and Seller shall be and remain liable therefor. Seller represents and warrants that as 
of the Closing Date, all obligations, liabilities and indebtedness of the Company or otherwise 
related to the Business shall have been paid, and does hereby agree to indemnify Purchaser and 
hold Purchaser harmless from any and all such obligations, liabilities and indebtedness. 
Except for the liabilities Purchaser expressly assumes herein, Purchaser hereby assumes 
no liabilities of Seller or the Company, including, without limitation, liabilities, claims or actions 
alleging or relating to any tort, product liability, environmental liability, taxes on Seller or the 
Business, or breach of contract or otherwise seeking damages and relating to the operation of the 
Business prior to the Closing Date. 
4. CLOSING: PAYMENT: DOCUMENTS. 
(a) The consummation of the transactions contemplated in this Agreement 
(the "Closing") shall be held and effective as of December 1, 1997 (the "Closing Date"). 
(b) Seller will deliver to Purchaser on the Closing Date a Bill of Sale in the 
form attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
(c) Seller will deliver possession of and title to the Membership Interest to 
Purchaser at Closing by a valid and duly executed document of assignment of Membership 
Interest in the Company. 
(d) All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this 
Agreement, or in any document delivered pursuant to this Agreement, shall survive the Closing. 
5. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF SELLER. Seller represents 
and warrants as follows: 
(a) The Company is a limited liability company validly existing and in good 
standing under the laws of the State of Utah. The Company has all necessary power and 
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authority to carry on its Business as and where now conducted. All of the Membership Interest 
in the Company has been duly and validly issued, is fully paid and nonassessable, and has been 
offered and sold in compliance with all applicable federal and state laws. 
(b) Seller and the Company have full power and authority to execute and 
perform this Agreement. This Agreement has been duly and validly authorized and approved 
by all necessary formal action on the part of Seller and the Company. This Agreement 
constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Seller and the Company enforceable in 
accordance with its terms. Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the consum-
mation of the transactions hereby contemplated result in, or will result in, a violation or breach 
of any provision of any other instrument to which Seller or the Company is a party or by which 
the Membership Interest may be affected. 
(c) Seller has, and at all times up through and including the Closing Date will 
have, good and marketable title to the Membership Interest, free and clear of all mortgages, 
pledges, liens, security interests, conditional sale agreements, charges, encumbrances and restric-
tions of every kind and nature. 
(d) No representation or warranty of Seller or the Company in this 
Agreement, nor any document furnished or to be furnished to Purchaser pursuant hereto or in 
connection with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue 
statement of a material fact nor do such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any 
statement necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not 
misleading. 
(e) With regard to any purchase orders or other contracts issued or received 
in the ordinary course of the Business by the Company and expressly agreed in writing to be 
assumed by Buyer (the "Assumed Contracts"), Seller warrants and represents that: 
(i) Each Assumed Contract is in full force and effect and is valid and 
enforceable in accordance with its terms. 
(ii) The Company is in compliance in all material respects with all 
applicable terms and requirements of each of the Assumed Contracts; 
(iii) To the best of Seller's knowledge, each other person or entity that 
has or had any obligation or liability under any of the Assumed Contracts is in 
compliance in all material respects with all applicable terms and requirements of such 
Assumed Contract; 
(iv) No event has occurred or circumstance exists that (with or without 
notice or lapse of time) may contravene, conflict with, or result in a violation or breach 
of, or give Seller or other person or entity the right to declare a default or exercise any 
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remedy under, or to accelerate the maturity or performance of, or to cancel, terminate, 
or modify, any Assumed Contract; 
(v) Neither Seller nor the Company has given to or received from any 
other person or entity, at any time since January 1, 1997, any notice or other 
communication (whether oral or written) regarding any actual, alleged, possible, or 
potential violation or breach of, or default under, any Assumed Contract; and 
(vi) Other than in the ordinary course of the Business, there are no 
renegotiations of, attempts to renegotiate, or outstanding rights to renegotiate any 
material amounts paid or payable to the Company under current or completed contracts 
with any person or entity included in the Assumed Contracts and no such person or entity 
has made written demand for such renegotiation. 
(f) There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations 
pending or, to the knowledge of Seller or the Company, threatened against or affecting Seller or 
the Company, nor is either Seller or the Company subject to any order, judgment, decree, 
stipulation or consent of or with any court, governmental body or agency that would impair the 
ability of Seller and the Company to consummate the transactions contemplated by this 
Agreement. 
(g) Neither the execution and delivery of this Agreement nor the 
consummation or performance of any of the transactions contemplated hereby will give any 
person or entity the right to prevent, delay or otherwise interfere with the transactions 
contemplated by this Agreement pursuant to any legal requirement or Order to which Seller or 
the Company may be subject, or any material contract to which Seller or the Company is a party 
or by which either may be bound, nor will violate any law, order, judgment, decree, rule or 
regulation of any court or governmental agency or body having jurisdiction over Seller or the 
Company. 
6. REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES OF PURCHASER. Purchaser 
represents and warrants to Seller as follows: 
(a) This Agreement has been duly and validly executed and delivered by 
Purchaser, and constitutes the valid and legally binding obligation of Purchaser enforceable in 
accordance with its terms. Purchaser has the absolute and unrestricted right, power and authority 
to execute and deliver this Agreement and the other documents contemplated to be executed and 
delivered at the Closing by Purchaser and to perform its obligations under this Agreement and 
such other documents. 
(b) No representation or warranty of Purchaser in this Agreement, nor any 
certificate furnished or to be furnished to Seller or the Company pursuant hereto or in connection 
with the transaction contemplated herein, contains or will contain any untrue statement of a 
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material fact nor shall such representations and warranties taken as a whole omit any statement 
necessary in order to make any material statement contained herein or therein not misleading. 
(c) There are no actions, suits, litigations or governmental investigations 
pending or, to the knowledge of Purchaser, threatened against or affecting Purchaser, nor is 
Purchaser subject to any order, judgment, decree, stipulation or consent of or with any court, 
governmental body or agency that would impair the ability of Purchaser to consummate the 
transactions contemplated by this Agreement. 
Purchaser makes no representation or warranty to Seller or the Company regarding the purchase 
or sale of any limited liability company Membership Interest other than that which is the subject 
of this Agreement. 
7. COVENANTS. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Seller will, 
at its own expense, execute and deliver, or cause to be executed and delivered, such documents 
to Purchaser as Purchaser may reasonably request in order to consummate the purchase of the 
Membership Interest and to vest, confirm or evidence in Purchaser good title to the Membership 
Interest. From time to time prior to, at and after the Closing, Purchaser will, at its own expense, 
execute and deliver or cause to be executed and delivered such documents to Seller as Seller may 
reasonably request in order to consummate the sale of the Membership Interest pursuant to this 
Agreement. 
8. CONDITION PRECEDENT TO PURCHASER'S OBLIGATION TO CLOSE. 
Purchaser's obligation to purchase the Membership Interest and to take the other actions required 
to be taken by Purchaser at the Closing is subject to the satisfaction of Purchaser, at or prior to 
the Closing, that there have not been made or threatened by any person or entity any claim 
asserting that such person or entity (a) is the holder or beneficial owner of, or has the right to 
acquire or to obtain beneficial ownership of, the Membership Interest, or (b) is entitled to all or 
any portion of the Purchase Price payable for the Membership Interest. 
9. INDEMNITY OBLIGATIONS. 
(a) Seller will indemnify and save Purchaser harmless from and against any 
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and 
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other 
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done, 
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Seller or the Company on or before the Closing 
Date specifically including (whether or not Seller has notice or knowledge on the Closing Date 
of such matters), but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Seller, the Company or the Business, 
accruing, arising or relating to an event occurring or existing prior to the Closing Date; (iii) any 
breach of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Seller contained in this Agreement, by or on 
behalf of Seller; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document or 
other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Seller pursuant to the terms of 
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this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations of Seller 
or the Company in respect of the Membership Interest, the Business or the transaction 
contemplated by this Agreement; (vi) any breach by Seller or the Company on or before the date 
of closing of any contract; or (vii) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by 
Seller, or the Company before the Closing Date. 
(b) Purchaser shall indemnify and save Seller harmless from and against any 
and all claims, demands, actions, controversies and suits, whether groundless or otherwise, and 
from and against any and all liabilities, losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other 
expenses of every nature and character arising by reason of or resulting from (i) anything done, 
suffered to be done, or omitted to be done by Purchaser in relation to the Business on or after the 
Closing Date, specifically including, but not limited to, (ii) litigation involving Purchaser or the 
Company, relating to an event occurring or existing only after the Closing Date; (iii) any breach 
of any warranty or any misrepresentation of Purchaser contained in this Agreement, by or on 
behalf of Purchaser; (iv) any misrepresentation in, or omission from, any instrument, document 
or other consideration executed and/or delivered by or on behalf of Purchaser pursuant to the 
terms of this Agreement; (v) any federal, state or local tax liabilities, assessments or obligations 
of Purchaser in respect of the Membership Interest or the transaction contemplated by this 
Agreement; or (vi) any civil or criminal statutory violation or tort committed by Purchaser, or 
the Company after the Closing Date. 
(c) Purchaser and Seller agree to give one another prompt written notice of 
any claim of one ("Indemnitee") against the other ("Indemnitor") under this Agreement arising 
from threatened or pending third party claims, specifically including, but not limited to, any 
claim, demand, action, controversy, or suit which may give rise to a claim for indemnification 
of Indemnitee by Indemnitor under this Agreement. Indemnitor shall undertake the defense of 
any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit by representatives of its own choosing, at 
its own cost and expense, provided, however, that in the event Indemnitor, within a reasonable 
time after notice of any such claim, demand, action, controversy or suit, shall fail to undertake 
the defense thereof, then Indemnitee shall have the right to undertake the defense, compromise 
or settlement thereof at the risk of Indemnitor, subject to the right of Indemnitor to assume such 
defense at any time prior to compromise or final determination thereof. The Indemnitor may 
settle any such claim with the consent of Indemnitee which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld, provided that adequate financial security for the fulfillment of the Indemnitor's 
indemnity obligations under this Section in cash lump sum is provided by Indemnitor to 
Indemnitee. 
10. ASSIGNMENT RIGHTS. Purchaser may assign this Agreement to any other 
person or entity without the consent of Seller. Seller may not assign its rights or delegate its 
duties under this Agreement. 
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11. MISCELLANEOUS. 
(a) The parties shall cooperate fully with each other in connection with any 
steps required to be taken as part of their respective obligations under this Agreement, and all 
parties will use their best efforts to consummate the transactions contemplated in this Agreement. 
(b) All transfer taxes, including sales or use taxes, if any, payable by reason 
of the sale, transfer or delivery of any of the Membership Interest shall be paid by Seller. 
Purchaser hereby waives compliance with any applicable bulk sale laws. 
(c) All notices shall be in writing and shall be deemed given when delivered 
by hand or by facsimile transmission, telexed or mailed by reputable courier service or registered 
or certified mail (return receipt requested), postage prepaid, to the parties at the addresses set 
forth on the records of the Company (or at such other address for a party as shall be specified 
by like notice; provided that notices of a change of address shall be effective only upon receipt 
thereof). The parties may change the address for any such notice, request, demand, tender or 
other communication by delivery of such notice of change of address in accordance with the 
terms of this Section. 
(d) This Agreement supersedes all prior discussions and agreements between 
the parties with respect to the matters contained herein, and this Agreement contains the sole and 
entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated herein. 
This Agreement may be amended or modified only in a writing signed by all of the parties 
hereto. 
(e) This Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the 
parties hereto and their respective legal representatives, successors and assigns. 
(f) This Agreement shall be construed and governed by the substantive laws 
of the State of Utah. 
(g) The invalidity or unenforceability of any particular provision of this 
Agreement shall not affect the other provisions, and this Agreement shall be construed in all 
respects as if such invalid or unenforceable provision had not been contained herein. 
(h) Whenever in this Agreement a singular word is used, it shall also include 
the plural wherever required by the context, and vice versa. Whenever in this Agreement a word 
of one gender is used, it shall also include the other gender and the neuter. 
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(i) The captions in this Agreement are for convenience and identification 
purposes only, are not an integral part of this Agreement, and are not to be considered in the 
interpretation of any part hereof. 
(j) All representations, warranties, covenants and obligations in this 
Agreement and any certificate or document delivered pursuant to this Agreement will survive 
the Closing. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have executed this Agreement under seal effective 
on the date first above written. 
SELLER: 
COMPANY: 
QUICK CASH, LLC 
* {-SEAL) 
Member and Manager 
PURCHASER: 
EXHIBIT A 
BILL OF SALE 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, and in accordance with that certain Agreement (the 
"Purchase Agreement") for Sale and Purchase of Certain Membership Interest of a limited 
liability company Membership Interest, dated as of December 1,1997, by and between RANDY 
L. HAUGEN ("Seller"), QUICK CASH, LLC (the "Company") and KIP D. CASHMORE 
("Purchaser"), Seller does hereby sell, assign, transfer, deliver, and convey to Purchaser all right, 
title and interest in and to the Membership Interest identified in the Purchase Agreement 
(collectively, the "Membership Interest"). 
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD said Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its 
successors and assigns, and Seller does hereby represent and warrant that such Membership 
Interest is transferred to Purchaser free and clear of any security interests, liens, adverse claims, 
encumbrances or other restrictions whatsoever, and Seller agrees to forever defend the title of 
such Membership Interest unto Purchaser, its successors and assigns against all persons 
whomsoever. 
THIS BILL OF SALE is given pursuant and subject to the Purchase Agreement, 
and in the event of any conflict between the terms hereof and those of the Purchase Agreement, 
the Purchase Agreement shall be deemed controlling. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller has executed this Bill of Sale effective as of 
the date first written above. 
0DMA\S0FTS0L\311\CEC\41107\0 
EXHIBIT "B" 12/16/1997 Pagel 
Quick Cash Sale 
Compound Period 
Nominal Annual Rate ... 
Effective Annual Rate .. 
Periodic Rate 
Daily Rate 
CASH FLOW DATA 
Event 
1 Loan 
2 Payment 
3 Payment 
• Monthly 
5.610 % 
5.757 % 
0.4675 % 
0.01537% 
Start Date 
11/30/1997 
12/30/1997 
01/02/1999 
Amount 
193,465.10 
15.000.00 
20.000.00 
Number Period 
1 
12 Monthly 
1 
End Date 
11/30/1998 
AMORTIZATION SCHEDULE - Normal Amortization 
Date Payment Interest Principal Balance 
Loan 11/30/1997 
1 12/30/1997 
1997 Totals 
2 01/30/1998 
3 02/28/1998 
4 03/30/1998 
5 04/30/1998 
6 05/30/1998 
7 06/30/1998 
8 07/30/1998 
9 08/30/1998 
10 09/30/1998 
11 10/30/1998 
12 11/30/1998 
1998 Totals 
13 01/02/1999 
1999 Totals 
Grand Totals 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
15.000.00 
15,000.00 
15.000.00 
15.000.00 
15,000.00 
15,000.00 
165,000.00 
20,000.00 
20,000.00 
200,000.00 
904.45 
904.45 
838.55 
772.35 
705.83 
639.01 
571.87 
'504.42 
436.65 
368.57 
300.17 
231.45 
162.40 
5,531.27 
99.18 
99.18 
6,534.90 
14,095.55 
14,095.55 
14,161.45 
14,227.65 
14,294.17 
14,360.99 
14,428.13 
14,495.58 
14,563.35 
14,631.43 
14,699.83 
14,768.55 
14,837.60 
159,468.73 
19,900.82 
19,900.82 
193,465.10 
193,465.10 
179,369.55 
165,208.10 
150,980.45 
136,686.28 
122.325.29 
107.897.16 
93,401.58 
78,838.23 
64,206.80 
49,506.97 
34,738.42 
19,900.82 
0.00 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
I AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN 
i Civil No. 010901074 
I Judge Roger S. Dutson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Randy Haugen, being first duly swom, deposes and states as follows: 
20CUV- r , ^ - ^ 
1. I owned a 50% membership interest in Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in 
October 1997. Kerry Pipkin "Pipkin" owned the other 50 % membership interest in Quick Cash in 
October 1997. 
2. Quick Cash operated check-cashing stores in October 1997. 
3. Around October 1997,1 decided that I no longer wanted to be in the check- cashing 
business and no longer wanted to own my membership interest in Quick Cash. 
4. I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished to be 
involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses. 
5. I told Pipken I wanted to sell my interest in Quick Cash, because I no longer wished 
to be involved in Quick Cash or any check-cashing businesses. 
6. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase Quick Cash. 
•7. I sold my membership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore for $375,000 by 
individual agreement and that agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore and myself. 
Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore by a separate individual agreement. Pipkin, 
Cashmore and myself were represented by the North Carolina law firm of Elliott, Culp and 
Carpenter in drafting the individual agreements to sell our interests in Quick Cash to Cashmore. 
8. Apart from the payment I received from Cashmore for the sale of my interest in 
Quick Cash, I received no other compensation from Cashmore for the sale of my interest nor have I 
afterwards had any interest at all in Quick Cash or in any check-cashing business with Cashmore. 
9. I did not sell my interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin with Cashmore as 
my partner in Quick Cash. 
10. RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell later for 
development. RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and unrelated to Cashmore's 
check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Cashmore. 
11. QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing 
business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to 
Cashmore. 
DATED: tenr 12- ,2001. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /£_ day of April; 2001 
NOTi^Y^tJBLIC 
KOTwar prone 
JO0VK.TAVLQR 
012 North 3000 West 
West Point UT 84015 
My Comm&ston Expires 
November 24&v 2001 
8IATBC7tn*B 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the( J* 
day of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY HAUGEN to 
be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
Etan E. Rosen SBN 173728 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
Telephone: (916) 369-9750 
Facsimile: (916) 369-9760 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF 
DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies 
that on the 12th day of July, 2001, he caused to 4?e served upon all counsel of record, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pippin's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures. 
DATED this 
PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Etan E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this / - ^ day oi //// J^/ 2001, to the 
following: -
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Puisen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
SaltLak£LCity, UT 84101-2006 
Sandra Smith 
EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
Telephone: (916) 369-9750 
Facsimile: (916)369-9760 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF 
DISCOVERY 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies 
that on the 12* day of July, 2001, he caused to^pe served upon all counsel of record, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin's Rule 26 Initial Disclosures. 
DATED this day of 
PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Etan E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
/ 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and.wqept copy of the' foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this /<** day of / /[/ IjJ 2001, to the 
following: ^ 
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
SaltXake^ity, UT 84101-2006 
Sandra Smith 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H.Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801)534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1 -50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF KIP CASHMORE 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Kip Cashmore, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. "USA Cash Services" is a DBA for Quick Cash, LLC. ("Quick Cash"). 
2. I offered to purchase and subsequently purchased Randy Haugen's ("Haugen") and 
Kerry Pipkin's ("Pipkin") membership interests in Quick Cash in December 1997 for a total of 
$750,000. 
3. I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Pipkin providing for 
Pipkin to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Both parties 
have fully performed under that agreement. Pipkin has been fully paid under that agreement and 
has never tendered back nor offered to tender back any part of the consideration he received for his 
interest in Quick Cash. 
4. I executed an individual agreement in December 1997 with Haugen providing for 
Haugen to sell his 50% ownership in Quick Cash to me in consideration for $375,000. Haugen and 
I have fully performed under that agreement. 
5.' In drafting the Pipkin and Haugen agreements, Pipkin, Haugen and myself were 
each represented by the North Carolina law firm of Culp, Elliott and Carpenter. 
6. I never stated or in any way implied or promised that Pipkin would continue to be 
involved in any of my check-cashing or other businesses after Pipkin sold his interest in Quick Cash 
to me in December 1997. 
7. Haugen has no interest in any of my check-cashing businesses nor has he been 
involved in any of my check-cashing businesses after the sale of his Quick Cash membership 
interest to me in December 1997. 
8. RKT Holding Company is a Utah company that holds real property to sell for 
development. RKT Holding Company is entirely separate from and has nothing to do with any of 
my check-cashing businesses. I am a co-owner of RKT Holding Company with Randy Haugen. 
9. "USA Cash Stores," an entity named in the Complaint, was a DBA for Quick Cash 
but no longer exists as an entity in which I have any interest. 
10. QC Instant Cash is a California limited liability company operating a check-cashing 
business in California and was an asset owned by Quick Cash when Quick Cash was sold to me. 
JqlvJ 
DATED: 4*mfe~ /<l , 2001. 
—rsn- lA 
^CffLCASHMORE 
vjjiy 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this _/^_ day o f W , 2001 
JOOTK.TWL0R 
812 Ftofft 3000 test 
WBStRATt, UT 84015 
My Commtsston Expires 
Nrasntera*m,200l 
smmawta 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the \\) 
day of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of AFFIDAVIT OF KIP CASHMORE to 
be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
iLAAs^L 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ] 
Defendants. ] 
) MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO 
) ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS 
) Civil No. 010901074 sJW. 2 7 £0( 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby move the 
Court for an order granting them leave to amend their Answer to assert counterclaims pursuant to 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the proposed Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." The basis for this motion, as more folly set 
forth in the accompanying memorandum, is that the litigation has not advanced in any meaningful 
2C0I JUL 1^ P 1: ^ 
a complete Rule 26 disclosure statement from the Plaintiff. Accordingly, an amendment of 
Defendants' Answer to include counterclaims will not be prejudicial nor will it delay these 
proceedings. Defendants, therefore, respectfully request this Court grant Defendants' Motion to 
Amend Answer to include the asserted counterclaims. 
DATED: July , ^ , 2 0 0 1 . 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
// l 
L ^ — • 
Thomas R. Karrenberg J 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the £ 3 day 
of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants1 Motion to Amend Answer to 
Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, j 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
) DEFENDANTS' AMENDED ANSWER 
) AND COUNTERCLAIM 
) (Jury Demand) 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores. USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants") hereby files his 
amended answer and counterclaim regarding Plaintiffs complaint and demand trial by jury. 
1. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 
the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint and, 
therefore, deny paragraph 1 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
2. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
3. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
4. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
5. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
6. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
7. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
8. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
9. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
JO. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
11. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
12. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
13. Defendants are without sufficient knowledge or information to form a belief as to 
the truth of each and every averment contained in paragraph 13 of Plaintiffs Complaint and, 
therefore, deny each and every averment contained therein, except Defendants admit that Mr. 
Haugen was involved in the establishment of Quick Cash. 
14. Defendants admit the averments contained in paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
15. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 15 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, but admit that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore met with Plaintiff to discuss the stores 
in 1997. 
16. Defendants deny the averments contained in paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
17. Defendants deny in part the averments contained in paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, but admit that when Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase seven of the stores, 
Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen agreed to sell their interests in their partnership. 
18. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint, except admit that Mr. Haugen did tell the Plaintiff truthfully that he was not a partner 
with Mr. Cashmore in the check cashing business. 
19. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
20. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by preference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above. 
21. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
22. Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore offered $750,000 to purchase the business 
and that Mr. Haugen told Plaintiff he wanted to sell the business. Defendants deny each and 
every other averment contained in paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
23. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
24. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
25. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 25 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
26. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 26 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
27. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 27 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
28. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admissiqn or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above. 
29. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 29 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
30. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 30 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
31. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 31 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
32. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 32 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
33. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 32 above. 
34. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 34 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
35. 
Complaint. 
36. 
Complaint. 
37. 
Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 35 of Plaintiffs 
Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 36 of Plaintiffs 
Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 37 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
38. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 38 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
39. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 38 above. 
40. Defendants admit that Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen entered into a business 
arrangement in 1994 concerning check cashing services, but deny each and every other averment 
contained in paragraph 40 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
41. Defendants admit that Mr. Cashmore knew that there was an existing business 
relationship between Plaintiff and Mr. Haugen and that Mr. Cashmore, Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff 
did have a business relationship involving Amway, but deny each and every other averment 
contained in paragraph 41 of Plaintiff s Complaint. 
42. Defendants deny each and every averment contained in paragraph 42 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
43. Defendants repeat and incorporate herein by reference each and every averment, 
admission or denial contained in paragraphs 1 through 42 above. 
44. Defendants admit that Mr. Haugen and Plaintiff entered into a business 
relationship in 1994 for the purpose of carrying on a check cashing business, but deny each and 
every other averment contained in paragraph 44 of Plaintiffs Complaint. 
45. Defendants admit that the check cashing business was carried on until about 
December 1997, but deny each and every other averment contained in paragraph 45 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
46. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
47. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
48. Plaintiffs Complaint and each claim for relief contained therein is barred by the 
doctrine of waiver. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
49. Plaintiff is estopped by reasons of his own actions in selling the business with the 
advice and assistance of counsel and Plaintiff, therefore, is barred from pursuing the claims 
contained in the Complaint. 
FIFTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
50. Any damages caused to Plaintiff as a result of any of the claims contained in 
Plaintiffs Complaint, which damages Defendants specifically deny occurred, were incurred as a 
result of Plaintiffs own fault which is greater than or equal to the fault of the Defendants, which 
fault these Defendants specifically deny exists, and, therefore, Plaintiff is barred from recovering 
any damages from the Defendants. 
SIXTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
51. Plaintiffs Complaint and each and every claim from relief contained therein is 
barred by the doctrine of laches. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, Defendants pray for relief as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff take nothing by his action; 
2. That Defendants be awarded all costs of suit incurred herein, including reasonable 
attorneys fees; 
3. For such further and other relief as the Court deems proper. 
COUNTERCLAIM 
Plaintiff Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore") hereby counterclaims against defendant Kerry 
Pipkin ("Pipkin") and alleges as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. Cashmore is and was at all times relevant to this action an individual residing in 
Weber County, Utah. 
2. Upon information and belief, Pipkin is and was at all times relevant to this action an 
individual residing in Weber County, Utah. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
3. In December 1997, Pipkin and Cashmore executed an Agreement ("Pipkin 
Agreement") providing for Pipkin to sell his 50% membership interest in Quick Cash to 
Cashmore. See Pipkin Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A. 
4. The Pipkin Agreement states that Pipkin agreed to "indemnify and save [Cashmore] 
harmless from against and any and all claims . . . and from and against any and all liabilities, 
losses, damages, costs, charges, counsel fees and other expenses of every nature and character 
arising by reason of or resulting from . . . litigation involving [Pipkin], [Quick Cash] or the 
Business . . . relating to an event occurring existing prior to the Closing Date." See Pipkin 
Agreement, attached hereto as Exhibit A, at 1 9.a. 
5. Pipkin's Complaint herein is based on events that occurred prior to the closing date 
prior to the Pipkin Agreement. Pipkin asserted causes of action for fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations, rescission and accounting 
against Cashmore based on alleged statements that Cashmore and Randy Haugen, Pipkin's 
previous business partner, made to Pipkin prior to the closing of the Pipkin Agreement. See 
Pipkin Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
6. Cashmore has incurred counsel fees and other litigation expenses as a result of the 
Pipkin Complaint. 
7. Induced by and in reliance upon the indemnity provision in the Pipkin Agreement, 
Cashmore entered into the Pipkin Agreement. 
8. Pursuant to the terms of the indemnification provision, Pipkin is required to pay 
Cashmore all expenses resulting from litigation arising out of events occurring prior to the 
closing date of the Pipkin Agreement and, further, to indemnify Cashmore for any liabilities, 
losses, damages, costs and charges which may be imposed upon Cashmore as a result of this 
litigation. 
9. By letter dated June 26, 2001, Cashmore demanded payment from Pipkin for the 
litigation expenses and demanded that Pipkin acknowledge his duty to indemnify Cashmore for 
any losses suffered by Cashmore as a result of this litigation. 
10. Pipkin failed, or otherwise expressed or indicated an inability, to promptly and 
properly pay Cashmore's claim and failed to acknowledge his contractual duty to indemnify 
Cashmore. As a result, Cashmore has been required to pay these amounts and, in addition, has 
incurre4 various costs and expenses in investigating, defending, paying, settling, or otherwise 
resolving the claim and may incur additional losses as a result of the litigation. 
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Breach of Agreement of Indemnity) 
11. Cashmore reallages and incorporates herein the preceding allegations in this 
Counterclaim. 
12. Under the terms of the indemnity provision in the Pipkin Agreement, Pipkin is liable 
to Cashmore for the total of all losses and expenses (including attorney's fees) that Cashmore has 
incurred or will incur as a result of the Pipkin Complaint. 
13. Cashmore has performed all of the terms and conditions of the Pipkin Agreement. 
14. Pipkin has breached the indemnity provision of the Pipkin Agreement by failing or 
refusing to perform his obligations to indemnify and save Cashmore harmless against losses, 
expenses and attorney's fees incurred as a result of litigation arising out of event occurring "prior 
to the closing date of the Pipkin Agreement. 
15. By reason of Pipkin's breaches of the indemnity provision, Cashmore has sustained 
damages at least in the amount of $10,000.00. Cashmore continues to sustained ongoing 
damages. The full extent of Cashmore's damages will be established by proof at the time of trial. 
WHEREFORE, Cashmore prays for judgment and other relief against Pipkin as follows: 
1. Under his First Claim for Relief for breach of the indemnification provision, for 
judgment against Pipkin at least in the amount of $10,000.00, plus such additional sums as may 
be established at the time of trial as the total of losses and expenses incurred by Cashmore by 
reason of the Pipkin Complaint and by reason of enforcing by litigation the indemnity provision 
in the Pipkin Agreement. 
2. For Cashmore's attorney's fees and expenses incurred in connection with this 
action. 
3. For pre-judgment and post-judgment interest at the rates allowed by law. 
4. For such other and further relief as may be just and proper under the 
circumstances, including other equitable relief deemed appropriate to protect and preserve 
Cashmore's rights under the Pipkin Agreement and the common law. 
DATED: July ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 29th 
day of March, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Defendants' Amended Answer and 
Counterclaim to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER TO 
ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
JUL 2 7 2001 
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company ("Defendants"), by and through 
their undersigned counsel, hereby submit this memorandum in support of their Motion to Amend 
Answer to Assert Counterclaims for indemnification. 
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants have moved this 
Court to allow Defendants to amend their Answer to assert counterclaims. While the parties may 
amend their pleading at this stage only by leave of Court or by written consent of the adverse 
party, "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). In this 
case, neither party will suffer prejudice by allowing the proposed amendment. 
Defendants, through their counsel, requested Plaintiff to stipulate to this motion. 
Plaintiffs counsel, however, refused to do so. Discovery has barely commenced and Defendants 
have not yet received a complete set of mandatory disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The deadline for amending pleadings is not until September 30, 
2001. A trial date is not yet set, and the case will not be certified as ready for trial until April 2, 
2002. The counterclaim will not greatly expand the scope of the litigation. Accordingly, 
Defendants request that this Court exercise its discretion and permit Defendants to amend their 
Answer to assert their counterclaim. 
•DATED: July c ^ , 2 0 0 1 . 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the <^6 day 
of July, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Memorandum in Support of Defendants1 
Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOn A. CALL 
JOHN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. TILY 
2QG\ 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
July 23, 2001 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al. 
Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of each of the following 
pleadings: 
1. Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims; and 
2. Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Answer to Assert 
Counterclaims. 
Please file the originals in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the 
copies to the undersigned in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
Michelle R. Somers 
Secretary 
Enclosures 
ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916) 369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)576-1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
m\ V 4 .) 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES, 
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT 
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and 
DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Duncan 
I am an attorney at law duly licensed to practice before all courts of the State of 
California, pro-hac vice' in this case and am attorney of record for Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin, herein. 
1. Everything contained in this declaration is matter of my own personal knowledge 
and I will testify in accordance therewith if called to testify at a hearing or trial. 
2. I conducted a search in the Superior Court of the State of California in the County 
of Sacramento regarding any of the Defendants in the case of Pipkin v. Haugen, et al. We located 
a case named Virginia McQueen v. U.S.A Cash Stores, Inc. where Kipley Cashmore and Randy 
Haugen were one of the Defendants. The case caption is 99AS04703. 
3. Apparently, U.S.A. Cash Stores, Inc. and Kipley Cashmore and Randy Haugen 
were sued by certain employees for sexual harassment. On or about September 5, 2000 in the 
law and motion department of the Sacramento Superior Court, Defendant Randy Haugen's 
Motion to Quash Service of Summons based on lack of jurisdiction was heard. It is my 
understanding the that court denied the motion to quash service of summons based on the fact 
that Mr. Haugen appears to have retained an ownership interest in the business that he supposedly 
sold to Mr. Cashmore. I managed to retrieve the court's tentative ruling on that matter which 
became the ruling of the court. A true and correct copy of that ruling is enclosed herein as 
Exhibit *4A" and incorporated herein by reference. 
4. Through my research into that specific case I also found a copy of a check made 
by Q C Corporation under the name of Randy Haugen to Amanda Lewis, one of the Plaintiffs in 
99AS04703, (the Sacramento County case). Apparently, Randy Haugen was signing checks 
under QC or (Quick Cash) after the supposed purchase of his interests by Kip Cashmore. A true 
and correct copy of that check is enclosed herein as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by 
reference. 
5. I also managed to find a W-2 form for wage and tax statement for the year 
1998 which was issued by January 31, 1999. This W-2 wage and tax statement for 1998 is in the 
name of Quick Cash, LLC. Randy Haugen, General Partner. A true and correct copy of that W-
2 is attached hereto as Exhibit " C and incorporated herein by reference. 
6. It appears as if Mr. Haugen retained an interest and an active role in Quick Cash, 
LLC even though he claims that he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to 
Kip Cashmore. 
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the ~ 
foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at Sacramento, California this 
jH , July, 2001. / jr-i 
Etan E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin 
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Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)576-1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES, ; 
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT ; 
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and ; 
DOES 1-50, inclusive. ; 
) AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF KERRY 
) PIPKIN IN SUPPORT OF 
) MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
) AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION OF 
) SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Duncan 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
Kerry Pipkin, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. Randy Haugen and myself each owned a fifty percent (50%) interest in Quick 
PIPKIN FPX NO. : 8014755393 T K ^ 2001 07:58PM 
P. 3 
7-23-2331 4:56PM FR3M BE i^fcR WD P'JNGR^lZ 9163699760 
Cash, LLC in 1997. On or about October, 1997 Randy Haugen allowed Kip Cashmore access to 
our books and records without my knowledge. It is my understanding that Randy Haugen then 
asked Cashnroc to propose a t h i w ^ 
bemapaitnerdiipwfc^ In response to my refusal to partner wta Mr. OshmDre, 
Mr, Haugen indicated to me that he wanted to sell the partnership to Mr. Cashmore and did not 
want anything to do with Quick Cash. L L C He indicated to me that he wanted to fccus his 
energies on his Amway Distributorship instead. 
2. Mr. Haugen asserted repeated pressure on me to sell my fifty percent (50%) 
Interest in Quick Cash, LLC to Mr. Cashmore. This pressure was substantial because I was 
involved in the Amway business with Mr. Haugen, and as my sponsor in the Amway business, Mr. 
Haugen had substantial financial authority and financial power over me. I specifically felt that if 1 
did not sell my fifty percent (50%) interest in Quick Cash, LLC to Mr. Cashmore, my Amway 
business with Mr. Haugen would be effected 
3. The sale of Quick Cash, LLC happened around December, 1997. On or about 
May 11,19981 received infonnarion that Randy Haugen and Kip Cashmore both signed new 
signature cards for the continued business of Quick Cash, LLC. L of course, understood Mr, 
Randy Haugen to have sold half of his interest to Kip Caahn*>re. 1 questioned Randy Haugen 
repeatedly about the new bank signature cards and he finally informed me, after a lot of pressure, 
that ha never received monthly payments fiom Mr. Kip Cashnxre, Therefore I understood that 
he decided to continue his business with Kip Cashmore In direct opposition to what he told m* in 
inducing me to sell to Mr. Kjp Cashmore. Mr. Haugen specifically told roe that the signature cari 
allowed him access to Quick Cash, LLC money at any time. 
4. On or about May 12,19981 learned again that Mr. Randy Haugen and Mr. Kip 
Cashmore were indeed partners. 
5. On or about October, 19981 received the front page only of the 1997 tax return 
relating to Quick Cash, LLC. On that page a question was asked "Did the LLC or its subsidiary 
have transfer of acquisition of more than fifty percent (50%) in control of ownership?" Mr. 
Cashmore's tax attorneys* answer to that was clearly "No.H 
6. On or about late 19991 found documentation indicated that Mr. Cashmore and 
Mr. Haugen were partners in cash stores. Quick Cash, LLC also doing business as USA Cash 
Stores, Inc. This entity us nothing more than a name change of my old business. 
7. On or about M>; 2000,1 met with Mr. Cashmore over issues relating to taxes 
relating back to 1997 and then learned that Mr. Haugen had a fifty percent (50%) ownership and 
Mr Cashmore had another fifty percent (50%) ownership in the cash stores. 
8. From approximately December, 1997 until July, 2001 the initial stores that I and 
Mr. Haugen allegedly sold to Mr. Cashmore grew from seven (7) stores to around seventy (70). 
1 would have never sold had I not been told that Mr. Haugen was intending on exiting the 
business. I did not intend to sell to Mr. Cashmore so that he and Mr. Haugen can continue doing 
business. 1 would have never sold had Mr. Haugen not pressured me to sell telling me he is 
getting out of the business. 
DATED; July ^ 3 > 2001 
ry?if 
A/ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 
UE MCCAFFEaTY! JU  
1344 West 4«?75 So»ith 
Ogden, V\zr> 8-V.C5 
My Commission Exoires 
June 13, 2002 
EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendants Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash and RKT Holding Company come now with a summary judgment 
motion prior to conducting any discovery in this case and prior to even scheduling the depositions 
of Plaintiff and Defendants. 
As seen in the affidavit of Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin and the declaration of his counsel, the 
'"undisputed material facts" are indeed disputed and therefore defendants motion for summary-
judgment must fail. 
II. DISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Plaintiff does not dispute statement number one. 
2. Plaintiff does not dispute statement number two. 
3. Plaintiff does not dispute statement number three. 
4. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number four. As seen in the affidavit of 
Plaintiff, which is attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference, Cashmore paid Plaintiff 
$375,000.00 but did not pay defendant Haugen anything. This is specifically the reason why 
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Haugen and Defendant Cashmore conspired to defraud him by 
informing him that Defendant Cashmore is paying $375,000.00 to Defendant Haugen when 
indeed Defendant Haugen did not receive any money but instead continued doing business with 
Defendant Cashmore. Evidence of the continued dealings is attached to the declaration of 
attorney Etan Rosen in Exhibits "B" and "C". 
5. Plaintiff does not dispute statement number five even though it is not relevant to 
this action whatsoever. 
6. Plaintiff does not dispute that he received $375,000.00 from Defendant Cashmore. 
7. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number seven. As seen in his declaration, 
attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. Defendant Cashmore did not perform under 
the Haugen agreement and did not pay $375,000.00 to Defendant Haugen but instead went into a 
continued business with Defendant Haugen after inducing Plaintiff to sell to Defendant Cashmore. 
8. Plaintiff does not dispute statement number eight. 
9. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number nine as seen in his affidavit. 
10. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number ten as seen in his affidavit. While 
Defendant Cashmore never promised or agreed to include Plaintiff Pipkin in any of his future 
business ventures, it was understood that Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen would not 
continue with the same check cashing business amongst themselves. Plaintiff would have never 
exited the check cashing business if it was not for Haugen's misrepresentations. See attached 
affidavit of Plaintiff attached hereto and incorporated herein by reference. 
11. Plaintiff disputes statement number eleven as it is irrelevant. 
12. Plaintiff disputes statement number twelve as seen in his affidavit. 
43. Plaintiff specifically disputes the statement in number thirteen as seen in is his 
affidavit. 
14. Plaintiff is unable to dispute or to affirm statements made in Defendants Statement 
of Undisputed Material Facts number fourteen aside from the fact that Defendants Cashmore and 
Haugen are co-owners of RKT Holding Company. 
15. Plaintiff disputes statement number fifteen as it has no relevance to this litigation. 
16. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number sixteen as to the fact that Defendant 
Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. Plaintiff believes that QC Instant Cash is 
owned by both Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen. Evidence on that fact is enclosed as 
Exhibit "B" to the declaration of Etan Rosen. 
17. Plaintiff highly disputes statement number seventeen as to the fact that Defendant 
Cashmore is the only member of QC Instant Cash. Plaintiff believes that QC Instant Cash is 
owned by both Defendant Cashmore and Defendant Haugen. Evidence to that fact is enclosed as 
Exhibit "B" to the declaration of Etan Rosen. 
III. ARGUMENT 
18. Defendants' motion for summary judgment should be denied as there are many 
genuine issues of material facts that are in dispute. While defendants are correct in stating the 
standard for summary judgment, it is clear from reviewing the issues still in dispute in this case 
that several issues, which are crucial, are actually disputed. Specifically, Plaintiff plead with great 
specificity fraud, negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations and 
recessions against various defendants. In the very essence of Plaintiffs complaint he claims that 
Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore conspired amongst themselves to defraud Plaintiff by "squeezing" 
him out of the check cashing business which he was involved in with Defendant Haugen only to 
learn afterward that Defendants Haugen and Defendant Cashmore continued with the business. 
Plaintiff submitted enough evidence, in the form of two declarations, to show on its face that 
Defendants Haugen and Cashmore continued with the business, even though Defendant Haugen 
claims that he sold his entire interest to Defendant Cashmore. Plaintiff claims that he sold his 
interest to Cashmore at a discount based on the fact that Mr. Haugen, his partner of several years 
and his sponsor in the Amway business, told him that he is exiting the check cashing business. 
Plaintiff claims that he would have never sold to Defendant Cashmore and certainly not for the 
amount that he did without the misrepresentations made by Cashmore and Haugen. 
19. Defendants now come and argue, supported only by their declarations, that 
Plaintiff does not have a case. Of course Plaintiff disagrees and attached is his declaration and 
exhibits that were discovered that fly in the face of the declarations of defendants. Therefore, 
PlaintiflF respectfully requests their summary judgment be denied. 
IV, CONCLUSION 
20. For the reasons stated above PlaintiflF respectfully request that the summary 
judgment be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEYER, PQNGRAT? & ROSEN 
DATED: July/U2001 By: 
L I Etant. Rose* 
Attorney for PlaihtiflF 
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QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
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Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY OF 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Etan E. Rosen, BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN, counsel for Plaintiff, hereby certifies 
that on the 25th day of July, 2001, he caused to be served upon all counsel of record, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid. Plaintiff Kerry Pipkin's Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
DATED this •31 
4 
day o 
ONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correc 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this 
following: 
t copy of the foregoing i nstrument was 
2001, to the 
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
One Tower 
padway 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES, ] 
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT 
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and ] 
DOES 1-50, inclusive. ; 
) PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
) DEFENDANTS MOTION TO AMEND 
) ANSWER AND TO ASSERT 
) COUNTERCLAIMS 
) Civil No. 010901074 
l Judge Roger S. Duncan 
Defendants. 
r 
STATEMENT 
This honorable Court is already familiar with some of the facts of this case as a summary 
judgment and its opposition were recently filed. 
^n - : - t A U; 51 
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Regardless, Defendants now come four months after filing their answer in this case and 
requests leave to file an amended answer, and more importantly a counterclaim for 
indemnification or breach of agreement of indemnity on behalf of Defendant Kip Cashmore. 
For the reason stated below Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants not be allowed 
to amend their answer. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants filed their initial answer to their complaint on behalf of all the named 
Defendants, including Mr. Kip Cashmore on March 29, 2001. The complaint was signed and filed 
approximately the end of January, 2001. 
There are no facts in this case that have changed from the time Defendants filed its initial 
answer to this complaint that would justify the Defendants neglect to file a counterclaim for 
indemnification at this late date. Defendants, were in possession of the supposed indemnification 
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Kip Cashmore at the time they filed their answer to 
the complaint but neglected for some reason to file a cross-complaint. Defendants now come to 
Court, without any justification or explanation as to why they should be able to file a cross-claim 
at this late date. Short of an inadvertent error, excuse, or neglect Defendants should not be 
allowed to do so. No such excuse was given. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as stated above Defendants' Motion To Amend Answer to Assert 
Counterclaims should be denied. .. - — 
Dated: ~ c> , July, 2001. 
Eton E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY I am a member and/or employed by the law firm of BEYER, 
PONGRATZ & ROSEN, 3230 Ramos Circle, Sacramento, CA 95827, and that on the ^jQ day 
of July, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendants' Motion 
to Amend Answer and to Assert Counterclaim to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
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Regardless, Defendants now come four months after filing their answer in this case and 
requests leave to file an amended answer, and more importantly a counterclaim for 
indemnification or breach of agreement of indemnity on behalf of Defendant Kip Cashmore. 
For the reason stated below Plaintiff respectfully requests that Defendants not be allowed 
to amend their answer. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants filed their initial answer to their complaint on behalf of all the named 
Defendants, including Mr. Kip Cashmore on March 29, 2001. The complaint was signed and filed 
approximately the end of January, 2001. 
There are no facts in this case that have changed from the time Defendants filed its initial 
answer to this complaint that would justify the Defendants neglect to file a counterclaim for 
indemnification at this late date. Defendants, were in possession of the supposed indemnification 
agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant Kip Cashmore at the time they filed their answer to 
the complaint but neglected for some reason to file a cross-complaint. Defendants now come to 
Court, without any justification or explanation as to why they should be able to file a cross-claim 
at this late date. Short of an inadvertent error, excuse, or neglect Defendants should not be 
allowed to do so. No such excuse was given. 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as stated above Defendants' Motion To Amend Answer to Assert 
Counterclaims should be denied. ^^— ^y 
Dated: ^ TJuly, 2001. V H J 
Efo^ ji E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff- Kerry Pipkin 
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I hereby certify that on the r day of August, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of 
Defendant Kip Cashmore's Responses to PlaintifPs Amended Request for Production of 
Documents and Defendant Randy Haugen's Responses to Plaintiff's Amended Request for 
Production of Documents to be served via first class mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
2QQ1 .\ \ ;6-q A ^ : 5 1 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
DATED: August ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
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Attorney for Defendants 
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was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
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August 8, 2001 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randy Haugen, et al. 
Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Certificate of Service. 
Please file the original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the 
copy to me in the enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
Thank you for your assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
Suzanne H. Hurst 
Secretaiy to James H. Tily 
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KERRY PIPKIN, j 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ) 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. ] 
> NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
I (Oral Argument Requested) 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents 
indicated have been filed with the Court. 
1. (a) Type of motion: Motion for Leave to Amend Answer 
to Assert Counterclaims 
(b) Date filed: July 25,2001 
(c) Party filing motion: Defendants 
(d) [X] Memorandum in support 
•q A il'-5°» 
: c : v - V 
(g) [X] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: August 9, 2001 
(i) [] Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(j) [X] Hearing requested? Yes X No 
DATED: August J* , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the j £ day 
AtAksf 
of-Jtrty, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Notice to Submit for Decision to be served, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ; 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ) 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
1 OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO 
1 AMEND ANSWER TO ASSERT 
• COUNTERCLAIMS 
> (Oral Argument Requested) 
> Civil No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendants have sought this Court's order allowing amendment of their Answer to assert 
counterclaims in this action. This motion comes less than four months after Defendants initially 
answered the Amended Complaint. Further, no trial date has been set and the case will not be 
certified as ready for trial until at least April 2, 2002. The deadline for amending pleadings is 
not even until September 30, 2001. Further, the parties have conducted little discovery; Plaintiff 
has served only one set of requests for production of documents on Defendants and have taken no 
deposition. Defendants have still yet to receive complete Rule 26 disclosures from Plaintiff. 
Close examination of Plaintiffs objections reveal that the objections are without merit. In 
Utah, "[the rules of civil procedure] must all be looked to in the light of their even more 
fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are 
afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute." Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963). Plaintiffs objection 
to Defendants' motion reveals a disregard for this fundamental purpose. The amendment 
Defendants seek will allow for that and do so without prejudice to either party and the Plaintiff 
has claimed no prejudice whatsoever in his opposition. 
FACTS 
1. The deadline for amending the pleadings is September 30, 2001. Defendants' 
Motion to Amend was filed on July 23, 2001. 
2. No trial date has been set and it is likely the case will not be certified as ready for 
trial until April 2, 2002. 
3. The discovery cutoff is not until December 31, 2001. The only discovery which 
has taken place in this case has been by Plaintiff who has served requests for production of 
documents. Plaintiff has not taken a single deposition. 
4. Defendants have still yet to receive complete Rule 26 disclosures from Plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
Rule 15(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a pleading 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a); see also Timm v. 
Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178, 1183 (Utah 1993) ("Courts should be liberal in allowing amendments 
to the end that cases may be fairly and fully presented on their merits.")- Utah courts consider the 
following factors in determining whether to allow amendment: (1) the timeliness of the motion; 
(2) the justification for the delay; and (3) any resulting prejudice to the responding party. Swift 
Stop. Inc. v. Wright, 845 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Of these requirements, the third 
is the most important: "A prime consideration in determining whether an amendment should be 
permitted is the adequacy of an opportunity for the opposing party to meet the newly raised 
matter." Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981); see also Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth, 664 P.2d 455, 464 (Utah 1983) ("A primary consideration that a trial judge must take into 
account in determining whether leave should be granted is whether the opposing side would be 
put to unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had not had time to 
prepare.") 
In this case, Plaintiff has plenty of time to respond to the counterclaim and they will 
suffer no prejudice if the Court grants the Motion to Amend. Plaintiff has served only one set of 
requests for production of documents. No depositions will have to be retaken; no written 
discovery will have to be re-served. Defendants' Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures identify witnesses and 
documents which support their counterclaims, so these matters are already known to Plaintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants should be allowed leave to amend their answer to assert their counterclaims in 
this action. First, there has been no bad faith delay. Second, there will be no prejudice to either 
party-there is plenty of time remaining for discovery and neither party has engaged in significant 
discovery which would have to be repeated. Third, forcing Defendants to bring their claims in a 
different action would be contrary to the efficient resolution of judicial disputes. Accordingly, 
Defendants respectfully request that they be permitted to amend their Answer to include the 
counterclaims attached as Exhibit "A" to the opening memorandum. 
DATED: August 0 , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
ThoAias R. karrenberg'" / 
James H. Tily ' 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg., 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the 0 _ day 
of-Ju^r, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims to be served, via U.S. Mail, 
postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. ] 
) REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL 
) ARGUMENT 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants, 
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their 
Motion for Leave to Amend Answer to Assert Counterclaims. 
DATED: August /) , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
(L i'. k 
Tftbmas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tih/ 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the J)_ day 
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument 
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. ] 
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) REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL 
) ARGUMENT 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants, 
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their 
Motion to Compel Disclosures and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees. 
DATED: August /j? ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
L i i$ 
Tffomas R./4jCarrenberg 
James H. Tily 
c o, 
m 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the/^_ day 
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument 
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
I 
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EtanE. Rosen SBN 173728 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
Telephone: (916) 369-9750 
Facsimile: (916)369-9760 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
PLAINTIFF KERRY PIPKIN'S 
RULE 26 
INITIAL DISCLOSURES 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), plaintiff hereby provides initial 
disclosures as follows: 
The following individuals are likely to have discoverable information. 
1. Kerry Pipkin, 1024 E. 5275, South Ogden, UT 84103 
(Plaintiff) 
2. Randy Haugen, 2488 Bonneville Terrace Drive, Ogden. UT 84403 
(Defendant) 
3. Kip Cashmore, 2522 Bonneville Terrace Drive, Ogden, UT 84403 
(Defendant) 
4. Mark Nelson, 2316 East 5950 South, Ogden UT 84403 
(801)476-9276 
(801) 721-9603 
(Witness) 
5. Terry Semrow, 3605 West 5700 South, Roy UT 84067 
(801)985-9097 
(Witness) 
6. Laurie Pipkin, 1024 Ease 5275 South, South Ogden, UT 84403 
(801) 940-1466 
(Witness) 
7. Ron Jenson, 3250 North 100 West, Pleasant View, UT 84414 
(801) 782-7375 
(Witness) 
The following documents are provided to support the allegations of the plaintiff; 
1. Membership Interest Purchase Agreement 
2. Amended Articles of Organization of Quick Cash, LLC 10/96 
3. Resolution of Members of Quick Cash, LLC 11 /97 
4. Amended Articles of Organization of Quick Cash, LLC 3/98 
5. Articles of Organization of QC Instant Cash, LLC 5/98 
6. West Star Investment Company, LLC Annual Report 10/98 
7. Quick Cash LLC Company Annual Report 8/99 
The following are the damages claimed by Plaintiff: 
1. Actual damages $1.5 million. [Based on estimated value of 14 interest less 
amount received]. Documentation in recorded conversation. 
2. Punitive damages in the amount of $ 1,000,000.00. 
DATED this,_
 w _ _ _ _ _ _ 
JRATZ & ROSEN 
Etan E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the^egoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this J~J day of ffJ&JSf 2001, to the 
following: ' 
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West firoadway , 
Salt Lake Cj# UT 841^1-2006 
Jftm J#f/^ 
Sandra Smith 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 2C"! 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, j 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURES 
> AND FOR SANCTIONS AND 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) (Oral Argument Requested) 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Rule 37(f), Defendants move the Court for an order that Plaintiff be 
compelled to disclose the damage information required by Rule 26 and for sanctions, costs and 
attorney's in bringing this motion. Defendants have already requested the damage information 
required by Rule 26 in two separate letters following the Plaintiffs failure to disclose the 
required damage information in their initial disclosures. (See Letters and facsimiles from James 
H. Tily to Etan E. Rosen dated July 18, 2001 and August 7, 2001, attached hereto as Exhibit A.) 
Rule 37(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "if a party fails to disclose a 
witness, document, or other material as required by Rule 26(a)(1), that party shall not be 
permitted to use the witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to 
disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose." Utah R. Civ. P. 
37(f). That rule further provides that in addition to or lieu of the sanction, "the court may order 
payment of reasonable costs and attorney fees" to the party forced to bring the motion. Utah R. 
Civ. P. 37 (f). Because Plaintiff has still failed to provide the required information on damages 
pursuant to Rule 26, this Court should issue an order that Plaintiff be compelled to produced such 
information and for sanctions, and awarding costs and attorney's fees to Defendants in bringing 
this motion. 
DATED: August / ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the / V 
day of August , 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Compel 
Disclosures and for Sanctions and Attorney's Fees was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
C/^LiAt^L ,uy t 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOTT A. CALL 
JOHN P. MUUf N 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. T1LY 
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A «OnSS»OKAi COtPOtATlON 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
July 18, 2001 
Via Facsimile and First Class Mail 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et al. 
Dear Etan: 
I received your Rule 26 Initial Disclosures on Tuesday, July 17, 2001. The disclosures 
are seriously deficient in that they fail to provide any damage calculations as expressly required 
b\ Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Please supplement your disclosures immediately so that they 
conform to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or we will be forced to seek the appropriate 
relief. 
Contact me if you have any questions. 
Sincerely, 
James H. Tily 
sh 
cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOn A. CALL 
JOHN P. MULL£N 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. T1LY 
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A ftOfESSIONAl COtfOtADON 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT lAKE CITY, UTAH S4101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
TELECOPIER (801) 364-7697 
August 7, 2001 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
Re; Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen. et al. 
Dear Etan: 
By letter and facsimile of July 18, 2001, I informed you that your Rule 26 disclosures 
were seriously deficient in that they failed to include damage calculations as required by Rule 
26. You indicated you would supplement your Rule 26 disclosures statement and send them to 
us immediately with the included damage information. We have not yet received any such 
supplement. Please supplement your Rule 26 disclosure statement immediately or we will be 
forced to file a motion to compel such disclosures and for sanctions and attorney's fees in 
bringing the motion. 
Please contact me if you have any questions regarding the above. 
Sincerely, 
ames H. Tily 
sh 
cc: Thomas R. Karrenberg 
KRIS' NOTICE TO SUBMIT 
Pats ^ y ) 7 ~ 0 I Judgs_
 f _ 
A motion/order ie being submitted to you for decision/signature. 
MOTION 
The time for responses has expired and the motion is ready for decieion. 
A hearinq ie requested on this non-dispositive motion. Fleaee indicate if you would 
\ like a hearinq Scheduled, YeS No (If yee. p\eaee return to echedullnq clerk) 
_ There ie no certificate of mailing on the motion. 
_ There was a delay in submitting this notice to you because: 
Other 
ORDER 
The time has expired for opposing party's objections. 
An objection has been filed. Fleaee indicate if you would like a hearinq scheduled. 
YeS No (If yee, pieaee return to echeduWnq clerk) 
There ie no certificate of mailing. 
There was a delay in submitting this notice to you because: 
^ W 
Other. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, j 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
> NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
> (Oral Argument Requested) 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents 
indicated have been filed with the Court. 
1. (a) Type of motion: Motion for Summary Judgment 
(b) Date filed: July 16,2001 
(c) Party filing motion: Defendants 
(d) [X] Memorandum in support 
(f) [X] Memorandum in opposition: Date Filed: Julv 25. 2001 
(g) [X] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: August 16, 2001 
(i) [X] Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): 
(1) Affidavit of Kip Cashmore filed July 17, 2001 
(2) Affidavit of Randy Haugen filed July 17, 2001 
(j) [X] Hearing requested? Yes X No 
DATED: August j}0 , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Uk 
Tfiomas R/Karrenberg 
James H. f ily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the r£_ day 
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Notice to Submit for Decision to be served, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. ] 
) REQUEST FOR HEARING AND ORAL 
) ARGUMENT 
) Civil No. 010901074 
> Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendants, 
by and through their undersigned counsel, hereby request a hearing and oral argument on their 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED: August \» ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
N iL 
TMrnas R. Kfcrrenberg 
James H. Tily 
•f~-. r \ _ r a J.- xk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the/_tf_ day 
of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of Request for Hearing and Oral Argument 
to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. * \[i^H^J 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
EtanE. Rosen f)l\j''%fj-">'££-' 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
RANQY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ] 
1 MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION 
l OF ETAN ROSEN, PORTIONS OF THE 
1 DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN 
1 AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT 
1 OF KERRY PIPKIN 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e), Defendants move to strike the Declaration of Etan Rosen, 
portions of the Declaration of Etan Rosen, and portions of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin, all of 
which are offered to support Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment. The 
"Declaration1' is not a proper document that can be considered by the Court in ruling on 
summary judgment. Rule 56(e). Furthermore, statements contained in the Declaration and 
Affidavit should be struck, because they are hearsay, lack foundation, lack personal knowledge 
or are legal conclusions and therefore inadmissible evidence that cannot be considered on a 
motion for summary judgment. The grounds for Defendants' motion are more fully set forth in 
the accompanying memorandum of points and authorities. 
DATED: August jV , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
US 
Thomas R./Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the / ^ 
day of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO STRIKE 
DECLARATIONS CONTAINED WITH PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ) 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ) 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ) 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ) 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
Plaintiffs memorandum filed in opposition to Defendants' summary judgment motion is 
not only deficient under the Utah rules, but also fails to raise a genuine issue of fact that would 
preclude Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs claims. 
I. PROCEDURAL DEFICIENCIES 
Plaintiff fails to respond to the Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Fact individually and 
disputes a number of facts without any particular reference to the fact in dispute. (See Plaintiffs 
Memorandum, responding to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Nos. 9, 11, 12, 13 and 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
15.) In addition to improperly responding to Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts, Plaintiff fails to provide any material facts or cite a single case or rule from any 
jurisdiction that would preclude Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Furthermore, 
Plaintiffs attached "Declaration of Etan Rosen" is not material that can properly be considered 
by the Court on summary judgment. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). Because Plaintiff has failed to 
provide affidavits or other supporting materials satisfying Rule 56(e) in support of Plaintiffs 
opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
II. THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE PRECLUDING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
For the reasons set forth in the Defendants' principal memorandum, under the undisputed 
material facts of this case, Pipkin cannot provide any set of facts that would support his Causes of 
Action for Fraud, Negligent Misrepresentation, Intentional Interference with Economic 
Relations, Rescission or Accounting against any of the Defendants. Pipkin's claims therefore fail 
as a matter of law, and should be dismissed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Pipkin has provided 
not a single legal argument in response to Defendants' memorandum. Rather, Pipkin attempts to 
dispute the material fact that Defendant Haugen sold his ownership interest in Quick Cash, LLC 
("Quick Cash") to Defendant Cashmore by making conclusory statements that Haugen still owns 
an interest in Quick Cash and by attaching documents that purport to show that Haugen 
maintained an ownership interest in Quick Cash. For the reasons, discussed below, neither 
Pipkin's Affidavit nor any of the documents attached raise a genuine material fact regarding 
Haugen's sale of his ownership interest to Defendant Cashmore and summary judgment should 
therefore be granted in favor of Defendants. 
A. The Attached Documents in Support of Pipkin's Opposition Memorandum 
Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment. 
Even if Plaintiffs proffered evidence could be considered and was viewed in light most 
favorable to Plaintiff, the evidence still does not preclude summary judgment. Plaintiff offers a 
January 5, 1998 check with the name Randy Haugen under the letters "QC." Plaintiff offers a 
1998 IRS W-2 form issued from Quick Cash to an employee, Amanda Lewis, with the name 
Randy Haugen listed as a general partner of Quick Cash. Plaintiff further attaches a minute entry 
from a September 8, 2000 proceeding in an employment law case that was pending in California 
against USA Cash Services. 
None of Plaintiffs proffered evidence raises an issue of material fact that would preclude 
summary judgment. The check and W-2 form do not raise an issue of material fact. At the 
most, the W-2 form shows only that Randy Haugen had not yet been taken off official IRS 
records in early 1998. The sale of Haugen's ownership interest in Quick Cash occurred on 
December 31, 1997. It would be expected that Randy Haugen's name would continue to be on 
IRS documents in 1998, when the sale occurred on the last day of 1997. The W-2 form is thus 
meaningless with respect to Haugen's ownership interest. 
Similarly, the check attached is meaningless relative to Haugen's ownership interest. The 
check only shows that in January 1998, Randy Haugen's name was still on checks issued by 
Quick Cash. Even if Randy Haugen's name were still on official checks issued by Quick Cash 
on January 5, 1998, this does not dispute the Defendants' uncontroverted evidence that Haugen 
sold his ownership interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore on December 31, 1997. Indeed, the 
signature on the check is Cashmore's signature despite that Rosen uses the check to erroneously 
state in his "Declaration" that, "Randy Haugen was signing checks under QC or (Quick Cash) 
after the supposed purchase of his interests by Kip Cashmore." (See Rosen Declaration at 14). 
The document indicating a minute entry in a sexual harassment case against USA Cash 
Services in California also does not raise an issue of material fact regarding Haugen's ownership 
interest in Quick Cash. The minute entry shows only that it was accepted as true for the purpose 
of the hearing on Haugen's motion to quash service in that action. Plaintiffs allegation in that 
proceeding that Cashmore purchased Haugen's ownership interest in Quick Cash by installment 
agreement. Indeed, this minute entry verifies that Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to 
Cashmore at the time of the agreement in December 1997. Even if Haugen sold his membership 
interest by installment agreement, that is irrelevant to the fact that Haugen sold his membership 
interest to Cashmore. In other words, when Haugen was to be paid for his interest is irrelevant 
to the fact that Cashmore owned Haugen's interest. Thus, the minute entry fails to raise any 
material issue of fact regarding Haugen's ownership interest after the sale and does not preclude 
summary judgment. 
B. The Statements Contained in Rosen's Declaration and Pipkin's 
Affidavit Do Not Preclude Summary Judgment. 
The statements made in the Rosen Declaration simply refer to the documents attached, 
which documents have already been discussed above as failing to preclude summary judgment. 
The statements made in the Pipkin Affidavit, for the reasons set forth in the Memorandum in 
Support of the Motion to Strike Portions of the Pipkin Affidavit, are inadmissible as hearsay, 
lacking foundation, lacking personal knowledge, and are conclusory. For this reason, the 
statements made in the Pipkin Affidavit should not be considered by the Court in deciding 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Furthermore, even if they were to be considered, Pipkin's conclusory allegations and 
legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not suffice to prevent the granting of a motion for 
summary judgment. See Campbell v. San Antonio. 43 F.3d 973, 975 (5th Cir. 1995); see also 
Dwares v. Citv of New York. 985 F.2d 94, 100 (2nd Cir. 1993). Thus, even if considered, 
Pipkin's statements that Haugen still has an ownership interest in Quick Cash, LLC are 
conclusory and lack and foundation and these mere conclusory allegations cannot preclude 
summary judgment. See id. 
HI. CONCLUSION 
Because Plaintiffs opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
demonstrates that there are no material facts in dispute precluding summary judgment, 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment. 
DATED: August fe ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
ju W 
Thdjnas R. K&rrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the \y 
day of August, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was served, via U.S. Mail, postage 
prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ) 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KTP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ; 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ; 
1 MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
> DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN 
1 AND PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT 
) OF KERRY PIPKIN 
> Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The declaration and portions of the affidavit attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition to Summary Judgment should be stricken, because declarations are not a proper form 
of evidence that can support a motion for summary judgment and Pipkin's Affidavit is rife with 
inadmissible statements. Rule 56(e) states, "supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on 
personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence . . . . When a 
motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party 
may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits 
or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
for trial." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). There is nothing in Rule 56 that allows for declarations to 
support a motion for summary judgment and the Declaration of Etan Rosen should therefore be 
stricken as inadmissible and not considered by the Court. See Rule 56(e). 
When Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was filed and supported by affidavits, 
Pipkin had an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 
56(e). D&L Supply v. Saurini. 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989); Thavne v. Beneficial Utah. Inc.. 874 
P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Pipkin has not responded with material allowed by Rule 56(e). The 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly supported by affidavits. Plaintiffs 
opposition merely contained a single, primarily inadmissible affidavit and no other material 
allowed by Rule 56(e), despite that Plaintiff had an affirmative duty to provide such materials to 
oppose Defendants' summary judgment motion. See id. These materials should therefore be 
stricken and not considered by the Court in ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
I. EVEN IF THE DECLARATIONS WERE PROPER TO SUPPORT 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION. THE STATEMENTS MADE IN THE 
DECLARATIONS ARE INADMISSIBLE AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE 
CONSIDERED BY THE COURT. 
A. The Declaration of Etan Rosen and Portions Thereof Should Be Stricken. 
In order for an affidavit to be of effective use in the determination of a motion for 
summary judgment, it must set forth facts as would be admissible in evidence. Preston v. Lamb. 
436 P.2d 1021 (1968); Norton v. Blackham. 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983). An affidavit that does 
not contain facts that would be admissible in evidence is subject to a motion to strike. Ho wick v. 
Bank of Salt Lake, 498 P.2d 352 (1972). 
1. Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Etan Rosen's Declaration 
Contain Inadmissible Statements and Should Be Stricken. 
Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Rosen Declaration contain inadmissible statements and 
should therefore be stricken. Testimony that would not be admissible if testified to at trial may 
not be properly be set forth in an affidavit supporting summary judgment. Western States Thrifty 
& Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 504 P.2d 1019 (1972); Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 
508 P.2d 538 (Utah 1973). Statements in an affidavit that are largely conclusory in form, and 
would not be admissible in evidence, may not be considered on motion for summary judgment. 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 587 (Utah 1983). 
\n paragraph 2, Rosen asserts, "we located a case name Virginia McQueen v. USA Cash 
Stores, Inc. where Kipley Cashmore and Randy Haugen were one of the defendants." (See 
Rosen Declaration at 1 2.) This statement is hearsay, because it is based on a "search" from 
which Rosen purportedly gathered the information and the information is offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted. Furthermore, Rosen referred to "we," however, the declaration is 
supposedly based on Rosen's personal knowledge and the "we" is never elaborated upon. 
Rosen states in paragraph 3, "apparently, USA Cash Stores, Inc. and Kipley Cashmore 
and Randy Haugen were sued by certain employees for sexual harassment." Paragraph 3 
continues, "it is my understanding that the court denied the motion to quash service of summons 
based on the fact that Mr. Haugen appears to have retained an ownership in the business that he 
supposed sold to Mr. Cashmore." Those statements are pure hearsay and are merely Rosen's 
interpretation of a minute entry in another proceeding. Furthermore, Rosen's statements in 
paragraph 3 lack personal knowledge. Rosen's lack of personal knowledge is demonstrated 
plainly by his use of the terms "apparently" and "it is my understanding." Because paragraph 3 
contains hearsay statements and statements that lack personal foundation, paragraph 3 should be 
stricken. 
Paragraph 4 of the Rosen Declaration lacks any foundation whatsoever and should be 
stricken. In fact, the statement made therein are false as demonstrated by Pipkin's own attached 
documents. In paragraph 4 Rosen states, "apparently, Randy Haugen was signing checks under 
QC or (Quick Cash) after the supposed purchase of his interest by Kip Cashmore." In fact, the 
signature on the attached check is Kip Cashmore's signature. There is absolutely no foundation 
provided for Rosen's statement that, "Randy Haugen was signing checks under QC or (Quick 
Cash)." Rosen's lack of personal knowledge and foundation to make the statement is evidenced 
by his use of the term "apparently" and the fact that the statement is complete false. Paragraph 4 
should therefore be stricken. 
Paragraph 5 of the Rosen Declaration also contains hearsay statements and statements 
lacking foundation or personal knowledge and should be stricken accordingly. Rosen states in 
paragraph 5 that a "W-2 Wage and Tax Statement for 1998 is in the name of Quick Cash, LLC. 
Randy Haugen, general partner." This statement is hearsay, because it taken entirely from a 
hearsay source, an entirely separate document. No foundation has been laid for the document 
and not only does Rosen lack personal knowledge of the contents of the W-2 Statement, but 
Rosen further lacks any foundation to make conclusions based on the W-2 Statement. For these 
reasons, paragraph 5 should be stricken. 
Paragraph 6 of the Rosen Declaration is patently inadmissible. In paragraph 6, Rosen 
states, "it appears as if Mr. Haugen retained an interest and active role in Quick Cash, LLC even 
though he claims that he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to Kip 
Cashmore." This statement lacks any foundation as evidenced by Rosen's use of the term "it 
appears as if." Rosen has no personal knowledge regarding Haugen's ownership or rather, lack 
thereof, in Quick Cash and further has absolutely no foundation for stating that Haugen retained 
an interest in Quick Cash. Furthermore, Rosen has no basis for stating that Haugen "claims that 
he did not pursue the business further after he sold his interest to Kip Cashmore." Rosen offers 
Haugen's statement for the truth of the matter asserted and the statement is therefore hearsay. 
The statements contained in paragraph 6 are inadmissible as evidence and likewise should not be 
considered by this Court. 
II. PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF KERRY PIPKIN 
SHOULD BE STRICKEN. BECAUSE THEY CONTAIN INADMISSIBLE 
STATEMENTS. 
Paragraphs 2 through 8 of Pipkin's Affidavit contains inadmissible statements and should 
therefore be stricken. Pipkin states in paragraph 2, "on or about October, 1997 Randy Haugen 
allowed Kip Cashmore access to our books and records without my knowledge." Plaintiff thus 
affirmatively admits he had no personal knowledge of any alleged access. Thus, this statement 
lacks personal knowledge and should be stricken. Pipkin then states in paragraph 1, "it is my 
understanding that Randy Haugen then asked Cashmore to propose a three-way partnership 
which did not materialize as I did not want to be in partnership with Mr. Cashmore." Again, 
Pipkin's use of the phrase "it is my understanding" evidences that he does not have personal 
knowledge of what Randy Haugen asked Cashmore, if anything, and this statement is therefore 
inadmissible and should be stricken. 
In paragraph 3 of Pipkin's Affidavit, he states, "On or about May 11, 1998, I received 
information that Randy Haugen and Kip Cashmore both signed new signature cards for the 
continued business of Quick Cash, LLC." Pipkin states merely that he "received information" 
without stating from where or from whom such information was received. This statement is 
patent hearsay and inadmissible. Thus, Pipkin's statement based on this information is 
inadmissible and should be stricken. Pipkin further states in paragraph 3 that, "I questioned 
Randy Haugen repeatedly about the new bank signature cards and he finally informed me, after a 
lot of pressure, that he never received monthly payments from Kip Cashmore. Therefore I 
understood that he decided to continue his business with Kip Cashmore . . . ." This statement 
lacks any foundation whatsoever. Pipkin's conclusion that Haugen continued to retain an 
ownership interest in Quick Cash because Haugen had a "signature card" lacks any foundation 
whatsoever, is inadmissible and paragraph 3 should therefore be stricken. 
In paragraph 4 of his Affidavit, Pipkin states, "On or about May 12, 1998 I learned again 
that Mr. Randy Haugen and Mr. Kip Cashmore were indeed partners." This statement is again 
completely without foundation, lacks personal knowledge and is hearsay. Pipkin never states 
how he "learned" that Haugen and Cashmore were partners. The statement is thus inadmissible 
and paragraph 4 should be stricken. 
Paragraph 5 of the Pipkin Affidavit contains a statement that is classic hearsay. In 
paragraph 5, Pipkin states, "On or about October 1998 I received the front page only of the 1997 
tax return relating to Quick Cash, LLC. On that page a question was asked 'Did the LLC or its 
subsidiary have transfer of [sic] acquisition of more than fifty percent (50%) in control of 
ownership?' Mr. Cashmore's attorneys answer to that was clearly 'no.'" Pipkin's statement as 
to what Cashmore's tax attorney said is hearsay, inadmissible and paragraph 5 should be stricken 
accordingly. 
Paragraph 6 of the Pipkin Affidavit contains statements for which Pipkin lacks personal 
knowledge and are without foundation. Pipkin states that, "On or about late 1999 I found 
documentation indicated [sic] that Mr. Cashmore and Mr. Haugen were partnership in Cash 
Stores, Quick Cash, LLC also doing business as USA Cash Stores, Inc. This entity us [sic] 
nothing more than a name change of my own business." Pipkin's statement that he "found" 
documentation indicating that Cashmore and Haugen were partners in Cash Stores is hearsay and 
Pipkin provides absolutely no foundation for the discovered "documentation." Furthermore, 
Pipkin concludes that the entity, Quick Cash, LLC, is "nothing more than a name change of my 
old business." This statement lacks personal knowledge, foundation and is an inadmissible legal 
conclusion. Paragraph 6 contains entirely inadmissible statements and should therefore be 
stricken. 
Paragraph 7 of Pipkin's Affidavit is also completely without foundation and inadmissible. 
Pipkin states that he, "learned that Mr. Haugen had a fifty percent (50%) ownership and Mr. 
Cashmore had another fifty percent (50%) ownership in cash stores." Pipkin provides absolutely 
no foundation or any other basis for how he "learned" this alleged information. Without any 
foundation, these statements are conclusory, based on hearsay and therefore inadmissible. 
Paragraph 7 should be stricken accordingly. 
Paragraph 8 contains statements by Pipkin for which Pipkin has no personal knowledge 
and absolutely no foundation to make. Pipkin states that the number of stores "grew from seven 
(7) stores to around seventy (70)." Pipkin provides absolutely no foundation for this statement. 
Pipkin's other statements in paragraph 8 of his Affidavit are otherwise completely irrelevant. 
Pipkin states that he, "would never have sold had I not been told that Mr. Haugen was intending 
on exiting the business" and that Pipkin "did not intend to sell to Mr. Cashmore so that he and 
Mr. Haugen can continue doing business" and that Pipkin "would have never sold had Mr. 
Haugen not pressured me to sell telling me he is getting out of the business." These statements 
by Pipkin relating to Pipkin's and Haugen's preferences for business partners and his reasons for 
selling his interest are completely irrelevant to the present action. Paragraph 8 contains entirely 
inadmissible statements and should be stricken. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Declaration of Etan Rosen should be stricken, 
paragraphs 2 through 6 of the Rosen Declaration should be stricken, and paragraphs 2 through 8 
of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin should be stricken. 
DATED: August _ft , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
[chilli 
Tti6mas R. K^irenberg 
Jajnes H. Tily 
Attorney for Defendants 
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COURT 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE TO SUBMIT FOR DECISION 
Civil No. 010901074 
Judge Roger S. Dutson 
The following matter is now at issue and ready for decision of the Court. The documents 
indicated have been filed with the Court. 
1. (a) Type of motion: Motion to Strike Declaration of Etan Rosen, 
Portions of the Declaration of Etan Rosen and 
Portions of the Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin 
(b) Date filed: August 16,2001 
(c) Party filing motion: Defendants 
(d) [X] Memorandum in support 
(f) n Memorandum in opposition: Date Filed: None filed 
(g) [] Memorandum in reply: Date Filed: None filed 
(i) 0 Other pleading(s) necessary to determine motion (specify): None 
(j) • Hearing requested? No 
DATED: September <(] , 2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Uf 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tify 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the//__ day 
of September, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Notice to Submit for Decision to be 
served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 958, 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RKT HOLDING COMPANY et al., 
Defendant, 
NOTICE OF 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
Case No: 010901074 MI 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: September 14,2001 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 10/10/2001 
Time: 10:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
These matters will be discussed: trial dates, discovery completion 
dates, jury or non-jury trial, trial length, dates for dispositive 
motions, dates for exchange of witness lists, nature and complexity 
of case, final pretrial date and settlement status. 
Counsel or parties are requested to be in their respective offices 
at the time set for the telephone conference. The clerk will 
initiate the conference call. 
Dated this l^L I day oJ ^•*<4/p*t \ot/ 
^ > < ?'<*/* itetft^uxSe/^ 
District Court Deputy Clerk 
Case No: 010901074 
Date: Sep 14, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010901074 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
ATTORNEY DEF 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail ETAN E ROSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
3230 RAMOS CIRCLE 
SACRAMENTO CA 95827 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
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Mail JAMES H TILY 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101-2006 
Dated t h i s day of ^lljjJr 20 1 / . 
'/ 
/Deputy Court Clerk 
Case No: 010901074 
Date: Sep 14, 2001 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea 
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RKT HOLDING COMPANY Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
LAW AND MOTION 
Case No: 010901074 MI 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: October 10, 2001 
Clerk: dianew 
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s) 
Defendant's Attorney(s) 
Video 
Tape Number: 
ETAN E ROSEN 
DENVER C SNUFFER 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JAMES H TILY 
D101001 Tape Count: 1003 
HEARING 
This is before the Court for a telephone conference. 
Counsel are requesting Oral Argument. Court grants. All 
pending motions will be argued. Those motions are: 
Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Declaration of Etan Rosen and 
Portions of Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin; Defense Motion to 
Compel Disclosures for Sanction and Attorney Fees; 
Defense Motion for Summary Judgment; and Defense 
Motion to Amend Answer and to Assert Counterclaims. 
Argument set 11-05-2001 at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Snuffer's 
appearance will be excused as Mr. Rosen is available and 
will be present. 
Case No: 010901074 
Date: Oct 10, 2001 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 11/05/2001 
Time: 01:30 p.m. , 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
before Judge ROGER S. DUTSON 
** CLERK REVIEW ONLY **. 
Date; 10/29/2001 
Time: 08:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
vs 
Plaintiff, 
RKT HOLDING COMPANY et al., 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 010901074 MI 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: October 10,2001 
ORAL ARGUMENT is scheduled. 
Date: 11/05/2001 
Time: 01:30 p.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Northwest 
Second District Court 
252 5 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
before Judge ROGER S. DUTSON 
THE FOLLOWING MOTIONS WILL BE ARGUED: 
a) DEFENSE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; 
b) DEFENSE MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND TO ASSERT COUNTERCLAIMS; 
C) DEFENSE MOTION TO COMPEL DISCLOSURES FOR SANCTION AND ATTORNEY 
FEES; and 
d) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN, PORTIONS 
OF DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN AND PORTIONS OF AFFIDAVIT OF KERRY 
PIPKIN. 
Dated t h i s day of OCT 1 0 2001 2 0 
-flmu v\ml 
District Court Deputy Clerk 
Case No: 010901074 
Date: Oct 10, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 010901074 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
ATTORNEY DEF 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
Mail ETAN E ROSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
323 0 RAMOS CIRCLE 
SACRAMENTO CA 95827 
Mail DENVER C SNUFFER 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10885 SOUTH STATE STREET 
MURRAY UT 84070 
Mail JAMES H TILY 
ATTORNEY DEF 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 
84101-2006 
Dated t h i s day of OCT 1 0 2001 20 
litltU \NCXXL 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Case No: 010901074 
Date: Oct 10, 2001 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Stella Perea 
at (801)395-1062 at least three working days prior to the 
proceeding. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
OCT I 2 2001 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ) 
V S . j 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ; 
Defendants. ; 
1 NOTICE OF HEARING 
> Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that a hearing has been set for Monday, November 5, 2001 at 
1:30 p.m. on all pending motions in the above-captioned matter. 
DATED: October ID ,2001. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the iy_ day 
of October, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of Notice of Hearing to be served, via U.S. 
Mail, postage prepaid, upon 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
yj/Y/MAll V\AsP 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JOHN T. ANDERSON 
FRANCIS J. CARNEY 
STEVEN W. DOUGHERTY 
SCOn A. CALL 
JOHN P. MULLEN 
JON V. HARPER 
NATHAN B. WILCOX 
STEPHEN P. HORVAT 
SHAYNE R. KOHLER 
JAMES H. TILY 
LAW OFFICES 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
SALT LAKE QTX 
200! OCT ! | P T 3 5 
SECOND DISTRICT c W T 
700 BANK ONE TOWER 
50 WEST BROADWAY 
UTAH 84101-2006 
TELEPHONE (801) 534-1700 
ER (801) 364-7697 
October 10, 2001 
Clerk of the Court 
Second District Court, Weber County 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Re: Kerry Pipkin v. Randv Haugen, et aL: Civil No. 010901074 
Dear Clerk: 
Enclosed please find the original and one copy of a Notice of Hearing. Please file the 
original in the above-referenced action and date-stamp and return the copy to me in the 
enclosed self-addressed, stamped envelope. 
•Thank you for your assistance. 
Very truly yours, 
Suzanne H. Hurst 
Secretly to James H. Tily 
(M*> 
Enclosures 
ETAN E. ROSEN, ESQ. - CBN: 173728 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916)369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)576-1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, KERRY PIPKIN 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH STORES, ] 
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT ; 
CASH, RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and ; 
DOES 1-50, inclusive. 
Defendants. 
) MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
) OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' 
) MOTION TO STRIKE THE 
) DECLARATION OF ETAN ROSEN AND 
) PORTIONS OF THE AFFIDAVIT OF 
) KERRY PIPKIN 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dudson 
) Hearing Date: November 5, 2001 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendants state in their Motion to Strike that the affidavits in support of plaintiffs 
Opposition to Summary Judgment should be stricken because "declarations are not a proper form 
of evidence that can support a motion for summary judgment..." Defendants' contention is in 
direct contravention of Utah R. Civ.P. 56(e) which allows for affidavits to be submitted in 
support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and is in direct contravention of 
defendants' own argument that ^Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment was properly 
supported by affidavits." (See page 2, Defendant's Motion to Strike). Defendants simply cannot 
have it both ways by arguing that it is proper to support their motion with affidavits but it is not 
proper for plaintiff to do the same. 
ARGUMENT 
A. PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION WAS PROPERLY SUPPORTED BY TWO 
AFFIDAVITS WHICH SET FORTH SPECIFIC FACTS SHOWING THAT 
THERE IS A GENUINE ISSUE FOR TRIAL. 
1. The Statements Made In The Declaration of Etan Rosen Are Admissible. 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires affidavits submitted in support 
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment to be made on personal knowledge, to set 
forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and to show affirmatively that the person 
making the affidavit is competent to testily as to those facts. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e). The 
Declaration of Etan Rosen satisfies these requirements and supports plaintiffs contention that 
defendant Haugen retained an ownership in the business that he purported sold to defendant 
Cashmore. The statements in Mr. Rosen's declaration at Paragraph 3 are not hearsay but are 
founded on public records. Those public records revealed a lawsuit against defendants Haugen 
and Cashmore in their capacity as owners of USA Cash Stores and also contained a ruling by the 
court, attached to the declaration as Exhibit "A'\ stating that defendant Haugen did indeed retain 
an ownership in the business. Furthermore, the statements in Paragraph 5 of the declaration 
regarding Haugen being listed as "general partner" on a W-2 form are founded on a public record 
and are admissible as non-hearsay as well. Additionally, defendants would like the Court to 
believe that because the declarations contain terms such as "apparently" and uit is my 
understanding" that they show a lack of personal knowledge and use this argument throughout 
their motion. This argument has no substance and is based on semantics alone. Defendants use 
the same logic to argue that statements in Paragraph 4 regarding the check (attached to the 
declaration as Exhibit "B") should be stricken. Because the use of the word "apparently" was in 
the statement regarding Randy Haugen signing checks under QC or (Quick Cash) after the 
supposed purchase of his interest by Kip Cashmore defendants argue that the statement is false 
and lacks personal knowledge. Defendants argument that Cashmore's signature is on the check 
lends even more support to plaintiffs contention that Ilaugen still maintained ownership because 
Cashmore signed his name to a check from Haugen's account. 
2. The Statements Made In The Declaration of Kerry Pipkin Are Admissible. 
Again defendants' arguments regarding the Declaration of Kerry Pipkin are based on 
semantics and not substance. Plaintiffs states in Paragraph 2,4fcon or about October, 1997 Randy 
Haugen allowed Kip Cashmore access to our books and records without my knowledge." 
Defendants' argue that this statement is an affirmative admission that plaintiff had no personal 
knowledge of any access. Nothing is further from the truth. Plaintiff indeed had knowledge of 
Cashmore's access to the stores and the books however plaintiff never gave his permission to 
allow such access. 
Defendants' arguments regarding Paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 are equally baseless. The 
statements contained in these Paragraphs are not hearsay but are based on admissions by Haugen 
and Cashmore and on non-hearsay business records. Plaintiffs declaration contains the specific 
facts that are required for a showing that there is a genuine issue for trial and that plaintiff is 
competent to testify to the matters stated in the declaration. Plaintiffs complaint is based on 
the same facts that are stated in his declaration which clearly indicates that there are many issues 
in dispute especially when compared to the alleged facts offered in the defendants' declarations. 
Therefore defendants' summary judgment motion and motion to strike should be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the Declarations of Etan Rosen and Kerry Pipkin should 
stand in their entirety and defendants' motion should be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Dated \o idof 
Etan E. Rosen 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of thg foregoing instrument was 
mailed, first-class, postage prepaid, on this fJ- day of (j(^O3^200\, to the 
following: 
Denver Snuffer 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dohle & Pulsen 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
James Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, 17^4101-2006 
Sandra Smith 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RKT HOLDING COMPANY Et al, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Case No: 010901074 MI 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
Date: November 5, 2001 
Clerk: dianew 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): ETAN E ROSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
Video 
Tape Number: D110501 Tape Count: 151 
HEARING 
This is before the Court on several pending motions. Court issues 
ruling. Mr. Karrenberg to prepare and submit order to Court for 
signature. 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
vs. ; 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ] 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ; 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ] 
Defendants. ; 
) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
The Court, having received and considered all pleadings submitted by the parties and 
having heard oral arguments thereon, and after considering the applicable law, hereby makes and 
enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Prior to Cashmore's purchase of Quick Cash, LLC ("Quick Cash") in December 
1997, Randy Haugen ("Haugen") and Kerry Pipkin ("Pipkin") each owned a 50% membership 
interest in Quick Cash. 
2. Kip Cashmore ("Cashmore") purchased Haugen's interest in Quick Cash in an 
arms-length transaction for $375,000 ("Haugen Agreement"). 
3. Cashmore purchased Pipkin's interest in Quick Cash in an arms-length transaction 
for $375,000 ("Pipkin Agreement"). 
4. Cashmore, Haugen and Pipkin have each fully performed under the Quick Cash 
purchase agreements. 
5. Pipkin received and retained $375,000 in consideration for the Pipkin Agreement. 
Pipkin has not tendered back nor offered to tender back any of this amount to Cashmore. 
6. Cashmore never promised nor agreed to include Pipkin in any of his future 
business ventures as a condition of the Pipkin Agreement. There is no provision in the Pipkin 
Agreement entitling Pipkin to any future royalties or profits from Quick Cash or any of 
Cashmore's other business ventures. Cashmore is the only member of Quick Cash. 
7. Haugen did not sell his interest in Quick Cash in order to replace Pipkin as his 
partner with Cashmore. After Haugen sold his interest in Quick Cash to Cashmore, Haugen has 
had no interest in Quick Cash or in any other check-cashing businesses with Cashmore. RKT 
Holding Company is a Utah company that does not operate any check-cashing or similar 
businesses and is entirely separate from any of Cashmore's check-cashing businesses. 
8. Neither Cashmore nor Pipkin made any untrue statements or negligent statements 
of material fact to Pipkin in connection with the sale of Quick Cash. 
9. All the material statements made by Cashmore or Haugen that Pipkin alleges are 
false or negligent are, in fact, true statements. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The following conclusions of law are based on the foregoing findings of fact and those 
factual findings inherent or implied in these conclusions. 
1. There is no question as to any material fact that would preclude granting summary 
judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs claims for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, 
intentional interference with economic relations, rescission or accounting against any of the 
Defendants. 
2. Pipkin suffered no legal injury as a result of Cashmore's purchase of Quick Cash. 
3. Pipkin's claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation fail, because Pipkin 
identifies no untrue or negligent misrepresentations of any material fact made by either Defendant 
necessary to support such a claim. 
4. Defendants did not act with an improper purpose or motive in selling Quick Cash 
to Cashmore and Cashmore did not act with an improper purpose or motive in purchasing Quick 
Cash, and Pipkin's claim for "intentional interference with business relations" lacks any legal 
basis. 
5. Pipkin has made no showing that legal remedies would be insufficient even if he 
had a valid claim and Pipkin is therefore not entitled to the equitable remedies of accounting or 
rescission. 
6. Pipkin has no legal claim against any other named or unnamed Defendants, 
because Pipkin has not identified any actions by any such Defendants that would give rise to any 
legal claim. 
DATED: November -
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
x, 
Tl&m^s^/ Karrenberg 
Jam^sJ^Tily 
AttoYiieys for Defendants 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Etan E. Rosen 
CERTD7ICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the _J_ 
day of November, 2001, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be served, via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
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Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726) 
James H. Tily (#8809) 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
Telephone: (801) 534-1700 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ; 
QUICK CASH, LLC, USA CASH ; 
STORES, USA CASH SERVICES, QC ] 
INSTANT CASH, RKT HOLDING ] 
COMPANY and DOES 1-50, inclusive, ] 
Defendants. ; 
) ORDER 
) Civil No. 010901074 
) Judge Roger S. Dutson 
DEC J 1 2 
On November 5, 2001 at 1:30 p.m., the Court conducted oral argument on all pending 
motions. Plaintiff was represented by his counsel, Etan E. Rosen of Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen, 
and Defendants were represented their counsel, Thomas R. Karrenberg of Anderson & 
Karrenberg. The Court having read and considered all the parties' papers relating to the 
motions, having heard and considered the arguments, having announced in open court its ruling 
on the motions, and good cause appearing for the entry of an order formally embodying the 
same, it is hereby 
Di 
• c l I 4 51FH 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
1. Defendants' Motion for Sanctions for Plaintiffs failure to make timely disclosures 
under Rule 26 is DENIED 
2. Defendants' Motion to Strike the Declaration of Etan Rosen and Portions of the 
Affidavit of Kerry Pipkin is DENIED. 
3. Defendants' Motion for Leave to Amend to Assert a Counterclaim against 
Plaintiff is DENIED. 
4. After thoroughly considering all the parties' submitted papers, alleged facts and 
legal arguments, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims is 
GRANTED. For the reasons set forth in Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Summary 
Judgment and for the reasons set forth in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court 
finds that there is no dispute as to any material fact that would preclude summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants. 
DEC 1 0 2001, 
DATED: November ,2001. 
Roger S/T)utson 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
Etan E. Rosen 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by the law firm of Anderson & 
Karrenberg, 50 West Broadway, Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, and that on the Z7^ 
day of November, 2001,1 caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served, 
via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, upon: 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento, California 95827 
lilc UjdlC^LFjl IvUsiiL 
Etan E. Rosen (SBN 173728) 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
A Professional Law Corporation 
3230 Ramos Circle 2001 OcC 20 P \: 5 5 
Sacramento, CA 95827 
(916)369-9750 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. (3032) 
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy, UT 84070 
(801)576-1400 
Attorneys for Plaintiff. KERRY PIPKIN 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KERRY PIPKIN. ) 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
RANDY HAUGEN, KIP CASHMORE, ] 
QUICK CASH, LLC. USA CASH STORES. > 
USA CASH SERVICES, QC INSTANT 
CASH. RKT HOLDING COMPANY, and 
DOES 1-50. inclusive. ; 
Defendants and Appellees. 
> NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 Trial Court No. 010901074 
1 Appellate Case No. 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff KERRY PIPKIN appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the final judgement of the Honorable Judge Roger S. Dutson entered in the above-
entitled case on December 1{, 2001. 
Dated 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgement. 
BEYER, PONjGRATZ & ROSEN 
By Id \ \ 0 
Etan E. Ros£r 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1 hereby certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF 
APPEAL by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, postage piepaid, on the 
2 i X day of: V W arx^yt^ 2&£& addressed to the following: 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2006 
KERR#TD>K!N 
010901074 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I, Fran Lund, certify that on the 28th day of December, 2001 that I sent a 
certified copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL to the UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Fran Lund, Clerk 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT 
Utah Court of Acpaals 
DEC 3 1 2001 
Pautette Sfcagg 
Cleric of the Court 
-ooOoo-
Kerry Pipkin, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, 
Quick Cash, LLC, USA Cash 
Stores, USA Cash Services, QC 
Instant Cash, RKT Holding 
Company, and Does 1-50, 
inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
ORDER 
District Court No. 010901074 
This matter is before the court on its own motion to 
transfer the appeal pursuant to Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is transferred to the 
Utah Supreme Court because it is taken from an order, judgment or 
decree of a district court in a civil case, not involving 
domestic relations, and is not within the original appellate 
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h)(1996). See Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) . A case number will be assigned by the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
Dated this 31 day of December, 2001:' 
FOR THE COURT: 
Qu liXCJ .A^a, 
Paulette Stagg,/ 
Clerk of the Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
1 hereby certify that on the 3 f day of DecewvkeT/ XOO) , a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the 
United States mail to the parties listed below: 
Etan E. Rosen 
Beyer, Pongratz & Rosen 
3230 Ramos Circle 
Sacramento CA 95827 
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr. 
Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulsen, P.C. 
10885 South State Street 
Sandy UT 84070 
Thomas R. Karrenberg 
James H. Tily 
Anderson & Karrenberg 
700 Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
Salt Lake City UT 84101-2006 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
Second District, Ogden Department 
2 525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden UT 84401 
Dated this 3 1 d aY o f December, 2001. 
By / W ^ u / foXjLj^jdb^C) 
^ S e p u t y Clerk 
D i s t r a c t Court No. 010901074 
Page 2 of 2 
^vcpxBxm Cmtrt of ptaij 
450 &avdl\ gtai* £>txzzl 
Tfi&.&BX 140210 
£al t ?Iake Cttg, ^talj 84114-0210 
<Appelixle Court <Aoranri«trai0r <&ppeilat* CUrts' Office 
tKcIeplfmtt (801) 578-3900 
(Clerk 
m ^ (801) 578-3940 
Supreme (Gmtri ^Reception 238-7967 
January 3, 2002 
ETAN E. ROSEN 
BEYER, PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
3230 RAMOS CIRCLE 
SACRAMENTO CA 95827 
RE: Pipkin v. Haugen Supreme Court Case No. 20011028-SC 
Dear Counsel: 
On December 31, 2001, the notice of appeal was received by the Utah Supreme Court. The case 
number is 20011028 and should be indicated on any future filings or correspondence. 
Rule 11(e), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that within ten days after filing the 
notice of appeal, the appellant must submit a transcript request or a certificate that no transcript is 
required. The transcript request should be directed to the court executive and the managing court 
reporter. 
The docketing statement and attachments, consisting of an original and two copies, is due within 
21 days of filing the notice of appeal in the trial court. Therefore, the docketing statement is due 
on January 10, 2002. The court, without prior notice, shall enter an order dismissing the appeal 
for failure to file a docketing statement. 
This court will permit documents of up to 10 pages (including attachments) that do not require a 
filing fee to be filed by fax. The faxed document, which must bear a facsimile of the required 
signature, will be accepted as an "original" document until the true original and any required 
copies are received by the court. The original must be received by this court within 5 business 
days from the date of the transmission by fax. If the original is not received within that period, 
the court will treat the filing as void. A faxed filing is considered "received" when stamped by 
Cl|uf Justice 
Associate GH|i*f Justice 
Cljrtstin* $L Purljain 
Justice 
Justice 
Justice 
3/0? d /O?Y 
JAM? mi 
Case No. 20011028-SC 
Page 2 
the clerk's office. The time for stamping is limited to regular office hours (weekdays, 8:00 a.m. to 
5:00 p.m.). All risks associated with the filing by fax are borne by the sender. The fax number for 
this court is 578-3999. 
Sherri Neeleman 
Deputy Clerk 
cc: DENVER C. SNUFFER JR. 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JAMES H. TILY y 
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT, #010901074 ^ 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF" UTAH 
00O00 
No, 20011028-SC 
010901074 
Kerry Pipkin, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Randy Haugen, Kip Cashmore, Quick 
Cash, LLC, USA Cash Stores, USA 
Cash Services, QC Instant Cash, 
RKT Holding Company and Does 1-10, 
inclusive, 
Defendants and Appellees 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Section 78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, this matter 
is transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. All 
further pleadings and correspondence should be directed to that 
court. 
The address of the Utah Court of Appeals is: 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Office of the Clerk 
450 S. State St. 
PO Box 140230 
Salt Lake City UT 84114-0230 
/AAUULU/ 3ff J&0Z 
FOR THE COURT: 
&y 
Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on January 29, 2002, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the party(ies) listed below: 
DENVER C. SNUFFER JR. 
NELSON SNUFFER & DAHLE 
10885 S STATE ST 
SANDY UT 84070-4104 
ETAN E. ROSEN 
BEYER PONGRATZ & ROSEN 
3230 RAMOS CIRCLE 
SACRAMENTO CA 95827 
THOMAS R. KARRENBERG 
JAMES H. TILY 
ANDERSON & KARRENBERG 
50 W BROADWAY STE 700 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101-2006 
0 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
SECOND DISTRICT, OGDEN DEPT 
ATTN: FRAN 
2525 GRANT AVE 
OGDEN UT 84401 
By Y/MJL (U^4^ \J/M 
Deputy Clerk 
X&*r 
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Fudith M. Bil l ings 
Associate Presiding Judge 
lusse l l W. Bench 
fudge 
Fames Z. Davis 
fudge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
William A. T h o m e , Jr. 
Judge 
Utaf) Court of Appeal* 
450 South State Street 
P 0 Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Appellate Clerks' Office (801) 578-3900 
Judges' Reception (801) 578-3950 
FAX (801)578-3999 
TDD (801) 578-3940 
Marilyn M. Branch 
Appellate Court Administrator 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
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OGDEN, UTAH, NOVEMBER 5, 2001 
HONORABLE ROGER S. DUTSON PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right. The first matter on the 
calendar is Kerry Pipkin vs. Randy Higen or Haugen and others. 
Mr. Rosen, which one is Mr. Rosen? You're Mr. Rosen 
and, let's see, you're Mr. ? 
MR. KARRENBERG: Karrenberg. 
THE COURT: Karrenberg, then? 
MR. KARRENBERG: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: All right. Let me just preliminarily 
indicate I've carefully reviewed all the pleadings and 
arguments and files and there was an objection to the affidavit j 
i 
of Mr. Rosen and some of the assertions in Mr. Pipkin's ! 
i 
! 
affidavit. The summary judgment being a request to finalize j 
some very important issues is the thing that needs to be very 
carefully considered on all of the seriously possible facts j 
that might exist because if there is any serious or material j 
fact that is controverted that may,have an affect on legal j 
liability then that needs to be considered by this Court. j 
I'm very, I guess you'd call be very conservative on 
granting summary judgments and very, therefore very liberal on j 
considering what might be provable at a trial. That's 
basically my approach to summary judgment. I think it's a ! 
j 
proper approach because of the finality of terminating a claim j 
ii 
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at a very early stage in a proceeding. And so though some of j 
the assertions of Mr. Rosen's pleadings are certainly hearsay | 
and although he has checked first hand on getting what he has | 
asserted, the conclusions he wishes the Court to draw, I j 
recognize are something that really rather than to cut out j 
I 
completely the allowing that to come in, I will take a look at j 
it. In other words, it's certainly not evidence that would be j 
permitted at this, at a trial but at this stage of the j 
proceedings I'm very liberal in looking at what might really bej 
there to be proven. j 
i 
On the other hand, I do have to find some substantial i 
| 
value in that and determine whether it has the intended impact ; 
that an asserting party might have weighing it and so forth and j 
so I'm not going to preclude him discussing and arguing what he | 
thinks is there because he has attached some support for those j 
positions. Now, what probative value they may have is a whole ! 
I 
other story. So, I'll allow both sides very liberal argument j 
about the issues but I'm not going to cut off a person on the j 
i 
defense or defending against a summary judgment motion from j 
presenting that evidence or to argue that evidence that's been j 
presented by affidavit and I'll accept the affidavit for what 
it says and is and as well as Mr. Pipkin's. j 
Now, that being said, I suppose that may help each of j 
you to know where to argue, given that ruling. I was going to j 
l 
rule on that as I told you in the telephone conference here I 
2 j 
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today after hearing argument but I really don't need to, I've | 
reviewed the file. I know what you're each asserting and so 
we'll proceed accordingly. ; 
Now, as far as the amendment of the pleadings, I'm j 
also very liberal in allowing amendment of pleadings but, I 
again, I think that's something that ought to wait until we seej 
where the ruling comes down on the summary judgment. And I've j 
reviewed everything in relation to the amendment of the j 
pleadings including the language of the agreement signed j 
j 
between Mr. Pipkin and Mr. Cashmore and so I know exactly what ! 
it says and I can tell you, you know, I know where we are on | 
that and we'll talk about that later if need be and probably j 
will be talking about that. But I don't want to address that j 
first. There is a motion for summary judgment that's really j 
the most important issue. Then I'd like to hear then in that ! 
order the motion for summary judgment argument and then if need j 
be we'll proceed to consider some of these other issues 
including the issues of sanctions for noncompliance with the j 
i 
rules and discovery and so forth but we'll move accordingly. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: Your Honor, Thomas Karrenberg of 
Anderson and Karrenberg on behalf the defendants. Thank you j 
j 
for the guidance. j 
THE COURT: Excuse me just one minute here. j 
I 
t 
Bailiff, I've scrapped myself and opened an old j 
wound. Would you bring me some Kleenex? I've got a bleeder | 
3 ; 
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here on the top of my hand and it's kind of annoying. Thank | 
i 
you. It happened a couple of weeks ago and it just keeps j 
getting bumped. All right. Proceed. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: Thank you, your Honor. As I said, j 
Thomas Karrenberg from Anderson and Karrenberg in Salt Lake j 
City on behalf of all of the defendants. Judge, I appreciate j 
the guidance you gave me and I appreciate the fact that you j 
obviously have had a chance to review the papers. And let me j 
j 
touch on a few relevant facts that I think goes right to the | 
I 
! 
meat of this argument. j 
As the Court I'm sure is aware, this dispute stems j 
from the sale of a check cashing business in December of 1997. j 
In fact, specifically, the sale by the plaintiff and one of the I 
defendants of their fifty percent ownership interest in a I 
limited liability to one of the defendants in the company that ; 
i 
operated the check cashing business. So, just selling a fifty 
percent interest in a limited liability company. | 
The plaintiff, Mr. Pipkin, and the defendant, Haugen, ! 
i 
! 
each were fifty percent owner in that LLC which operated the j 
business, Quick Cash, LLC, just a check cashing business with ! 
a number of stores. They sold to the each of them of separate j 
agreements, as the Court has seen, using, all three of them j 
using the same lawyers in North Carolina. So they all had j 
advice of counsel. Sold the business, sold their interest to I 
j 
defendant Cashmore. 
i 
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Now, four years later after trial, after the sale, j 
excuse me, Mr. Pipkin decides to attack that sale. He sued j 
both individuals, both the purchaser and the seller. He sued I 
the LLC which was not a party to any agreement. He sued a | 
D.B.A. of one of the LLC's. He sued a wholly owned California i 
i 
subsidiary, another LLC, owned by the LLC that operated the j 
business and he sued a third party real estate development I 
company of which Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore each hold an j 
interest that has nothing to do with the cash business. And j 
what did he sue all of these entities for? For fraud in the • 
sale of his interest. Yet most of these people had nothing to | 
do with it. j 
He sued fraud, Judge, if we look at this, this is i 
important. It's labeled as intentional misrepresentation but i 
it's fraud against all the defendants. Every one of them. 
i 
Though throughout the complaint and throughout these papers j 
i 
you're hard pressed.to find anything alleged to have been j 
represented by most of these defendants, in other words, j 
everybody but the individuals. Negligent misrepresentation j 
against all the defendants. Accounting and recession against j 
all of the defendants. But as we pointed out in the papers, j 
Judge, you haven't seen anybody tender any money back and 
intentional interference with the business, presumably with 
business relations, presumably the relationship between Mr. 
Haugen and Mr. Pipkin because it's not made clear in the papers 
5 
but that's the only business relationship that's even | 
identified. | 
Now no way that most of these allegations could even | 
satisfy a Rule 11 Motion, Judge. But rather than go through | 
that we just came for a summary judgment motion. An example, | 
how did the LC itself, Quick Cash, LC or its sub or its D.B.A. j 
make any representation in connection with the deal of which ; 
Mr. Pipkin was selling his interest? It's not in the j 
i 
complaint, it's not in the affidavits, it's no where to be j 
i 
i 
found whether intentional or negligent. Yet they've sued for j 
fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Not even an attempt to j 
make an allegation that they said anything. And how could ! 
they, your Honor? Because prior to the sale Mr. Pipkin had a j 
controlling interest in those three. How could the partnership! 
that does the real estate development have made -
THE COURT: Let me, let me stop you. My 
understanding was there was a 50/50 interest. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: Well, it was, your Honor, but it j 
was- ! 
THE COURT: It isn't, yeah, it isn't totally . j 
controlling, it's equally controlling. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: It's equally controlling but that's j 
still controlling. I mean, he could - \ 
THE COURT: Well, - -
MR. KARRENBERG: - veto anything. Nothing is going | 
6! 
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1 I to happen without the two of them agreeing -
2 ! THE COURT: That's right 
3 I MR. KARRENBERG: - in the business. 
4 ; THE COURT: But my understanding was he did not have 
5 j a greater interest than the other party. 
6 j MR. KARRENBERG: Well, that's true, your Honor. But 
7 | the companies were not involved in this transaction. | 
8 | THE COURT: I understand but I just, I just wanted to! 
9 I know if there was something I had missed. j 
10 | MR. KARRENBERG: Okay. All I meant was in a fifty j 
| i 
11 | percent interest he has as much to say about what goes on this j 
12 j company as anybody else and, Judge, the companies were not j 
13 j involved in this transaction. These are transactions, two i 
14 I separate transactions between two, between two individuals, Mr. j 
15 | Cashmore and Mr. Pipkin, Mr. Cashmore and Mr. Haugen ! 
16 ! separately. I 
| ! 
17 j Now, how did this RKD Holdings, the real estate j 
18 j development company, have anything to do with it? We put j 
19 | affidavits in that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore have been in j 
!
 I 
20 I this real estate development company for a number of years. j 
21 j That they have -
22 ; THE COURT: Mr. Rosen, let me just ask you before we 
23 ; spend time on this. Are you seriously pursuing the RKT Holding 
24 | Company in this matter? 
I 
25 I MR. ROSEN: Let me explain our frustration, your 
7 
i 
Honor. When, if your Honor is asking are we seriously | 
pursuing, obviously - j 
THE COURT: Well, let's take your theory to it's J 
fullest extent and that is that somehow this RKT Holding ! 
Company got the full half interest that was originally owned j 
and let's say that that full amount went into the RKT Holding \ 
Company, how would this be involved in your suit. In other j 
words, -
MR. ROSEN: And, your Honor - ! 
THE COURT: - what would be the connection because if j 
you're serious, yes, I'll let you argue it. If you're not then; 
I'll cut it off now. I just wanted to know if you after you'vej 
i 
discovered and done some preparation for this - j 
I 
MR. ROSEN: Right. ! 
THE COURT: - if you're intending to seriously pursue: 
the RKT Holding Company claim. 
I 
MR. ROSEN: The truth of the matter, the evidence we j 
i 
l 
have at this early in the game and we haven't taken depositions I 
i i 
but from what we've been able to agcomplish today we understand! 
i 
that Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore are involved in an entity j 
i 
named as Weststar Investment Company, LLC, and then a new J 
company called USA Cash, also known as USA Cash Services, Inc., j 
Kip Cashmore individually, Randy Haugen individually. These ! 
entities seemed to have existed before and one of them seems to ; 
be a continuation - j 
8 ! 
1 I THE COURT: Well, I take your answer is yes, you are 
2 | intending to pursue RKT? 
3 | MR. ROSEN: I'm getting to this. To this date we 
4 | have no direct evidence in our hands that RKT is an entity that 
5 | we can pursue based on the evidence. At the same time we found; 
6 | other entities that these gentlemen own together and we might I 
7 j have to substitute them in as substituting some (inaudible) j 
8 ! but- ! 
i 
9 | THE COURT: All right. j 
i i 
10 j MR. ROSEN: - not RKT. j 
11 j THE COURT: I think your answer is yes. Go ahead j 
12 ! then. 
13 | MR. KARRENBERG: And assuming that's what the answer ; 
14 | is, your Honor, the question is it is time for summary judgment j 
15 | motion, Judge, and, your Honor, you know I understand your j 
i ; 
I i 
16 j position on the motion to strike and how you'd like to view j 
' i 
17 j yourself as liberal on granting. Rule 56(e) does require that ' 
18 j at summary judgment time if the evidence of the moving parties 
19 j supported by affidavit on personal,knowledge - which every bit • 
20 ; of ours is - that the defendant has the obligation to come in 
: i 
21 ! with evidence that's admissible in court. Now, Judge, I just j 
22 | heard Mr. Rosen complain and he complained to us in the j 
23 | telephone conference that it's early in the proceeding. But, j 
24 : Judge, no one has made a Rule 56(f) motion whatsoever, your j 
25 ! Honor. No one has done that. No one has attempted any j 
I 
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discovery up to this point to deal with it. ! 
Judge, so it is time to come forward with evidence j 
that's admissible at trial rebutting what we've put in which is! 
all admissible at trial. RKT Holdings by the affidavit has i 
absolutely no interest whatsoever in the check cashing I 
business. Never has, does not, and is not intended to. How ] 
they could be in the lawsuit I don't know. There is nothing ini 
there that Quick Cash, L.C., made any representations, not even 
claimed in the complaint. Nor that the other entities, the j 
wholly owned subsidiary in California or the D.B.A. do they. j 
Another claim against all these defendants including Mr. Haugen ; 
is that he interfered with business relations. 
Now, Judge, the law is clear in this State. You : 
cannot interfere with your own contracts. What business 
relations did Mr. Haugen interfere with? His relationship with \ 
Mr. Pipkin? It's not legally cognizable. There is no claim on: 
here. What we're really down to is a fraud claim or a j 
negligent misrepresentation claim made, supposedly made by | 
against Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore in connection with the 
sale. But, Judge, we went through the complaint carefully as 
we looked at the papers and we looked at what is alleged and 
there hasn't been anything else changed about what the alleged 
fraud is at this point. Paragraph 17 is one of the allegations 
they say my clients did. Mr. Cashmore specifically. That he 
offered $750,000 jointly for each of their interests, half to 
10 
one, half to the other. Well, Judge, it's absolutely true. 
Not only did he offer it, he did it. It wasn't a ! 
misrepresentation and he paid it. A lot of money. j 
Secondly, your Honor, in paragraph 17 of the j 
Complaint, the other allegation - and this is all we're allowed! 
to deal with because this is what he sued on. He hasn't moved j 
to amend. Haugen told Pipkin that Haugen no longer wanted to j 
own the check cashing business. Well, as the affidavit says, j 
that's absolutely true. It is not a misrepresentation. He did; 
j 
not want to be in the check cashing business. He wanted out of! 
it-
Paragraph 23 indicates there was an omission that ! 
Haugen somehow secretly wanted Cashmore to be his partner. j 
Well, Judge, we've came through with the evidence, admissible | 
evidence, Mr. Haugen both on both their affidavits has no 
interest whatsoever in the check cashing business with ! 
Mr. Cashmore, none. Absolutely zero. It's in affidavits. We 
have the originals, the original agreement to sell the interest i 
and Mr. Cashmore has paid the money for that interest. They ! 
are in this real estate development business that has nothing | 
to do with this. So, what was omitted? Nothing. j 
Paragraph 19, 21, and 23 of the Complaint, the ! 
I 
plaintiff claims that Haugen is still involved in the check 
cashing business. Again, the affidavit is admissible show he \ 
is not. ! 
Now, what evidence has come back? As I indicated, j 
Judge, while I appreciate your concern about summary judgment, j 
it is under the rules time to come in and present your ! 
i 
! 
evidence. Now, Judge, I'm on that rules committee, the | 
advisory committee for the Supreme Court and we take great care j 
in writing those and there is an option. If you don't like 
what, if you don't believe you've had enough chance to do 
discovery. It's called Rule 56(f). You move the Court - j 
THE COURT: But is still ends up being discretionary j 
with the Judge, doesn't it? j 
I 
MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, I have no doubt about that. 
I have no doubt about whose courtroom I'm in and who is in j 
charge here. I've been around long enough to know otherwise. j 
But, your Honor, it also is, should be discretionary with the 
judge when the claim has no merit and the plaintiff has not j 
come forward with any admissible evidence. There is no good 
reason to indulge such claims. You have better things to do. 
The clerk's office has better things to do. My client's have 
better things to spend their money ,on, your Honor, and I've got 
plenty of business. We don't need to be subsidized dealing 
with bad claims. And it is, if there is no evidence there is 
none. Now, what did they come up with? And, your Honor, it's 
actually in the motion to strike. Mr. Rosen files a 
preliminary ruling in California on a case dating back for 
events prior to the sale on a sexual harassment case in 
California and he attaches the preliminary ruling. ; 
Now, Judge, I know, I use to practice in California j 
years ago when I first started out and I came back home and a I 
preliminary ruling is just, what they do in California to save [ 
I 
time is the judge will issue preliminary ruling, just like you | 
sort of did except it will be a little bit in writing so that j 
when you come in in the morning and you go to the motion j 
i 
calendar, you can look at what the judge's preliminary decision! 
is and you can direct your arguments at it. It's not even a | 
final ruling. j 
I 
MR. ROSEN. I'd object to that as being not a j 
I 
statement of truth, your Honor, and I (inaudible). j 
MR. KARRENBERG: I understand when you ask him to j 
interrupt the argument but I'd rather have the courtesy of 
having my argument go on until under his turn and I won't ! 
I 
! 
interrupt his, as well. j 
THE COURT: Continue. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: Thank you, sir. j 
Now, Judge, but in any event there is a rule. If youj 
want an official document there is a rule of evidence that j 
shows how you get it in. You don't go into the file and just j 
take it. The preliminary ruling is full of hearsay in the 
first place and it was on a motion to quash a subpoena. It 
wasn't anything conclusive. It wasn't res judicata. It's not 
even argued. It wasn't even argued as collateral estoppel and 
13 00 286 
it wasn't argued that there was evidence. It was just whether j 
| 
i 
or not the subpoena should be quashed and it's not even a final! 
ruling. Now, is this certified in accordance with the Utah | 
Rules of Evidence? No. And what even if it was, Judge? You'd! 
consider like you want to say. It's nothing but a motion of j 
quash. Nobody, there is no finding in there. If this was such | 
a great piece of evidence, why don't we have the evidence that 
says he is there? And if you look what's in there, what the ! 
i 
Court made its ruling on in the preliminary ruling, it's j 
manufactured evidence. It says Mr. Haugen's former partner. ; 
Well, there is only one, Mr. Pipkin. The plaintiff here claims! 
he's involved. That's manufacturing your own evidence, Judge, 
and he has no foundation for it. j 
What else? A W-2 form for '98. The tax records had j 
to be changed in '98 for a x97 form. Again, it's not, it | 
i 
wouldn't be admissible. I'd object to this at trial. The I 
Court would have no choice but to keep it out because it has ! 
not been properly authenticated but so what? A W-2 form? Then 
he has a check dated in January of /98 and he says it's got Mr. 
Haugen's name still on it. Of course, it's from the business, 
Quick Cash, L.C., and here is exact proof of why we have these 
rules that you have to have proper foundation, your Honor, 
because the signature on that check is Mr. Cashmore's. The 
fact that they're still using old checks from the business 
doesn't mean anything. It has raised no evidence, no weight 
whatsoever, Judge. j 
And look at the other evidence. Mr. Pipkin's 
i 
affidavit. What does he say in paragraph 1? My understanding j 
is that Haugen and Cashmore, that Haugen asked Cashmore to ! 
i 
propose a three way partnership. Well, it's his understanding, j 
That's hearsay, Judge, by any definition plus Haugen proposed, j 
j 
it doesn't say it was done that way. So what? ! 
Number 2, that Haugen allowed Cashmore access to the 
books. Not on personal knowledge. It's on, it's only on j 
i 
hearsay information and so what? What does have, any j 
misrepresentation by any of my clients? j 
Number 3, on 5/11/98 he writes, paragraph 3, I j 
received info that both defendants signed new signature cards 
for Quick Cash. I received. Where are these signature cards? ! 
i 
Where is the proper foundation? Where is the evidence? What 
does this prove? Nothing. j 
5/12/98, in paragraph 4, he says I learned that the ! 
defendants are indeed partners. Not any foundation. Where did
 ! 
he hear this? Where did he learn t;his. The uncontroverted j 
i 
evidence is they're not. ! 
Paragraph 5, I received a ^95 front page of a tax I 
i 
return when an attorney answered his question that, i.e., J 
before the sale no one had 100 percent interest. That's the I 
year it was sold as well as, again, hearsay evidence. j 
i 
Paragraph 6, I found documentation that Cashmore and \ 
1 5 I 
Haugen were partners. Where is the documentation, Judge? 
Where is the authentication? 
Paragraph 7, Pipkin claims he learned that Haugen had 
50 percent and Cashmore had 50 percent. Claims he learned? 
Where? Judge, those are just allegations. That is not 
evidence. 
Haugen, here's another one, paragraph 8. He claims 
that the number of stores grew from seventy to, from seven to 
seventy. It's not even true, your Honor. It's not even true. 
Now, what is he rely on? The only thing in the 
Motion to Strike is he says the business record. Again, your 
Honor, there is rules. It says how you get a business record 
in. None of these are certified by the custodian. None of 
these are established as a business record. We are dealing 
with nothing but rankest hearsay and nothing but allegations 
and we have submitted sworn affidavits saying it is not true, 
Judge. There was nothing opposing this Motion for Summary 
Judgment that would be at all closest to competent evidence to 
say that there any misrepresentations that were relied on to 
anybody's damage. 
And, Judge, one other thing, he's received $375,000. 
There is not one allegation that he's given it back for a 
recission for a fraud claim which is the preferred remedy. 
Judge, my client, Mr. Cashmore bought a business from the two 
of them. The documentation is there. For some reason and I 
16 
for the life of me can't figure out what it is, Mr. Pipkin j 
seems to think that somehow these gentlemen are in business I 
together. Your Honor, we have put sworn affidavits in they are j 
not. Mr. Haugen receives no business, no monies whatsoever out! 
of this business outside of the note on his $375,000. It was i 
an arms-length transaction where everybody was represented by ! 
counsel. He sold his personal property. His interest in an j 
LC. None of these companies had anything to do with it and j 
there is not one alleged misrepresentation or omission of j 
material fact that should withstand this motion. Thank you, ! 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: And, again, your Honor, I will j 
submit, since the Court has read the papers, I'll submit the j 
Motion to Amend. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
You may proceed. I 
i 
MR. ROSEN: Thank you, your Honor. My name is Etan | 
Rosen and I appreciate the Court al/lowing me to practice here j 
Pro Hac Vice and I have the Utah Rules and I studied them and I : 
understand many things about your jurisdiction. I understand j 
that the motion for summary judgment is in its essence treated | 
as a motion for summary judgment in California which means you j 
i 
still have to show that there are materials, that there are 
matters, (inaudible) material fact that are in dispute. It's i 
1 7 I 
1 I not who has better evidence, it's do I have some evidence that ! 
I j 
2 1 is in dispute that is material to the case? That by itself j 
3 | does not change between California and Utah even though there j 
4 j are changes since my learned colleague here, Mr. Karrenberg on | 
5 ! practice in California and I'll get into it. j 
I | 
6 ! One thing that I wanted to bring out in my affidavit j 
7 | as it regards to Exhibit Number C of my declaration was a W-2 i 
8 | Wage and Tax Statement for 1998. I made a mistake by getting j 
9 ; by the "L" slot that in 1998 the Wage and Tax Statement is j 
10 | given in 1998. Well, in 1998 Wage and Tax Statement the W-2 j 
11 i Form is given in the year 1999, the year after. It is given by j 
12 | January 30th or January 31st as the year may be to an employee. I 
13 j In this case I found Amanda Lewis and this is straight from ! 
i i 
14 | Court records that I found it. Amanda Lewis in 1999, January 
15 | 30th, received a W-2 Wage and Tax Statement and it said Quick 
16 ! Cash, LLC, Randy Haugen, General Partner. This is not only a j 
17 ! month after the sale, this is a year and a month after the 
18 | sale. 
j 
19 | Regarding the check that ,we presented, Q.C., Randy 
20 j Haugen, check number 1214. Now, the interesting part of that 
i 
21 | check is that it is signed, the handwriting on that check is 
i 
22 j Mr. Haugen's handwriting. The signature is Kip Cashmore's 
23 ! signature. It's dated January 5, 1998, well after the sale. 
i 
24 j And the question is why is Mr. Randy Haugen signing, writing 
25 j checks if he sold the business. Why is he still writing checks 
18 
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and why is he on the tax return? Not tax return but why is he 
on the W-2 Statement? Now, I can understand that argument, you I 
know, that a few months after the sale they just didn't catch j 
j 
this but this is a year after. 
And here comes the issue of the tentative ruling that j 
came in Sacramento County. Now, that's a County where I j 
practice. We only have two law and motion departments and \ 
that's all they do. And the new rule for the last year has j 
been that a minute order which you have in front of you becomes! 
effective immediately. There becomes no formal order. There j 
has been just too much law and motion. This then became the j 
order of the court. And what has happened in this case is that; 
a jurisdiction was, this attorney and her name is Wendy York, j 
tried to establish jurisdiction over Mr. Haugen in California 
regarding a Cash store in California, in Sacramento. Mr. j 
Haugen, of course, came in and said, Well, I sold my interest ! 
in 1997. I have no interest. There was, there were a lot of ; 
papers, there were a lot of pleadings that went back and forth | 
and this is the judge's ruling. Th,e judge ruled and this is 
Department 54 which, I'm sorry, Department 53 which would be j 
Judge Coupiarchi, ruled that it appears that Mr. Haugen has 
retained an ownership interest in the business for personal j 
j 
financial reasons. So he might have or he might have not. I 
It's still a material issue of fact that has to be determined. 
Now, these are only issues. That doesn't win a case. I 
no ;?7^L9i 
I sit here and I hear Mr. Karrenberg say granted $375,000 is a j 
lot of money. Well, it is and it isn't. First of all, in j 
California it doesn't even buy a small house and, second of j 
all, our claim is that Mr. Haugen who had power over our client I 
because he was above him in the AMWAY business told our client j 
we were partners in Quick Cash, LLC. It was our business. It j 
was ours. We built it to seven stores. In fact, I just drove I 
by the first one that they have here. I want out of this I 
I 
business. I don't want to be involved in it anymore. I want j 
you to meet this guy. He's going to buy us out but I don't 
want to be involved in this. ! 
THE COURT: Let me ask you, Mr. Rosen. j 
MR. ROSEN: Yes. | 
THE COURT: Get right to the heart of this thing. If! 
I were to accept all of your arguments, how did that rise to j 
i 
the level that you're claiming of misrepresentation or j 
inducement to enter into this agreement? Are you saying that i 
by him being in a superior position in AMWAY somehow translates i 
i 
to him influencing your client's decision to the degree that he! 
did not have his own free will to decide what he wanted to do? 
MR. ROSEN: This is only part of the argument, your 
Honor. My client indicated and it's in the pleadings that he 
did not want to sell. It says in his declaration - j 
THE COURT: Well, let's suppose he didn't want to j 
sell and let's just suppose that Haugen wanted to get him out j 
20 j 
1 I of the business and he told him that, you know, I'm tired of 
2 I doing business whether it's with you or what and that, in fact, 
3 | he's still a partner. Let's say that your claim is absolutely 
] true -
5 MR. ROSEN 
6 | THE COURT 
7 ! MR. ROSEN 
8 | THE COURT 
Right. 
- that he is a partner with Cashmore. 
Right. 
How does this all rise to the level of 
9 ' your claims? 
10 ! MR. ROSEN: It was worth a lot more that $375,000. 
11 ; THE COURT: Well, but your client is a grown man. 
12 | He's been involved in business for years. Are you saying he is 
13 j so naive that he couldn't make decisions on his own? I 
! i 
14 | MR. ROSEN: The decisions that the cards were 
i i 
15 I stacked, your Honor. And that's - | 
1
 ! 
| ! 
16 | THE COURT: Well, tell me how they were stacked. How! 
17 | was he forced or compelled or mislead to the degree that he did j 
18 i not act freely and voluntarily in entering into his contract? I 
19 ; How did that happen? 
20 ! MR. ROSEN: Mr. Haugen, again, was his superior in 
21 j the AMWAY business and this is at the level that they were in, | 
j ! 
I j 
22 | at the level that they were in they were generating well in j 
i ! 
23 | advance of four to $500,000 a year from their businesses. J 
24 | THE COURT: Isn't that all the more reason that your I 
25 ; client should be aware of business dealings? 
I 2 1 i 
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MR. ROSEN: Said to him, I'm getting out of this | 
business. You've got to, my client could not run this on his j 
own. There were seven stores. His partner and his mentor and j 
his supervisor, so to speak, in the AMWAY business - | 
i 
THE COURT: No, but just a minute. Supervisor in ! 
AMWAY. How does that work? Tell me what exactly your evidence ! 
would be that he was in such a controlling position that he i 
would have been able to compel or to influence your client's j 
decision making on this collateral side business to the degree j 
that you claim that I ought to set aside the original 
transaction and look beyond that. Now how could that happen? j 
Tell me. \ 
MR. ROSEN: Well, if you want to know the evidence, j 
the evidence will be my client's testimony and also the people 
that were in his organization. That will, of course, be the j 
evidence and whether or not he's believable or not -
THE COURT: Well, but what's it going to show if you | 
prove everything you intend to prove with it? What would it j 
show? | 
MR. ROSEN: It would show the following. It showed j 
that there was an attempt to take fifty percent off the j 
business that was worth substantially more than $375,000, naive j 
or not, away from client and move his position - j 
THE COURT: I can see the result you're after but I'm; 
saying at the time of the transaction is what we have to look 
i 
2 2 i 
at. j 
MR. ROSEN: Right. It was worth then more that j 
$375,000. j 
THE COURT: Well, let's say it was but at that time, j 
how is his position in AMWAY in relation to your client going | 
to impact that? I'd like to know just what your evidence wouldi 
i 
be. | 
MR. ROSEN: All right. AMWAY works, if I understand j 
correctly, on an organization basis and you go up the chain of ! 
command. Mr. Haugen was superior to my client in his chain of 
I 
command. j 
THE COURT: True. j 
MR. ROSEN: He had substantial retribution mechanism j 
towards my client. In fact, my client will testify that this I 
has been happening and his income, because of this lawsuit is 
income that has gone from about $15,000 a month, has shrunk to 
I 
close to $3,000 a month from the AMWAY side. Now, Mr. Haugen | 
i 
has the ability to exclude my client from AMWAY dealings if he j 
so wishes because he is higher above him in the command. He i 
can - I 
THE COURT: Well, but doesn't your client in the j 
AMWAY business get those working under him to generate the j 
i 
money for him? j 
MR. ROSEN: Correct. I 
THE COURT: Then how then does someone else above him | 
23 
1 I influence that? 
2 J MR. ROSEN: Because he is in such a superior position 
3 J and he is in his organization which means he can contact -
4 | which he has done - people in his organization and say from now I 
i I 
5 | on we do not work with the branch that involves Kerry Pipkin 
6 I and he has done that. And we, in fact, have taped 
7 | conversations of this. 
8 I Now, to bring the case in summary judgment motion 
9 | three, four months after it started when I had discussions with 
10 ! the office of Mr. Karrenberg, when Mr. Tily' s office said we 
11 ; really need to take some depositions here. We need to get this 
I 
i 
12 J thing out. If you think at the end of the depositions - and we 
13 I only have three depositions here. We have Mr. Cashmore, Mr., j 
j | 
14 ; Mr., sorry, Haugen, and my client. If, after the depositions j 
15 | are taken you do not believe we have a case then you bring a \ 
16 ! summary judgment. But, no, this had to be done this way and I J 
j i 
17 j thought at least I showed enough evidence to survive the j 
18 | summary judgment so we can establish the depositions and start \ 
19 | discovery because all we've done 1§, of course, get some I 
20 ! records but - and then they have prejudice. They can bring j 
21 ! their summary judgment at a later date. In fact, I'm sure that I 
! i 
22 I they will if they think there is still no case. Our case is j 
23 | simply one of money. That's all it is. We believe that these ; 
24 ! gentlemen, Haugen and Cashmore, are involved in. What have I i 
25 ; found? Haugen International, Freedom Associates, Dream ; 
I 24 < 
Builders, Inc. There's fifteen different lawsuits I found herej 
alone. I found four different entities that they're involved j 
in. Aside from the 63 Cash stores that they seem to be j 
operating together and, yes, they say in the declaration that | 
l 
they're not continuing doing business together. But what has j 
happened here is a typical squeezing out of a partner. Now you \ 
can say how naive is my client? I don't know. I don't know. j 
It seemed to have been, one, that he was just squeezed out. j 
I 
! 
Now, he says $375,000 and what I got from my fifty percent 1 
interest is simply not enough and I have evidence that can show j 
i 
that it was worth more than that and I would have not moved if j 
Mr. Haugen had not told me to do this. 
I don't know how the case will turn out, your Honor. 
I don't know how it will turn out. I don't know if my client 
will prevail on the merits because he has the burden of proof 
but I know as we speak we have evidence. Now, it might not be 
in the most beautiful way but we have a check and we have a W-2 I 
showing that they were involved and now this morning I found j 
some partnership share in Kl Schedules that fly in the face of j 
what I was told. And for my little research this morning I j 
found another business that they're involved in, Weststar 
Investment Company, LLC. j 
I mean, your Honor, I agree with you as you speak \ 
that I probably don't have any evidence right now RKT Holding 
Company. When we filed the complaint we had enough information j 
25 i f; n <) 7 o 
to think that these guys have enough evidence. (Inaudible) not 
West Star Investment in front of me. And I have the Articles 
of Organization signed by Mr. Haugen, Mr. Cashmore and a 
gentleman called Troy Thompson and then it looks like he was 
taken out. This is of 1996. At the very minimum my client was 
not disclosed to when he entered this deal that these gentlemen 
have such an extensive relationship between them that he needs 
to look into it. He was simply, he was simply mislead. He was 
mislead. He basically gave away a fifty percent interest in a 
check cashing business for $375,000. With all due respect, I 
understand it's a lot of money but it's really not. It's 
really not. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. KARRENBERG: Your Honor, may I respond? 
THE COURT: Do you have anything further, Mr. Rosen? 
MR. ROSEN: Yeah. Yes, I do. There were two issues, 
again, that I have discussed, not with Mr. Karrenberg because 
he assigned a lot of the work for Mr. Tily to do. I discussed 
with Mr. Tily my need to take depositions in this case and Mr. 
Tily and I agreed the depositions will be taken after the 
summary judgment motion. Of course, assuming we are 
successful, we basically agreed to that. 
There is another issue. The Rule 26 disclosures. 
Now, the Rule 26 disclosures is one that I place fault on 
myself. I've read your local rules. There was one issue in 
the local rules that we needed to, that we needed to disclose | 
our proposed damages or at least what we thought at the time j 
were our damages. We did that. Mr. Tily and I agreed that he j 
is going to drop that motion off calendar. In fact, he called \ 
me and told me he's dropping that motion off calendar. If that I 
motion was dropped off calendar, I do not see why the Court 
should rule on that motion. I agree, Rule 26 disclosures was | 
i 
lacking. It was supplemented but that motion should have been 
dropped off calendar by a call from Mr. Tily to myself. That's! 
all I have to say. j 
MR. KARRENBERG: Your Honor, briefly. There has been; 
! 
some absolute misstatements to the Court. As far as j 
depositions, Mr. Rosen and I spoke directly. He tried to have j 
his secretary call me to schedule them and I called back and j 
said I need to speak to him directly because scheduling is too 
difficult and I keep my own calendar. We spoke, he tried, he j 
asked from certain dates for my clients. I told him they j 
weren't available. I gave him alternative dates. In the j 
meantime we had filed our motion fpr summary judgment. On his \ 
choice he chose to wait and see what happened on the summary | 
judgment before taking the depositions. It was not an 
agreement. If he wants to notice up depositions and do it 
properly under the Rules, he is free to do so. If he wants to | 
not notice them up, he's free to do so. If he wants to follow j 
i 
I 
Rule 56(f) motion, he's free to do so. j 
i 
27 j 
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As far as the Rule 26 Motion, we have not withdrawn 
that motion. Judge, we talked about that in the telephone 
conference, scheduling conference. And, your Honor, listening 
here today proves the need for that motion. I have tapes, he 
said. Those weren't disclosed. I have employees of the old 
company who are going to testify. Those weren't disclosed as 
witnesses. He has employees within the organization. That's 
not disclosed. He now says he's got different entities and 
lawsuits and evidence where it said that the company was worth 
more than $750,000. That wasn't disclosed. That's exactly 
what Rule 26 was meant to stop. That kind of stuff. That's 
why we wrote that rule that way. Not to come in here and not 
do it. 
Now, Judge, here is why I made the motion to strike 
and I think Mr. Rosen's argument proves the point. I tell you 
that the check that he puts in that we've objected to is Mr. 
Cashmore's signature. Mr. Rosen now, not with the handwriting 
expert of any affidavit says it's Mr. Haugen's handwriting. 
Where does that come from, Judge? .What, he can't be 
testifying. 
And, Judge, we haven't heard anything about these 
other LLC's, these other partnerships, but, Judge, even if 
that's true and they exist, what difference does it make? 
Since when, where was the representation that someone said you 
have, Pipkin, you have to sell the Cashmore because I want 
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nothing to do with Cashmore and I don't have anything to do 
with them. They're allowed to have other businesses. There is 
not even any claim in the complaint that there was an omission 
that he relied upon that he thought was material that they had 
no relationship together. Do you want to know why, Judge? 
Because they couldn't do it. Mr. Cashmore was involved in 
AMWAY with these gentlemen, too. He knew that these gentlemen 
had a relationship. And even if he didn't, so what? 
Now, Judge, the claim here as I went through in the 
beginning is fraud, negligent misrepresentation. You just 
listened to Mr. Rosen say that the reason it's no longer that 
there's misrepresentation or omission, that there is some sort 
of duress in connection with the AMWAY relationship. Well, 
Judge, there is no duress claimed in the pleadings. 
Secondly, your Honor, we haven't addressed this in 
the papers because it's not in the pleadings. There is not 
economic duress in Utah. The Utah Supreme Court is crystal 
clear on that. It doesn't exist. Now he claims there is some 
sort of control relationship. Well, under the Vonhockev case 
there could be possibly a confidential relationship that could 
lead to a breach of fiduciary duty though I can't imagine this 
would withstand that but that's not plead. Judge, we have him 
come up here and argue a whole different case. We have 
submitted evidence that on the representation claims whether 
they were intentional or negligent that there were no 
29 
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misrepresentations of material fact and that there were no | 
omissions of material fact. We have supported it with J 
competent evidence that is admissible at trial. There has been | 
nothing opposing that. Your Honor, I respectfully submit that 
the motion should be granted. Thank you for your time, Sir. I I 
appreciate it. j 
THE COURT: Thank you. | 
Mr. Rosen, I'm going to allow you to respond if you | 
wish. 
i 
MR. ROSEN: Is defendant infliction duress claim for j 
t 
what he has done from what Randy Haugen could have inflicted on j 
my client such as maybe in California would be intentional | 
infliction of some kind of a distress? No, there isn't. Therej 
I 
isn't in California a business dealing. What we're saying is j 
his position. He was the source of my client's income. | 
Without him, without his sponsorship in AMWAY my client's j 
income is minimal and this is actually a fact. So, what this j 
gentleman did, he said to him, Hey, as your sponsor in AMWAY ; 
I'm selling, you're selling, too. ,And this is what it is. j 
Now, is this fraud? It is fraud if he didn't tell him all the ! 
facts. If you get into a business deal, yes, you're not - j 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, let me just stop you there. | 
j 
Let's suppose that Mr. Haugen had all of the intentions that j 
you attribute to him and that is he was going to get right back j 
into a full blown business relationship with Mr. Cashmore and 
! 
! 
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proceed to do everything that he and Mr. Pipkin had been doing, 
let's suppose in a hypothetical argument, at least, that's the 
case. Are you arguing then that that is, in fact, a breach of 
some duty or responsibility by not disclosing that? 
MR. ROSEN: The problem here is that he specifically 
6 | disclosed the opposite. My client claims that he -
7 ! THE COURT 
8 j MR. ROSEN 
9 j THE COURT 
10 '• MR. ROSEN 
i 
11 I THE COURT 
What if he changed his mind? i 
He changed his mind the day after? j 
j 
What if he did? j 
Well, I mean - I 
Let's suppose that, you know, originally 
12 j one intent existed and another intent emerged at a later point ! 
13 j in time and let's suppose that he continued to represent that j 
j i 
14 | he wanted to get out of the check cashing business. That's thej 
i i 
15 j strongest that you have, I believe, is that's what his 
16 I representation was. He wanted to get out of the check cashing j 
17 I business and that wasn't true. Let's suppose that wasn't true. \ 
18 | MR. ROSEN: All right. 
19 | THE COURT: But let's suppose that there was another j 
20 ] motive. He just didn't want to continue to do business with I 
! j 
21 | your client and he was telling him that. Now does that rise to I 
22 | the level in this case of improper misrepresentation to the ] 
23 i degree that I should step in and set aside the agreement that | 
j ; 
24 I was reached? I 
25 j MR. ROSEN: Well, your Honor, first of all, the ; 
I 3 1 I 
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$375,000 that my client received we'll have to deal with at j 
some point because obviously you can't have your cake and you j 
can't eat it as well. So, what we're saying is the following: 
let's assume that the Court's hypothetical is such that it's j' 
true that the gentlemen actually, Mr. Haugen said to my client, j 
you know something, Mr. Pipkin, you know, I don't want to be, ij 
don't want to be your partner anymore. I just don't get along ; 
with you. We're not getting along. I don't want to be your | 
partner. 
THE COURT: No, but that isn't what happened. j 
MR. ROSEN: Right. No, nof but let's assume that j 
that's what happened. 
i 
THE COURT: Well, there's no evidence that that I 
happened. I 
MR. ROSEN: No, no, but let's try to see why that is I 
different than what actually happened and why we are - j 
THE COURT: Well, I can understand the argument then | 
that may have caused your client to look at it a little 
different. j 
i 
MR. ROSEN: And, of course, he wouldn't have sold. ! 
i 
He wouldn't have sold. He wouldn't have sold to Kip Cashmore. j 
At least that what he says. He said he wouldn't have sold. 
And if he would have sold he wouldn't have sold to Kip Cashmore1 
or he would have looked at it to such an extent that he would 
have seen what the lost value is in his price. That -
THE COURT: How do you get around the fact that had I 
i 
i 
things gone soft with Mr. Haugen and Mr. Cashmore, he had an i 
agreement also that would have left him out in the cold? How 
do you get around that? 
MR. ROSEN: Excuse me, your Honor. I don't \ 
i 
understand that. j 
i 
THE COURT: How do you get around the basic fact that j 
I 
they entered into exactly the same agreement and if after the 
transaction took place Mr. Cashmore said, sorry, Mr. Haugen, 
you're, I really don't want to do business with you. You know, j 
this man, Mr. Haugen, who you claim was misleading your client, ; 
entered into exactly the same agreement that your client j 
entered into. , 
MR. ROSEN: Well, that's the thing. On paper it's j 
the same agreement. But, your Honor, if you read the 
declarations that they submitted, it's very interesting because; 
we claim and I think in the declaration of Kerry Pipkin - j 
THE COURT: Well, but wouldn't Mr. Haugen have been j 
bound by that agreement? : 
MR. ROSEN: This is a sham. j 
THE COURT: And Mr. Cashmore? In other words, j 
everybody was bound by these agreements. ' 
MR. ROSEN: Agreements, agreements are only as good j 
as the people who write them, your Honor. I know my client got j 
$375,000 but if you look even at their own declarations, your 
33 I 
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Honor, look at the declaration of Randy Haugen and this is j 
attached to the opposition. It says here around October A97 I I 
decided I no longer wanted to be in the check cashing business j 
and so on and so forth and it says Cashmore offered $750,000 toj 
purchase Quick Cash, to purchase Quick Cash. I sold my i 
interest in Quick Cash (inaudible) for $375 by individual j 
agreement. That agreement has been fully performed by Cashmore I 
i I 
and myself. No where does he say that my client actually, that ! 
he actually received the money. Then in exhibit number - j 
l 
THE COURT: Well, let's suppose that he didn't just J 
for argument sake and that he transferred that asset into some j 
other business negotiation - or business dealing with Cashmore. j 
MR. ROSEN: Then the agreement would be null and void; 
i 
t 
i 
for lack of consideration. 
THE COURT: Not if he still had that value set forth j 
in that agreement that he could claim on. Okay. Anything j 
further? j 
j 
MR. ROSEN: Okay. Here we go. This is the I 
j 
declaration of, this is the declaration of Kip Cashmore. j 
That's also attached to the Motion for Summary Judgment. In I 
paragraph 3 now it says: j 
I executed an individual agreement in j 
December ^97 with Pipkin providing for j 
Pipkin to sell his $50,000 ownership in ! 
Quickcash to me in consideration for | 
34 ! 
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2 
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4 
$375,000. 
Both parties have fully performed that agreement. And then he 
says: 
Pipkin has been fully paid under that 
5 ! agreement and has never tendered back nor j 
6 | offered to tender back any part of the | 
i i 
7 ! consideration he received for his interest ; 
8 ! in Quickcash. j 
9 | And then he says as to the agreement he reached with Haugen: j 
10 I I executed an individual agreement in 
11 | December 1997 with Haugen providing for ; 
12 | Haugen to sell his 50 percent ownership in j 
13 ; Quickcash to me in consideration for j 
14 ! $375,000. Haugen and I fully performed j 
15 ! under that agreement. j 
I I 
16 j No mention whatsoever that he paid him. The fact that he i 
17 \ doesn't mention it specifically in light of the fact that he j 
18 | mentions the fact that he paid Kerry Pipkin is a problem to me. J 
19 | THE COURT: Well, let's suppose he came up with j 
20 j $375,000 more and invested it in RKT. What's wrong with that? ! 
21 ! MR. ROSEN: None of this was disclosed to my client, j 
22 | None of this was disclosed. None of these business dealings 
23 ; amongst them. None of their future plan. You see the future \ 
i ' 
j • 
24 \ plans that they had apparently started a day or two right after j 
• i 
25 i my client sold out. 
I ! 
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THE COURT: Maybe, maybe, but what's wrong with that? 
MR. ROSEN: It doesn't address the (inaudible), your 
Honor, and there is too many material issues of material fact. 
THE COURT: Well, I've try to see if there is any 
material fact, supported by any substantial evidence and I 
6 | can't find any. I'm going to grant the motion for summary ! 
7 | judgment. I grant it on the basis of the argument that has j 
i i 
8 | been presented by the defendants but I believe that the Court j 
9 - could even go beyond that, although it's not totally before the j 
10 | Court, and state that even allowing maximum conjecture and j 
11 j speculation as to what the evidence is and even accepting all | 
12 i of your arguments, Mr. Rosen, I don't believe it would meet the I 
13 j standards to resist a summary judgment motion even speculating 
14 j as you've asked the Court to do. So, I frankly just can't see ; 
15 | how this case could proceed even speculating on what the j 
16 | evidence might be. But that's, I'm being asked to rule on j 
17 ; that. I'm being asked to rule based upon the motion that has j 
18 | been presented and I certainly grant the motion for summary j 
! i 
19 | judgment in favor of the defendants in this case. j 
i i 
20 ! Now, as to the issue of allowing you even at this j 
21 | stage to amend your complaint, Mr. Karrenberg, I've reviewed I 
22 | the agreement that existed between Mr. Pipkin and your client j 
23 | and I, frankly, can't see any kind of a legal basis where you \ 
24 j would be able to pursue legal fee, attorney's fees and costs ! 
25 I against Mr. Pipkin in that agreement because, frankly, that ; 
I 3 6 i 
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agreement relates to seller breaches. It very specifically j 
l 
lists all of the seller's breaches of the agreement that would j 
give him a basis for pursuing that in claims but I don't see | 
i 
anything there. So, your motion would be denied even if we | 
were to pursue that. j 
I 
As to the Rule 26, I'm very liberal. It's liberal in! 
Utah and I still am allowing the attorneys to, you know, to get | 
extra time to respond to things. That's not an issue in this I 
case. I don't hold that against Mr. Pipkin in this matter at 
i 
i 
all. It's a hard rule, frankly. It's a good rule but it's 
kind of a hard rule for people to get use to. There's a lot of ! 
struggling going on with Rule 26. So, I'm trying to help all I 
attorneys that run into Rule 26 problems avoid being kick out ; 
I 
of court because of a Rule 26 violation. I usually make them ! 
violate two or three times before I rule against anybody on the | 
Rule 26. So, that's not an issue in this case. j 
I just might comment on the evidence that Mr. Rosen 
has attached to his affidavit. I discount the check that 
fortunately was made out by Mr. Haijgen and signed by Mr. 
Cashmore. I considered it based on the fact that Mr. Haugen's 
name was still on it. I just really don't find, however, that | 
that is any substantial evidence. The '98 W-2fs still having | 
Mr. Haugen's name on it, a former business owner, I don't think | 
i 
that is substantial evidence to show the fact that it's j 
supposed to be showing a court docket entry in California is a [ 
37 j 
motion to quash service against Mr. Haugen and it is very self j 
serving. It's based and denied and I would have probably ! 
denied it as well had I been the judge down there on trying to i 
terminate service against Mr. Haugen. I'd certainly want to \ 
have substantial evidence eventually presented in the case and j 
I'd give them a chance to do so and the claims were probably j 
enough to prevent a dismissal for not having a basis for \ 
serving. That's a very preliminary type of motion and they j 
shouldn't be granted easily. But even looking at what is said 
in that docket order, I don't find that that is substantial j 
evidence that support the plaintiff's claim in this matter. 
I just in reviewing the allegations of your j 
affidavit, Mr. Rosen, I just don't find that those are enough. 
They're just not supported by any substantial evidence in my j 
opinion. So, I have carefully considered it and I've carefully; 
considered your affidavit because I don't think that it is \ 
proper for a court to quickly grant a summary judgment but as I : 
look at the law that would be applicable to the issues that are j 
raised in your pleadings and the f^cts that have been presented j 
some eight months now after this case has been filed, there is j 
just no substantial evidence to support your claims, therefore 
I'm granting the motion. All right that will be all. ! 
MR. KARRENBERG: Judge, I'll prepare and Order and the j 
Findings and submit them by Mr. Rosen and to the Court. j 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) (C) : 
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